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During the past decade, the Mexican government launched an ambitious expansion 
of public health insurance through the Seguro Popular programme (SP). As a result, 
health care access was legislated as citizens’ entitlement, a generous benefit package 
was offered, and public health expenditure was significantly increased. In 2011, the 
programme had reached 52 million affiliates. However, there is limited evidence on 
its effects on a number of outcomes and their distribution.  
 This thesis analyses three aspects that are key to evaluate health system 
performance. Specifically, using quasi-experimental methods and recent 
distributional measures of pure health, it examines the effect of universal insurance 
coverage on infant mortality, non-medical consumption, and health inequalities.  
 Drawing on municipality-level data, the first article finds that the programme 
led to a 3.9 per cent decrease in infant and neonatal mortality. These reductions were 
concentrated in more populated, urban, and less marginalised municipalities, 
however, probably because this type of municipalities have been traditionally better 
equipped and are thus better prepared to offer all the interventions from the benefit 
package.  
 Based on data from the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), the second 
article shows that unexpected health events such as accidents and deterioration in 
physical capacity are associated with large declines in non-medical consumption. 
Social security seems to provide protection against both types of shocks, but 
endogeneity-corrected estimates show that the SP only protects consumption against 
accidents. This suggests that income losses associated with disability shocks for 
which the programme does not offer protection, are likely larger than medical care 
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expenditures, and poses the question of whether other social security benefits, such 
as disability insurance, should also be extended. 
 Finally, the third article analyses the distribution of health in the context of 
the SP implementation. Unlike traditional studies, pure health inequality and 
mobility are analysed using a recently developed class of indices appropriate for 
categorical data. If a downward-looking definition of status is employed, the 
distribution of health appears stable, but if an upward-looking definition is adopted, a 
significant increase in inequality is observed. Evidence of strong persistence in 
health was also found. This lack of improvement in the health distribution suggests 
that factors other than health insurance coverage, such as institutional performance, 
are more important determinants of health inequalities. 
 Overall, this thesis finds important health effects from extending health 
insurance coverage but limited effects on economic welfare and the distribution of 
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By the end of the last century, most low- and middle-income countries (LMIC) still 
failed to provide access to health services and financial protection to important 
shares of the population. In recent years, however, a number of those countries 
managed to implement important reforms to their health systems to address this 
problem (World Health Organization 2010). In particular, the Mexican government 
started in 2002 an expansion of health services through a publicly funded, voluntary 
health insurance known as Seguro Popular (SP),2 for over 50 million individuals 
who had been previously excluded from social insurance. By 2012, it was announced 
that universal coverage had been achieved in the country (Knaul et al. 2012).  
The expansion of health insurance is expected to improve health mainly 
through increased health care utilisation (Gruber 2003). Empirical evidence, 
however, is not conclusive. Studies that have analysed the effects of insurance on 
health have found limited or no effects (Giedion and Díaz 2010, Levy and Meltzer 
2008, Finkelstein et al. 2012). The expansion of health insurance is also expected to 
protect consumption against health shocks (Chetty and Looney 2006), but this has 
been scarcely analysed. Likewise, although the effects of insurance expansions on 
individuals’ perception of their health are clearer (Finkelstein et al. 2012, Sommers 
et al. 2017), little is known about the distribution of these effects. This thesis 
                                                 
2 Seguro Popular is often translated as “Popular Insurance” but “Insurance for the People” would be 
more adequate. Throughout this thesis I use the name in Spanish or the correspondent acronym, SP.  
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attempts to contribute filling these gaps. Specifically, the thesis is made of three 
papers that draw on the unique Mexican experience to analyse: 1) the effect of the 
expansion of health insurance on infant mortality, 2) the welfare consequences of 
health shocks and the role of public health insurance, and 3) whether insurance 
coverage is associated with improvements in the distribution of health.  
Mexico provides a suitable setting to conduct this research for at least three 
reasons. First, Mexico was one of the first LMIC to increase health care coverage 
through the expansion of public health insurance. Due to financial and infrastructural 
constraints at the time of the policy intervention, the health insurance expansion was 
gradual, which resulted in a quasi-natural experiment that allows the use of quasi-
experimental methods to analyse its effects. Second, public health insurance was 
limited before the introduction of the SP, so as expected, marked inequalities 
prevailed. Third, Mexico is one of the few LMIC with good quality vital statistics at 
the national and subnational levels and a longitudinal survey that covers the period 
before and after the implementation of the SP. 
This thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 describes the setting for all the 
analyses, i.e., explains the configuration of the Mexican health system and the 
implementation of the SP to extend insurance coverage to all the population. Chapter 
3 describes the two types of data employed in the analyses, namely aggregated data 
at the municipality level (vital statistics, administrative records, and Census data), 
and individual level data (survey data). Chapter 4 studies the effects of health 
insurance on infant and neonatal mortality. Chapter 5 examines the effects of 
unexpected health events on the consumption of Mexican households and the role of 
public insurance to protect against consumption fluctuations. Chapter 6 analyses the 
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pattern in health inequality and mobility during the health insurance expansion. 







2. Public Health Insurance in Mexico 
 
As in many other LMIC, the Mexican health system is characterised by its 
fragmentation. Social security institutions created in the 1940s and 1950s, on the one 
hand, cover formal workers and their families, which account for approximately half 
of the population. The other half, on the other hand, have access to public facilities 
run by the Ministry of Health for a fee until the most recent reform, which created 
the Seguro Popular programme and wiped out the health care fee for treatments 
covered in the health care package. The next two sections explain the main 
characteristics of both types of public health insurance to better understand the 
implications of the SP.  
 A wide range of private providers also offer health services in Mexico, but 
since only a small share of the population has private insurance —3 per cent 
according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2005; 
OECD)— these are mainly funded through out-of-pocket expenditure.  
 
2.1 Antecedents of the Seguro Popular Programme: The Divide between Formal 
and Informal Workers 
The main social security providers in Mexico have been the Mexican Institute of 
Social Security (Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social, IMSS) and the Mexican 
State’s Employees’ Social Security (Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios Sociales para 
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los Trabajadores del Estado, ISSSTE). The IMSS was created in 1943 to provide 
health services and other social security benefits to private sector workers and their 
families, while the ISSSTE was created in 1959 to provide similar benefits to public 
sector workers. The Ministry of National Defence (Secretaría de la Defensa 
Nacional, SEDENA), the Ministry of Navy (Secretaría de Marina, SEMAR), the 
state-owned oil company (Petróleos Mexicanos, PEMEX), and the 31 states that 
comprise the Mexican federation also provide social security benefits to their 
employees and their families, but cover a small share of the population.3 According 
to administrative records, nearly 60 per cent of the population had access to social 
security at the beginning of the last decade (Table 2.1), which implies that the 
remaining 40 per cent were uninsured. Other sources such as the 2000 Census 
indicate that the uninsured could have accounted for at least 57 per cent of the 
population (Table 2.2).4 
   
  
                                                 
3 There are 31 states in Mexico, plus a Federal District that will formally become the 32nd state 
(entidad federativa) in 2018 and will be named Ciudad de México, or Mexico City. 
4 Census data are publicly available on the website of the National Institute of Statistics and 
Geography (INEGI); see section 3.1 of Chapter 3 below. According to the 2000 Census, there were 
55.6 million uninsured individuals, 39.1 million insured, and 2.8 million had no insurance status 
information.  
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Table 2.1. Social security beneficiaries in Mexico, 2000-2015 
(million individuals) 
Year IMSS ISSSTE PEMEX SEDENA SEMAR States Total 
Beneficiaries as a 
percentage of the 
total population 
2000 45.05 10.07 0.65 0.49 0.19 1.31 57.75 57% 
2001 44.72 10.24 0.67 0.51 0.21 1.43 57.78 57% 
2002 45.35 10.31 0.68 0.54 0.21 1.37 58.46 57% 
2003 41.52 10.35 N/A N/A N/A N/A 51.87 50% 
2004 43.01 10.46 0.69 0.68 0.21 1.47 56.52 53% 
2005 44.53 10.61 0.71 N/A 0.2 1.44 57.49 54% 
2006 46.64 10.8 0.71 N/A 0.2 1.54 59.88 55% 
2007 48.65 10.98 0.71 N/A 0.2 1.42 61.97 56% 
2008 48.91 11.3 0.73 N/A 0.22 N/A 61.16 55% 
2009 49.13 11.59 0.74 0.87 0.23 0.95 63.51 56% 
2010 52.31 11.99 0.74 1.05 0.24 1.94 68.28 60% 
2011 54.91 12.21 0.75 0.81 0.26 1.95 70.89 61% 
2012 57.48 12.45 0.76 0.83 0.28 1.68 73.47 63% 
2013 59.51 12.63 0.76 0.83 0.29 1.55 75.58 64% 
2014 59.49 12.8 N/A N/A N/A N/A 72.29 60% 
2015 61.87 12.97 N/A N/A N/A N/A 74.84 62% 
Notes: The acronyms correspond to the names in Spanish of each social security institution —IMSS 
for the Mexican Institute of Social Security; ISSSTE for the Mexican State’s Employees’ Social 
Security; SEDENA for the Ministry of National Defence; SEMAR for the Ministry of Navy; and 
PEMEX for the state-owned oil company. The states that comprise the Mexican federation also have 
specific social security institutions. N/A = not available. 
Source: Data on beneficiaries come from the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) 
but is based on information from administrative records of social security institutions; total population 
figures used to calculate the percentages are available on the website of the National Population 
Council (CONAPO). 




Table 2.2. The Mexican health system before the Seguro Popular programme 
  Social security beneficiaries Uninsured 
Population share in 
2000 
40 per cent or 39 million (formal 
sector workers and their families). 
57 per cent or 56 million 
(informal sector workers and their 
families). 
Provider of health 
services 
Government; facilities run by 
social security institutions, 
centralised administration. 
Government; facilities run by the 
Ministry of Health, decentralised 
administration. 
Funding Payroll taxes, employer 
contributions and general 
revenues. 
General revenues and progressive 
fees. 
Per capita public 
expenditure in 2000 
MX$3,197.5 MX$1,482.4 
Benefit package Includes a wide range of services 
and prescription drugs, as well as 
disability benefits, housing loans 
and severance payments, among 
other benefits. 
Not available.  
Other health services such as 
vaccination campaigns also 
provided to the general 
population. 
Notes: MX$ = Mexican Pesos. Insurance affiliation is measured for population five years and older; 
the insurance status of 3 per cent of this population is not specified.  
Source: Data on population coverage come from the 2000 Census available on the website of the 
National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI); per capita public health expenditure is from 
the Federal and State Health Accounts System (SICUENTAS) available on the website of the 
Ministry of Health.  
 
 Social security services are funded through payroll taxes, employer 
contributions, and general revenues; no co-payments apply. The institutions that 
provide these services have their own facilities and budgets, and are centrally 
administered by the federal government. Apart from health care access, social 
security benefits include temporary disability subsidies (for sickness, risks at work, 
and maternity), disability pensions for workers who suffer permanent disabilities, 
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old-age pensions, and housing credits, among others.5 Hence, social security 
provides protection from both effects of health shocks, income losses, and 
catastrophic health expenditures (see Chapter 5).  
 The uninsured population have access to health services provided by the 
Ministry of Health at a fee. The fees are based on self-reported income, and are well 
below the real cost. By the end of the 1980s the decentralization of these services 
started in some states, but it was not until the mid-1990s that the Ministry of Health 
resumed the decentralization process (González-Pier et al. 2006).  
 Although the government is the provider of health services through both 
social security and Ministry of Health facilities, the latter were severely underfunded. 
While public per capita expenditure was 3,197.5 pesos in 2000 for social security 
beneficiaries, the corresponding figure for the uninsured was less than half (1,482.4 
pesos; Table 2.2).6 This resulted in marked disparities in access to health care and 
health status, underinvestment in infrastructure, and high out-of-pocket expenditures 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2005, Knaul et al. 
2012). Between 2 and 4 million households suffered catastrophic and impoverishing 
health care spending in 2000; 86 per cent of these households were uninsured (Knaul 
et al. 2006). In fact, Mexico was ranked 144th out of 191 countries in fairness of 
health care by the World Health Organization (2000; WHO) at the beginning of this 
century.  
 
                                                 
5 To qualify for these benefits, the affiliates must fulfil certain requisites. For example, to qualify for a 
disability pension, the worker must have contributed for 150 to 250 weeks before the event that causes 
the permanent disability.  
6 Figures in constant pesos. Health expenditure data are publicly available on the Federal and State 
Health Accounts System (Sistema de Cuentas en Salud a Nivel Federal y Estatal, SICUENTAS) 
administered by the Ministry of Health. 
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2.2 The Seguro Popular Programme: Health Access for All as Citizens’ 
Entitlement 
The implementation of the Seguro Popular programme implied a fundamental 
change in the notion of health care access. Instead of a model based in labour status, 
the objective was to transition to a model of social protection to guarantee access to 
health care as a universal right. Formally, the reform that came into force in 2004 
created the System of Social Protection in Health (Sistema de Protección Social en 
Salud, SPSS), with the SP as the insurance component. Affiliation to the SP is 
voluntary, and the only eligibility criterion is not being a beneficiary of social 
security (Table 2.3). Once affiliated, beneficiaries receive a Chart of Rights and 
Duties (Carta de Derechos y Obligaciones) that clearly indicates the services to 
which they are entitled and the facilities where they can have access to those 
services.  
 According to the rules of the SP, the funding comes from the federal 
government, which contributes with an annual transfer equivalent to 3.92 per cent of 
the minimum wage per beneficiary known as cuota social plus an additional 
contribution of 1.5 times the cuota social; the state government, which contributes 
with 0.5 times the cuota social; and progressive contributions from beneficiaries  
—the poorest being exempt (see General Health Law or Ley General de Salud, LGS 
and its regulations).7 In practice, however, the SP has virtually operated as non-
                                                 
7 Before 2010 the financing unit was the family instead of the individual, and the cuota social was 15 
per cent of the minimum wage per enrolled family. This created some disparities in the per capita 
allocation of resources across states, however, as the average family size is smaller in wealthier than 
in poorer states (Knaul et al. 2012). In addition, the SP rules originally indicated that beneficiaries in 
the first two income deciles would be exempt from the beneficiary contributions, but in 2010 this was 
extended to those in the first four income deciles. The SP rules also stipulate a few other cases in 
which beneficiary contributions are waived, e.g., for residents in localities with less than 250 
inhabitants (article 127 of the Reglamento de la Ley General de Salud en materia de Protección Social 
en Salud). In 2010, the cuota social was equivalent to 812.07 pesos.    
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contributory health insurance since contributions from beneficiaries are negligible. 
According to the National Commission for Social Protection in Health (Comisión 
Nacional de Protección Social en Salud, CNPSS) that administers the SP, the family 
contributions amount to less than 1 per cent the SP yearly budget between 2004-2014 
(Comisión Nacional de Protección Social en Salud 2015). Moreover, the average 
contribution per beneficiary has declined over the years, from 11.77 pesos in 2004 to 
0.52 pesos in 2014 (Presidencia de la República 2015).8  
 
Table 2.3. Characteristics of the Seguro Popular programme 
Eligibility Individuals not covered by social security. 
Provider  Government; facilities run by the Ministry of Health. 
Funding Federal contribution + state contributions + progressive 
contribution of beneficiaries (the poorest exempt). 
Benefit package  Medical services and drugs listed in a catalogue (CAUSES) that 
covers most of the causes of morbidity and mortality (this 
catalogue included 91 services in 2004 but was progressively 
expanded to reach 275 in 2010-2011, 284 in 2012, and 285 in 
2013-2014; the number of drugs increased from 142 in 2004 to 
609 in 2013). 
Notes: The description of the funding comes from the programme rules but in practice the 
contributions from beneficiaries are negligible.  
Source: General Health Law (LGS), Comisión Nacional de Protección Social en Salud (various 
years). 
 
                                                 
8 In 2002 and 2003, the pilot years of the SP (i.e. before the law that formally created the SP became 
in force), the average contribution per beneficiary was the highest registered so far (24.43 pesos and 
62.78 pesos, respectively). This is probably related to the low coverage of those years (1.1 million and 
2.2 million individuals, respectively), which could have facilitated the collection of these 
contributions. In 2004, however, the average contribution radically fell (to 11.77 pesos per 
beneficiary), and it continued falling as the coverage expanded (it only slightly recovered in 2012). 
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 The SP benefit package guarantees access to a wide range of preventive and 
treatment interventions, described in the Catálogo Universal de Servicios Esenciales 
de Salud (CAUSES, Universal Catalogue of Essential Health Services; Comisión 
Nacional de Protección Social en Salud 2012), that cover most of the causes of 
morbidity and mortality (González-Pier et al. 2006).9 Moreover, several services 
have been added over the years; between 2004 and 2014, the interventions offered 
increased from 91 to 285. The government estimates that these interventions cover 
100 per cent of the demand for primary care and 85 per cent of the demand for 
hospitalisation and surgery (Comisión Nacional de Protección Social en Salud 2015). 
Nearly 60 costly, specialised procedures such as intensive neonatal care and cervical 
cancer are also covered.10   
 The implementation of the SP also drastically changed the allocation of 
public resources. To ensure an adequate supply of health services, public health 
expenditure grew from 2.6 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2000 to 3.1 
per cent in 2011, which is equivalent to 2,325 and 4,001 constant pesos per capita, 
respectively (Table 2.4). This resulted in over a half percentage point increase in 
total health expenditure as percentage of GDP in the same period (from 5.6 per cent 
to 6.2 per cent). The gap in public per capita expenditure between those with and 
without social security beneficiaries also narrowed (Figure 2.1). Additionally, 15 
                                                 
9 The catalogue included 91 services in 2004 but was expanded to 155 in 2005, 249 in 2006, 255 in 
2007, 266 in 2008-2009, 275 in 2010-2011, 284 in 2012, and 285 in 2013-2014.  
10 The LGS indicates that 8 per cent of the SP funds have to be allocated to the Fund for Protection 
against Catastrophic Health Expenditures (Fondo de Protección contra Gastos Catastróficos, FPGC) 
to finance the costliest interventions included in the SP benefit package. Up to 2010, the FPGC funded 
49 interventions such as cervical cancer, HIV/AIDS, intensive neonatal care (premature births, sepsis, 
respiratory distress syndrome), other cancers, transplants, and Non-Hodgkin lymphoma among other; 
the number of interventions increased to 56 in 2011 and 59 in 2013. In 2013, 1,037.46 million pesos 
were used to attend nearly 22 thousand cases that required intensive neonatal care, which amounted to 
14 per cent of the FPGC budget. A similar proportion is observed for other years between 2007 and 
2012 (Comisión Nacional de Protección Social en Salud, various years). 
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high-specialty centres were built between 2001 and 2011 (Knaul et al. 2012), as well 
as 176 hospitals and 2,525 clinics; the ratio of physicians, hospitals and clinics per 
1,000 population increased 14 per cent, 15 per cent, and 9 per cent during the same 
period, respectively (Table 2.5).  
 


















2000 2.6 5.6 3,197.5 1,482.4 2,325.0 
2001 2.7 6.0 3,323.8 1,533.1 2,396.8 
2002 2.7 6.2 3,414.8 1,576.7 2,447.3 
2003 2.6 5.8 3,809.5 1,638.0 2,648.5 
2004 2.7 6.0 4,393.3 1,795.6 2,983.4 
2005 2.6 5.9 4,177.2 2,085.5 3,025.6 
2006 2.6 5.7 4,203.6 2,276.4 3,143.6 
2007 2.6 5.8 4,391.5 2,513.5 3,359.4 
2008 2.7 5.8 4,263.1 2,867.7 3,500.4 
2009 3.1 6.4 4,474.9 3,053.5 3,694.4 
2010 3.1 6.3 4,729.5 3,172.2 3,880.0 
2011 3.1 6.2 4,899.2 3,251.6 4,000.6 
Notes: Public per capita health expenditure is in constant Mexican pesos of 2011.   
Source: Federal and State Health Accounts System (SICUENTAS) available on the website of the 




Figure 2.1. Health insurance coverage and public health expenditure in Mexico, 
2000-2010 
 
Notes: Insurance affiliation refers to population five years and older; the percentages do not add up to 
100 for each year since some insurance information is missing. Public per capita health expenditure is 
in constant Mexican pesos of 2011.  
Source: Data on population coverage come from the 2000 and 2010 censuses and the 2005 Conteo 
available on the website of the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI); per capita 
public health expenditure is from the Federal and State Health Accounts System (SICUENTAS) 
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Table 2.5. Health infrastructure and personnel in Mexico, 2001-2011 
  
Physicians Hospitals Clinics 
n rate  n rate  n rate  
2001 67,597 0.6619 575 0.0056 10,900 0.1067 
2002 70,345 0.6802 586 0.0057 11,142 0.1077 
2003 53,447 0.5104 590 0.0056 11,266 0.1076 
2004 58,037 0.5478 615 0.0058 11,441 0.1080 
2005 60,658 0.5661 636 0.0059 11,607 0.1083 
2006 64,514 0.5951 659 0.0061 11,761 0.1085 
2007 69,194 0.6303 668 0.0061 11,866 0.1081 
2008 72,849 0.6545 693 0.0062 12,447 0.1118 
2009 78,264 0.6935 716 0.0063 12,918 0.1145 
2010 80,207 0.7020 736 0.0064 13,272 0.1162 
2011 87,058 0.7526 751 0.0065 13,425 0.1161 
Notes: n = number, rate = rate per 1,000 population.   
Source: Infrastructure and personnel data come from the Equipment, Human Resources and 
Infrastructure Information System (SINERHIAS) available on the website of the Ministry of Health; 
total population figures used to calculate the rates are available on the website of the National 
Population Council (CONAPO). 
 
 While affiliation to the SP is voluntary for all uninsured individuals, 
PROSPERA beneficiaries are particularly encouraged to affiliate.11 PROSPERA is a 
conditional cash transfer programme that started in 1997 and currently benefits 6 
million families (see more information in section 4.2.2 of Chapter 4). In 2004, 
659,054 families affiliated to the SP were also PROSPERA beneficiaries, i.e., 13 per 
cent of the families covered by PROSPERA. But this number increased to 2.8 
million families in 2008 and nearly 3.6 million in 2014, which is more than half the 
total number of PROSPERA beneficiaries in each year (Comisión Nacional de 
Protección Social en Salud, various years). PROSPERA families that are 
                                                 
11 Eligibility criteria and affiliation procedures to the SP are the same for PROSPERA beneficiaries as 
for the rest of the population, but according to the CNPSS, strategies to encourage affiliation have 
been particularly directed to PROSPERA beneficiaries and other vulnerable groups (Comisión 
Nacional de Protección Social en Salud, various years).  
 29 
incorporated to the SP move from the PROSPERA benefit package of 13 
interventions (known as Paquete Básico de Salud or Basic Health Package) to the SP 
benefit package of nearly 300 interventions.12 It is important to consider, however, 
that the facilities that attend the poorest beneficiaries of PROSPERA cannot be 
generally certified as able to provide the SP interventions due to the lack of adequate 
infrastructure (Instituto Nacional de Salud Pública 2005). While PROSPERA 
beneficiaries who affiliate to the SP may be transferred to other health units that have 
the capacity to offer more specialised procedures if they require attention in the 
second or third level, urgency services or complex procedures, this certainly limits 
the capacity of the SP programme to affiliate PROSPERA beneficiaries.    
 The implementation of the SP started as a pilot in 2002 and was gradually 
expanded due to financial reasons. The pilot rules indicated that the programme 
would start operating in 26 municipalities of five states;13 these regions were selected 
based on the following characteristics: high social security coverage, adequate 
capacity to supply the services, large urban or semi urban concentrations, and the 
existence of beneficiaries of social programmes from the federal government 
(Secretaría de Salud 2002). According to administrative records, however, over 200 
municipalities in 20 states had at least ten beneficiaries in 2002; Colima and Sinaloa 
                                                 
12 From 2013, the health units that provide services for PROSPERA beneficiaries are progressively 
expanding the Basic Health Package to provide 27 interventions from the CAUSES. Since these new 
interventions are mainly preventive, can be generally provided in the same first-level health units.  
13 States are divided into municipalities, which are the smallest autonomous political entities; there are 
currently 2,457 municipalities. The five states considered in the pilot rules were: Colima 
(municipalities of Colima and Villa de Álvarez), Jalisco (municipalities of Acatic, Atotonilco, 
Ayotlán, Cabo Corrientes, Arandas, Encarnación de Díaz, Jalostotitlán, Jesus María, Puerto Vallarta, 
San Julián, San Miguel el Alto, San Sebastián del Oeste, Tepatitlán de Morelos, Tomatlán, Valle de 
Guadalupe and Cañadas de Obregón), Aguascalientes (municipality of Aguascalientes), Tabasco 
(municipalities of Comalcalco and Cunduacán) and Campeche (municipalities of Calkiní, 
Hecelchakán, Tenabo, Campeche and Holpechén). The pilot rules also indicated that the affiliation of 
individuals in the first (poorest) six deciles of the income distribution, with no access to social 
security, had to be prioritised. 
 30 
in the west coast of Mexico had the highest coverage in that year (Table 2.6). By 
2003, the programme had reached 417 municipalities in 25 states and the number of 
beneficiaries had doubled (from 1.1 to 2.2 million). 
 
Table 2.6. Coverage of the Seguro Popular programme by state in the pilot 
years, Mexico 2002-2003 
State Municipalities with at 







2002 2003 2002 2003 2002 2003 2002 2003 
Aguascalientes 1 1 33,426 79,674 9% 9% 3.4% 7.8% 
Baja California    5 5 70,612 129,622 100% 100% 2.7% 4.8% 
Baja California Sur         0 4 0  16,108  0% 80%  0% 3.4% 
Campeche 4 4 10,201 27,865 80% 80% 3.2% 8.7% 
Coahuila 20 20 32,902 0 53% 53% 1.4% 0.0% 
Colima 10 10 127,838 265,501 100% 100% 23.1% 47.6% 
Chiapas 1 12 19,003 143,337 1% 11% 0.5% 3.5% 
Guanajuato 4 10 39,581 56,964 9% 22% 0.8% 1.2% 
Guerrero 4 5 24,607 22,025 6% 7% 0.9% 0.8% 
Hidalgo 8 26 16,763 58,990 10% 31% 0.7% 2.6% 
Jalisco 25 53 32,658 104,195 20% 43% 0.5% 1.6% 
Estado de México 6 12 29,365 28,211 5% 10% 0.2% 0.2% 
Michoacán 0  9  0 11,976 0%  8%  0% 0.3% 
Morelos 6 16 9,097 31,644 18% 48% 0.6% 2.0% 
Oaxaca 7 17 28,639 34,908 1% 3% 0.8% 1.0% 
Quintana Roo 4 4 34,456 31,333 50% 50% 3.5% 3.0% 
San Luis Potosí 17 40 82,755 188,119 29% 69% 3.5% 8.0% 
Sinaloa 18 18 217,036 337,624 100% 100% 8.5% 13.1% 
Sonora 23 31 95,214 47,246 33% 44% 4.2% 2.0% 
Tabasco 3 16 37,507 268,040 18% 94% 1.9% 13.7% 
Tamaulipas 24 42 87,483 179,682 56% 98% 3.1% 6.2% 
Tlaxcala  0 9 0 10,038 0%  15% 0%  1.0% 
Veracruz  0 14 0 45,154 0% 7% 0% 0.7% 
Yucatán  0 2 0 12,486 0%  2% 0% 0.7% 
Zacatecas 25 37 35,090 60,007 51% 76% 2.7% 4.6% 
TOTAL 215 417 1,064,233 2,190,749         
Notes: Figures estimated with panel municipalities (n=2399; see section 3.1 of Chapter 3). 
Source: Own estimates based on administrative records of the Seguro Popular programme (CNPSS).  
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 Once the modifications to the LGS that formally created the Seguro Popular 
became in force in 2004, the states that wanted to implement the programme had to 
sign a coordination agreement with the federal government, and negotiate the target 
of families to be enrolled every year.14 While the LGS indicated that the affiliation of 
individuals in the first two income deciles, in more marginalised, rural and 
indigenous areas had to be prioritised, no specific guidelines for the expansion of the 
programme across municipalities was provided. Previous analysis of the 
determinants of the SP implementation have found that more populated 
municipalities implemented the programme earlier (Azuara and Marinescu 2013, 
Bosch and Campos 2014, Pfutze 2015; see section 5.2.1), but no other salient pre-
programme characteristics seem to be correlated with the implementation. In 
practice, after the passage of the reforms to the LGS, a steady increase in 
municipality coverage continued. Figure 2.2 summarises the expansion of the SP; the 
strong line shows that most municipalities had at least ten beneficiaries in 2007. At 
the same time, affiliation to the programme progressively expanded so that nearly 
half of the population was already affiliated by 2011 (dotted line). 
 
  
                                                 
14 The states proposed annual targets but the amount of federal resources available determined the 
final number. To guarantee an adequate flow of resources from the federation to the states, the annual 
number of new affiliates could not exceed 14.3 per cent of the potential beneficiaries. With this 
procedure, the SP was projected to reach universal coverage in 2010, although this was later adjusted 
to 2012. Overall, the negotiation process between the states and federal government since the SP 
inception has been far from easy; Lakin (2010) provides a detailed description of the policy process 
that led to the SP adoption and implementation.  
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Figure 2.2. Cumulative percentage of municipalities and individuals with 
Seguro Popular. Mexico, 2002-2012 
 
Notes: Figures estimated with panel municipalities (n=2399); a municipality is defined to be covered 
in year t if at least ten individuals were affiliated to the SP in that year (see section 3.1 of Chapter 3).  
Source: Own estimates based on administrative records of the Seguro Popular programme (CNPSS). 
 
To visualise more clearly the geographic variation in the SP implementation, 
Figure 2.3 shows the timing of introduction by municipality.15 The shading is 
assigned by start-up date, with darker shading denoting a later start-up date. 
Although some detail is missed due to the large number of municipalities in some 
central and southern states, it can be seen that there is great variation between and 
within states. Figure 2.4 further explores within-state variation. While the expansion 
of the programme took place in a short period in some states such as Aguascalientes 
                                                 
15 A similar map is included in section 3.2 of Chapter 3 to show the timing of introduction of the SP 
only for the municipalities included in the MxFLS sample (300 municipalities), which is the 
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(in central Mexico), where municipalities were covered within 3 years, the expansion 
in other states such as Oaxaca (in the southwest coast), was more gradual. In general, 
the roll-out period of the programme within states went from one year (e.g. Baja 
California) to nine (e.g. Oaxaca); in over half of the states (15 out of 32), all 
municipalities had been covered after four years.  
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Figure 2.3. Start date of the Seguro Popular programme by municipality, Mexico 2002-2011 
 
Notes: Red lines indicate state limits. A municipality is defined to be covered in year t if at least ten individuals were affiliated to the SP in that year (see section 3.1 of 
Chapter 3). The number of municipalities in each category is in parenthesis. 
Source: Own estimates based on administrative records of the Seguro Popular programme (CNPSS). 
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Figure 2.4. Cumulative percentage of municipalities with Seguro Popular in selected states, Mexico 2002-2011 
  
 
Notes: A municipality is defined to be covered in year t if at least ten individuals were affiliated to the SP in that year (see section 3.1 of Chapter 3). 






























































































































































































 During the second half of the last decade, the SP was further extended in two 
ways. First, the benefit package for children born on 1/December/2006 and after was 
expanded through the Seguro Médico Siglo XXI programme (SMSXXI, XXI Century 
Medical Insurance, before Seguro Médico para una Nueva Generación or Health 
Insurance for a New Generation). Children who are affiliated to this programme are 
automatically affiliated to the SP so the same SP affiliation rules apply, i.e., 
affiliation is voluntary (the mother has to apply even if she is already affiliated to the 
SP) and the children (or their parents) should not be beneficiaries of social security. 
The SMSXXI covers 131 (originally 110) additional interventions during the first 
five years of life. By the end of 2007, 786,171 children from all over the country had 
been affiliated to both the SP and the SMSXXI (Comisión Nacional de Protección 
Social en Salud 2008); by 2015, the joint coverage reached 5.6 million children 
(Comisión Nacional de Protección Social en Salud 2016). The second expansion of 
the SP was introduced in May 2008. Specifically, the Embarazo Saludable (Healthy 
Pregnancy) strategy was implemented to encourage the affiliation of pregnant 
women to the programme. This strategy consisted in waiving the beneficiary 
contributions for pregnant women in the first seven deciles of the income 
distribution. As mentioned earlier, however, most SP beneficiaries are in practice 
exempted from beneficiary contributions. Since the CAUSES already included 100% 
of the services offered to pregnant women in the first level of attention, 95% of the 
services offered in the second level of attention, and 100% of the services to attend 
complication before, during, and after the childbirth, no additional interventions were 
incorporated as part of this strategy (Comisión Nacional de Protección Social en 









This thesis draws upon municipality and individual level data. Aggregated indicators 
at the municipality level and the corresponding sources are described in the first 
section of this chapter. The second section describes the survey that provided 
information at the individual level.  
 
3.1 Municipality Level Data 
Municipality level data was employed to analyse the effects of the Seguro Popular 
programme on infant mortality. The information was obtained from different 
sources, namely vital statistics, administrative records from the Seguro Popular and 
PROSPERA programmes, and censuses. Most of these data can be easily 
downloaded from the websites of the corresponding institutions. Details are provided 
below.  
 In 1990 there were 2403 municipalities, but new municipalities have been 
created over the years, so the number increased to 2428 in 1995, 2443 in 2000, 2454 
in 2005, 2456 in 2010, and 2457 from 2011 (Appendix). To build a balanced panel of 
municipalities, the information of those that were split was merged. Municipalities 
that were segregated from more than one municipality were excluded (both the new 
municipality and the original municipalities). This resulted in a balanced panel of 
2,399 municipalities. 
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3.1.1 Infant Mortality  
Mortality indicators were constructed using 1990 to 2014 vital statistics. Vital 
statistics contain information on all certified deaths and births throughout the country 
and are publicly available on the website of the National Institute of Statistics and 
Geography (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, INEGI).16 Information on 
the municipality of residence of the infant who died or the mother of the newborn 
was used to aggregate the data at the municipality level. The infant mortality rate 
(IMR) was defined as the number of deaths of infants under age one year for every 
1,000 live births in a calendar year (Haupt et al. 2011). Natality data for 1990 and 
1991 do not distinguish live from stillbirths, hence the IMR was calculated from 
1992 onwards.17 Figure 3.1 shows a declining trend in IMR, which is especially stark 
after 1997.  
   
 
  
                                                 
16 Vital statistics are also publicly available on the National Health Information System (SINAIS) 
website, administered by the Ministry of Health. Since both institutions collaborate to build these 
registries, deaths and births data from the Ministry of Health and INEGI are identical, except for birth 
registries from 2008 onward. From 2008, the Ministry of Health only reports births occurred and 
registered on the same year, while INEGI continues reporting all the births registered each year, which 
includes extemporaneous registrations (births that occurred before the year of registry).  
17 Between 0.6 per cent and 1.4 per cent of the births registered and occurred between 1992 and 2014 
were stillbirths.  
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Figure 3.1. Infant and neonatal mortality rate in Mexico, 1992-2011 
 
Notes: Only municipalities of balanced panel considered (n=2,399). 
Source: Own estimates based on vital statistics (INEGI). 
 
 Since the main causes of death for children under one month differ from 
those for older children, neonatal mortality rates (NMR), defined as the number of 
deaths of children under one month per every 1,000 live births, were also analysed 
(Figure 3.1). According to the registries, the share of neonatal deaths has increased 
from nearly half the total infant deaths in 1990 to two thirds in 2011 (Table 3.1). 
Also, although the share of infant deaths due to infectious diseases (respiratory and 
intestinal) has decreased over the past two decades, 35 per cent post-neonatal deaths 
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Table 3.1. Infant and neonatal deaths by aggregated causes in Mexico, 1990-2011 
  Infant deaths   Neonatal deaths 
    
Due to infectious 
diseases 
Due to non-
infectious diseases     
 As a percentage of 
total infant deaths 




1990 64,095 31% 50%   30,946 48% 10% 84% 
1991 56,154 29% 55%   29,670 53% 10% 85% 
1992 52,257 25% 58%   29,103 56% 8% 87% 
1993 48,957 24% 59%   27,239 56% 7% 88% 
1994 48,738 23% 59%   27,314 56% 7% 89% 
1995 47,496 22% 61%   26,994 57% 6% 90% 
1996 44,949 21% 62%   25,973 58% 6% 90% 
1997 43,843 20% 64%   25,870 59% 5% 91% 
1998 41,635 16% 68%   25,192 61% 3% 92% 
1999 39,772 15% 67%   23,488 59% 1% 95% 
2000 38,377 14% 70%   23,364 61% 1% 95% 
2001 35,400 13% 71%   21,777 62% 1% 95% 
2002 35,913 13% 71%   22,161 62% 1% 95% 
2003 32,978 12% 72%   20,556 62% 1% 95% 
2004 32,318 12% 72%   19,936 62% 1% 95% 
2005 32,165 12% 72%   19,922 62% 1% 95% 
2006 30,335 11% 73%   18,986 63% 1% 96% 




(continues) Table 3.1. Infant and neonatal deaths by aggregated causes in Mexico, 1990-2011 
2008 28,911 9% 73%   18,321 63% 1% 94% 
2009 28,697 8% 74%   18,344 64% 1% 94% 
2010 28,442 8% 74%   17,893 63% 1% 94% 
2011 28,646 8% 75%   17,962 63% 1% 95% 
Notes: Only municipalities of balanced panel considered (n=2,399). Infectious diseases include respiratory and intestinal infections, while non-infectious diseases include 
conditions originating in the perinatal period, congenital anomalies, and nutritional aspects. The percentages across causes of death do not add up to 100 since some causes of 
death are not specified. 
Source: Own estimates based on vital statistics (INEGI).
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 Under-reporting of infant deaths is a common problem of vital statistics. 
While Mexico has been ranked in the top group of countries for high quality 
mortality data (Mathers et al. 2005, World Health Organization 2012), incomplete 
reporting of deaths is still an issue, especially in rural areas (Braine 2006, Lozano-
Ascencio 2008). There is also evidence of under-reporting in births data (González 
and Cárdenas 2005), although this is mostly related to extemporaneous registration. 
A comparison with official mortality rates based on pregnancy histories drawn from 
the National Survey of Demographic Dynamics (Encuesta Nacional de la Dinámica 
Demográfica, ENADID) and Census data, shows that the estimates derived from 
vital statistics are lower.18 For example, the infant mortality rate in 2000, just before 
the start of the Seguro Popular programme, is 20.9 deaths per 1,000 live births 
according to official figures and 15.4 according to vital statistics (Table 3.2).  
 Nevertheless, adjustments for under-reporting can bias the results too. In 
particular, these adjustments may smooth changes related to public interventions 
such as the Seguro Popular programme (Barham 2011). I use, hence, unadjusted data 
from vital statistics as the main data source, though I further discuss the potential 
effects of underreporting in section 4.5.2.19 Additionally, I have restricted the end of 
the study period to 2011, but I take advantage of the available data on birth registries 
for 2012-2014 to account for extemporaneous registration of births occurred during 
the period under analysis. According to Eternod (2012), 85 per cent of the births in 
                                                 
18 Official figures are publicly available on the website of the National Population Council 
(CONAPO). This information is also included in the Annual Government Reports of the president 
(Presidencia de la República 2013, 2015) and was used to monitor the progress made towards the 
Millennium Development Goals or MDGs (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía 2013). 
Consejo Nacional de Población (2012) describes the methods used to calculate these mortality 
estimates.   
19 Unfortunately, CONAPO only provides adjusted births data at the municipality level (adjusted 
mortality figures and/or adjusted mortality rates per municipality are not publicly available). 
Therefore, one of the robustness checks in section 4.5.2 consists of replacing births data from vital 
statistics with births data from official estimates to calculate municipality IMR and NMR. 
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Mexico are registered within the first year after occurrence, 92 per cent within the 
second, and over 95 per cent by the 32th month after the birth occurred; therefore, 
estimates that take into account registries for up to three years after the year of 
interest are fairly accurate. 
 
Table 3.2. Comparison of infant mortality rates from different sources.  
Mexico, 1992-2011 
  
Official estimates based on 
fertility surveys and censuses 
Own estimates based 
on vital statistics 
1992 29.8 20.2 
1993 28.5 19.1 
1994 27.3 19.1 
1995 26.1 18.9 
1996 24.9 18.6 
1997 23.8 18.4 
1998 22.8 17.3 
1999 21.8 16.5 
2000 20.9 15.4 
2001 20.0 14.7 
2002 19.2 15.1 
2003 18.4 14.1 
2004 17.6 14.0 
2005 16.9 14.1 
2006 16.3 13.3 
2007 15.7 13.1 
2008 15.1 12.5 
2009 14.6 12.5 
2010 14.1 12.6 
2011 13.6 12.7 
Notes: Estimates based on vital statistics are for the balanced panel of municipalities (n=2,399; see 
section 3.1 of Chapter 3). 
Source: Own estimates based on vital statistics (INEGI) and official figures from the National 




3.1.2 Seguro Popular Coverage 
Seguro Popular administrative records were used to create treatment indicators. This 
information is not publicly available but was requested to the CNPSS through the 
Federal Institute of Access to Public Information (Instituto Federal de Acceso a la 
Informacion, IFAI). The records indicate the number of individuals affiliated to the 
programme in each quarter from 2002 to 2014. Following Bosch and Campos 
(2014), I consider that the SP was operating in a given municipality if the yearly 
number of affiliates was greater than ten. This rule is used since some municipalities 
present a very low number of affiliates for some years, which makes difficult to 
determine whether the programme was actually active.20 According to this definition, 
all the municipalities had joined the SP by 2011. Alternative definitions were tested 
as robustness checks though (see section 4.5.2 of Chapter 4). In particular, a stricter 
definition that considers the SP was operating in a given municipality if the number 
of affiliates was greater than ten in at least two consecutive years, as well as a more 
relaxed definition that considers at least one affiliate, were used.  
 
3.1.3 PROSPERA Coverage 
The PROSPERA programme has been a key intervention to improve children’s 
health (see section 4.2.2 in Chapter 4). Therefore, a binary variable that indicates 
whether this programme was operating in a certain municipality-year is included in 
the models in Chapter 4. This information was created using PROSPERA 
                                                 
20 126 municipalities are in this situation. For example, according to the programme records the 
municipality of San Francisco de los Romo in the state of Aguascalientes had two affiliates in 2002, 
none (zero) in 2003 and 8,363 in 2004. Similarly, the municipality of Frontera in the state of Coahuila 
had six affiliates in 2002, none in 2003 and 1,293 in 2004.  
 45 
administrative records publicly available on the programme’s website. Information is 
reported per locality, so it had to be aggregated at the municipality level. Since 
PROSPERA public records start in 1998, one year after the programme was 
launched, the Household Socioeconomic Characteristics Survey (Encuesta de 
Características Socioeconómicas de los Hogares, ENCASEH), also publicly 
available on the programme’s website, was used to identify the municipalities where 
the programme started operating in the second half of 1997.  
 
3.1.4 Municipality Characteristics 
Additional data on municipality characteristics were taken from the INEGI 1990, 
2000 and 2010 Censuses, and the 1995 and 2005 Conteos.21 All the information at 
the municipality level is publicly available on INEGI’s website. The indicators 
considered were total population and the proportion of population in localities with 
less than 2,500 inhabitants (rural areas). The marginalisation index estimated by the 
National Population Council (Consejo Nacional de Población, CONAPO), that 
summarises other information from INEGI Censuses and Conteos, was also used. 
This index is publicly available on CONAPO’s website and is calculated using 
principal component analysis to reduce the dimensionality of nine socioeconomic 
indicators (Consejo Nacional de Población 1994, 2001, 2006, 2011).22 Linear 
interpolation was used to obtain values for the years for which data is not available.  
                                                 
21 The Conteos are shorter versions of the Census that are collected in between Census periods.  
22 The indicators used to calculate the index are: percentage of people aged 15 years or older who are 
illiterate, percentage of people aged 15 years or older with no primary school completed, percentage 
of people living in houses without piped water, percentage of people living in houses without drainage 
connected to the public system and without toilets, percentage of people living in houses with dirt 
floor, percentage of people living in houses with no electricity, percentage of houses with some level 
of overcrowding, percentage of population in localities with less than 5,000 inhabitants, and 
percentage of employed people with an income up to two minimum wages. 
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3.1.5 Health Supply 
Health supply data are also from administrative records publicly available on the 
website of the National Health Information System (Sistema Nacional de 
Información en Salud, SINAIS), specifically, on the Information Subsystem of 
Equipment, Human Resources and Infrastructure (Subsistema de Información de 
Equipamiento, Recursos Humanos e Infraestructura, SINERHIAS). These data cover 
the facilities run by the central and state governments, which provide health care to 
Seguro Popular beneficiaries. In particular, the number of doctors per 1,000 
population is used as an indicator of health supply. This information is only available 
from 2001.  
 
3.2 Individual Level Data 
Individual level data was employed to analyse whether the Seguro Popular 
programme was providing financial protection in the event of unexpected changes in 
health (Chapter 5). It was also used to analyse health inequality and mobility during 
the expansion of the programme (Chapter 6). These data come from the Mexican 
Family Life Survey (MxFLS), a longitudinal survey that covers most of the past 
decade. Three waves are available.23 The first wave, conducted in 2002, included 
more than 35,000 individuals from approximately 8,440 households, of which nearly 
90 per cent were followed-up in 2005-2006 and 2009-2010. 24   
                                                 
23 All the data bases, questionnaires, and supplementary information of the MxFLS are available in 
Spanish and English at http://www.ennvih-mxfls.org. Rubalcava and Teruel (2006, 2008, 2013), also 
available at the website of the MxFLS, describe the planning and design of the survey, as well as the 
content and structure of the data sets. 
24 7,572 (89.7 per cent) and 7,912 (93.8 per cent) of the original sampled households were re-
interviewed in the second and third rounds of the MxFLS, respectively. Additionally, the second and 
third rounds included 865 and 1,492 new participants each. 718 (83 per cent) of the new households 
added in the second round were re-interviewed in the third round. A few households were interviewed 
for the second and third round in 2007 and 2011-13, respectively. 
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 The MxFLS employed probabilistic, stratified, and multi-staged sampling 
design, and is representative at the national level, for rural and urban areas (less than 
2,500 inhabitants and 2,500 inhabitants or more, respectively), and for five regions: 
south-south east, centre-occident, centre, northeast, and northwest.25  
 The information collected in the MxFLS covers a wide variety of topics. 
Indicators of expenditure, land use, economic shocks, and violence and victimisation, 
among others, are provided at the household level. Other information such as 
education, labour supply, marital and fertility history, migration history, time 
allocation, health status, health care utilisation, and cognitive ability is collected at 
the individual level. Finally, qualitative and quantitative information at the 
community level is also available, including commercial infrastructure; education, 
health, and transportation services; and prices of goods and services.  
 The MxFLS interviews were implemented as follows. One or two adults 
reported all the information related to the socioeconomic status and demographic 
composition of the household. In parallel, each household member 12 years and 
older was interviewed to collect the information at the individual level. The 
information for children under 12 years was provided by an adult member of the 
household (their primary caregiver if possible). If any adult 15 years and older was 
not present at the moment of the interviews, proxy information was collected from 
                                                 
25 These regions correspond to those considered in the National Development Plan (Plan Nacional de 
Desarrollo) for 2000-2006 and are defined as follows: 1) the south-south east region covers the states 
of Campeche, Yucatán, Chiapas, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Guerrero, and Veracruz; 2) the 
centre-occident region covers the states of Jalisco, Michoacán, Colima, Aguascalientes, Nayarit, 
Zacatecas, San Luis Potosí, Guanajuato; 3) the centre region covers the states of Mexico City, 
Querétaro, Hidalgo, Tlaxcala, Puebla, Morelos, and Mexico; 4) the northeast region covers the states 
of Tamaulipas, Nuevo León, Coahuila, Chihuahua, and Durango; and 5) the northwest region covers 
the states of Baja California, Baja California Sur, Sonora, and Sinaloa.  
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other household members. This information is reported in a separate book so it can 
be easily identified.   
 Since Chapter 5 uses the SP coverage across MxFLS municipalities in some 
specifications (see section 5.4.1 of Chapter 5), Figure 3.2 shows in black the 
municipalities included in the MxFLS sample, while Figure 3.3 shows the timing of 
introduction of the SP in those municipalities. Similar to Figure 2.3 (see Chapter 2), 
a darker shading denotes a later start-up date. 
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Figure 3.2. Municipalities in the MxFLS sample 
 
Notes: Red lines indicate state limits. The number of municipalities in each category is in parenthesis.  
Source: Own estimates based on the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS). 
 50 
Figure 3.3. Start date of the Seguro Popular programme by MxFLS municipalities 
 
Notes: Red lines indicate state limits. The number of municipalities in each category is in parenthesis. A municipality is defined to be covered in year t if at least ten 
individuals were affiliated to the SP in that year (see section 3.1 of this Chapter). 






4. The Effect of Health Insurance on Infant Mortality 
 
4.1 Introduction 
By the beginning of the century, many health systems still showed signs of failure in 
providing timely access to health care and financial protection for all. As a 
consequence, millions of individuals perished of preventable diseases and were at 
risk of poverty. According to the World Health Report of 2000 (World Health 
Organization 2000), nearly 3 million children died every year from diseases that 
could be preventable with available vaccines, and millions of families in large, 
middle-income countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Bulgaria, Kyrgyztan, and Peru had 
to spend 50 per cent or more of their non-food expenditure on health. To address this 
situation, about 30 middle-income countries modified their health systems to reach 
universal health coverage (Giedion et al. 2013). While the reforms have varied in 
their design and implementation process, a common objective is to improve the 
health conditions of the population.  
The expansion of health insurance is hypothesized to exert an effect on health 
status mainly through increased utilisation of health care and increased non-medical 
consumption. The expansion of insurance coverage reduces the price of health care, 
which is expected to increase the utilisation of health services (Gruber 2003, Meer 
and Rosen 2004). Also, access to health insurance frees resources that households 
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may invest in consumption of non-medical items, some of which could be beneficial 
to health (Wagstaff and Pradhan 2005). Recent literature reviews, however, conclude 
there is little robust evidence on whether health insurance improves health (Giedion 
and Díaz 2010, Levy and Meltzer 2008). Although a large number of studies show 
positive correlations between insurance and health outcomes, they generally fail to 
overcome the problem of omitted joint determinants of both variables. Only a 
handful of studies have been able to use randomisation to address this problem, and 
have found limited or no effects (Brook et al. 1983, Newhouse 1993, Baicker et al. 
2013). So far, the only health measure for which more evident results have been 
observed is self-reported health status (Finkelstein et al. 2012). 
Other studies that have used quasi-experimental designs, such as those that 
analyse the expansion of the Medicaid in the US, a programme that provides public 
health insurance for the poor, show mixed results. While Currie and Gruber (1996) 
found that the extended eligibility of Medicaid reduced infant mortality in 5.1 per 
cent, Dubay et al. (2001) found only a small impact on birth weight. More recent 
analyses of subsequent insurance expansions in the US also have conflicting findings 
(see a summary in Sommers et al. 2017).  
Existing studies for middle-income countries are scarcer but also provide 
mixed evidence. Dow and Schmeer (2003), for example, found that health insurance 
had no effect on infant and child mortality in Costa Rica, but Camacho and Conover 
(2013) found that the expansion of a subsidised health insurance in Colombia 
reduced the incidence of low birth weight in 1.7 to 3.8 percentage points. The present 
chapter adds to this literature by specifically addressing the effect of a large 
expansion of public health insurance on infant mortality in a middle-income country. 
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As Chapter 2 explains, Mexico is one of the countries that started an 
ambitious expansion of health insurance in the first half of the 2000s. The Seguro 
Popular programme, a voluntary health insurance, was created to provide access to a 
generous benefit package to over half of the population. In 2007 most municipalities 
were covered by the SP and affiliation continued increasing so that nearly half of the 
population is currently affiliated to the SP. In this chapter, I exploit the phasing-in 
over time of the SP to analyse the effect of health insurance on an important 
indicator of children’s health, infant mortality. Infant mortality is defined as the 
number of deaths of infants under one year per 1,000 live births and is constructed 
using vital statistics.  
Whether the SP insurance expansion had an effect on infant mortality is an 
important and feasible question to address for at least two reasons. First, Mexican 
mortality data is regarded as high-quality data according to international 
classifications (Mathers et al. 2005, World Health Organization 2012). Second, it is 
well known that infant mortality is particularly sensitive to health care 
improvements. In fact, Nolte et al. (2006) classify infant mortality as one of the 
causes of death amenable to health care, which are defined as those that could have 
been averted if effective care had been provided. In particular, it is plausible to 
expect positive effects of the SP on infant mortality, as its benefit package includes 
several interventions to address the main causes such as prenatal care, attention 
during delivery, new-born care, vaccination, and treatment for the most common 
transmittable diseases, among many others (Comisión Nacional de Protección Social 
en Salud 2012).  
Notwithstanding the large amount of resources allocated to the SP and its 
rapid expansion, few studies have examined the effects of the programme on health 
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outcomes. Using randomised encouragement to uptake the programme, King G. et al. 
(2009) found no effects on self-assessed health, blood pressure, and glucose levels, 
although the assessment period was less than a year (Victora and Peters 2009). 
Bleich et al. (2007) and Sosa-Rubí et al. (2009), however, found that the SP 
enrolment improved blood control among hypertensive adults in the first case, and 
blood glucose levels among adults with diabetes in the second case. Similarly, Teruel 
et al. (2012) found evidence of positive effects on self-assessed health.  
More recently, Pfutze (2015) also analysed the effect of the SP on infant 
mortality using the micro sample from the 2010 Census. Since this sample only 
reports information on the last live birth per woman, infant mortality estimates were 
reconstructed and used in a weighted binary model, where yearly UNICEF (United 
Nations Children’s Fund) estimates of infant mortality are treated as population 
proportions. However, the data used in this chapter has several advantages. First, 
vital statistics provide a direct measure of infant mortality that minimises recall and 
other measurement errors that are more common in survey and self-reported data. 
Second, vital statistics provide information for all municipalities in Mexico. And 
third, vital statistics are available for the pre-programme period, which allows a 
better assessment of the strategy employed to identify causal effects.   
The chapter is organised as follows. First, I describe some important 
interventions that were implemented before the SP to improve children’s health. 
Then, I review the literature on the expected effects of health insurance on health 
outcomes, as well as the empirical evidence available. Afterwards, I describe the 
identification strategy and the empirical model employed. The last two sections 
present the results and the discussion of these results.  
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4.2 Public Interventions to Improve Child Survival before the SP 
Chapter 2, describing the health system in Mexico, explains that health care access in 
Mexico was segmented by labour status before the Seguro Popular. The federal 
government, however, provided some health services for the general population (see 
Table 2.2 in Chapter 2). These services included vaccination campaigns among 
others, that were largely intended to address the main causes of morbidity and 
mortality in children. Prior to the SP, a conditional cash transfer programme called 
PROSPERA is another intervention that merits special attention. This programme, 
introduced in 1997, covers the poorest population and has a health component that 
targets children and pregnant women. Both types of public intervention are important 
to understand the evolution of infant mortality before the implementation of the SP 
and are thus briefly described below (Figure 4.1).  
 
Figure 4.1. Main public health interventions to improve child survival in Mexico  
in recent decades 

























4.2.1 Oral Rehydration Salts and Vaccination Programmes during the Eighties and 
Nineties  
One of the most important interventions implemented in the first half of the1980s, 
when diarrhoea was the main cause of death among children, was the provision of 
rehydration salts through the Oral Rehydration Programme introduced in public 
hospitals (Sepúlveda et al. 2006a).26 Vaccination campaigns were also essential. 
Until the second half of the 1980s, vaccines were only given to children at public 
health facilities if requested by the mother. Between 1986 and 1991, however, 
different vaccination campaigns were implemented: vaccination days in 1986, 
vaccination weeks in 1988, and the Universal Vaccination Programme (UVP) in 
1991. By 1993, immunisation activities had been incorporated to the National Health 
Weeks, designed to reach all preschool children. The National Health Weeks take 
place twice a year and provided a complete package of vaccines to children at their 
homes, school and clinics, as well as other health services that include active 
promotion of oral rehydration salts, distribution of mega-doses of oral vitamin A, and 
mass anthelmintic therapy. Parallel to the expansion of immunisation coverage, 
vaccination registries were also improved. During the first half of the 1990s, 
computerised, personal records of vaccines received were created for every child. In 
this period, vaccination coverage exceeded 92 per cent. As a result of these efforts, 
the last notifications of polio, diphtheria and autochthonous measles, were in 1990, 
1991 and 1996, respectively.   
In addition to vaccination campaigns, the Clean Water Programme has been 
implemented since the beginning of the 1990s as a response to the outbreak of 
                                                 
26 This section is mainly based on Sepúlveda et al. (2006a). Additional references used are cited where 
it corresponds.  
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cholera in the country. The objective of this programme is to improve the quality of 
water for human consumption trough chlorination of supplies outside the households, 
and through boiling and chlorination inside the house. Other activities to strengthen 
basic sanitation such as adequate disposal of waste and the creation of sewage-
treatment plants are also included. In 2001, the operation rules of the programme 
were published for the first time. These rules formally regulated the decentralisation 
to the states, as well as the implementation of its components. According to 
Sepulveda et al. (2006b), the implementation of the Clean Water Programme was 
associated with a decrease in the incidence of cholera from over 16,000 cases in 
1995 to no cases in 2002; this was also associated to a decrease in child mortality 
from diarrhoeal diseases. 
 
4.2.2 The PROSPERA Programme 
The PROSPERA programme (originally named Progresa and later on 
Oportunidades) was one of the first conditional cash transfer programmes aimed at 
breaking the intergenerational transmission of poverty, and the first social 
programme in Mexico with a rigorous, external evaluation.27 From 1997 to 2001, 
PROSPERA focused on rural areas (localities with less than 2,500 habitants), but the 
results obtained in this period motivated its expansion to urban areas. PROSPERA 
currently benefits 6 million families and covers all the municipalities in the country 
(Table 4.1). 
 
                                                 
27 PROSPERA was originally targeted to the most marginalised rural localities that had access to 
primary and secondary schools, and to permanent health clinics to ensure that the beneficiaries could 
meet the conditionalities (see more about the targeting of PROSPERA in Skoufias et al. 1999). Due to 
budgetary and physical constraints (e.g. lack of infrastructure), however, the programme was 
gradually expanded to all the localities that fulfilled the targeting characteristics. This process allowed 
using randomisation at the initial stage, which resulted in rigorous evaluations of the programme. 
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Table 4.1. PROSPERA programme coverage 
  Municipalities Families 
1997 151 292,542 
1998 1,465 1,595,604 
1999 1,986 2,306,325 
2000 2,166 2,476,430 
2001 2,310 3,116,042 
2002 2,354 4,240,000 
2003 2,360 4,240,000 
2004 2,429 5,000,000 
2005 2,435 5,000,000 
2006 2,441 5,000,000 
2007 2,444 5,000,000 
2008 2,445 5,049,206 
2009 2,445 5,209,359 
2010 2,445 5,818,954 
2011 2,448 5,827,318 
2012 2,449 5,845,056 
2013 2,451 5,922,246 
2014 2,456 6,129,116 
Source: Own estimates based on administrative records of the PROSPERA programme.  
  
The maximum transfer PROSPERA beneficiaries can receive has evolved 
over the years, from 550 Mexican pesos per month in 1997 to 1,825 in 2015 for 
families with students in primary and secondary level or 2,945 for families with 
students in high school. This amount includes a transfer for food consumption, 
student scholarships, and (from 2007) a transfer for energy consumption. The 1997 
maximum transfer was equivalent to 75 per cent the minimum wage in that year, 
while the 2015 maximum transfers were equivalent to 89 per cent and 144 per cent 
the minimum wage in that year (or 117 and 188 US dollars, respectively). 
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Beneficiaries can also receive separate transfers for the elderly and to buy school 
materials.  
The conditions to provide PROSPERA cash transfers are regular school 
attendance and visits to health clinics. In particular, the health component targets 
children and pregnant and lactating women and was designed to address the main 
causes of disease. Children from birth to two years of age are required to have eleven 
check-ups per year, older children are required to have between one to three check-
ups per year, pregnant women are required to have a minimum of five check-ups 
during prenatal period and two check-ups after birth, and adults are required to have 
one annual check-up. Mothers also have to attend health educational talks, and food 
supplements are provided to pregnant and lactating women, children 4 to 24 months, 
and underweight children 2 to 5 years old.  
PROSPERA beneficiaries are entitled to a basic health package (Paquete 
Básico de Servicios de Salud or Basic Health Services Package) that includes 13 
interventions, mainly preventive: basic sanitation; family planning; prenatal and 
puerperal care; supervision of nutrition and children’s growth; vaccinations; 
prevention and treatment of diarrhoea and respiratory infections; prevention and 
control of tuberculosis, high blood pressure, and diabetes; anti-parasite treatment; 
accident prevention and first-aid for injuries; community training for health care self-
help; and (from 2001) prevention and control of cervical cancer. From 2014, 
PROSPERA beneficiaries will progressively receive other 27 interventions included 
in the benefit package of the SP, such as ten additional immunogens for children and 
adolescents under 14 years and five for adolescents and adults 14 years or older, as 
well as other preventive services. PROSPERA beneficiaries who join the SP, 
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however, are entitled to all the interventions in the SP benefit package (see section 
2.2 in Chapter 2). 
Several studies have shown PROSPERA improved the health condition of 
infants. A summary by Skoufias and McClafferty (2001) for the first years of 
operation of the programme, for example, shows PROSPERA children under 5 years 
had a 12 per cent lower incidence of illness than those without the programme. 
Rivera et al. (2004) also found the programme was associated with better gain in 
height (1.1 cm) and lower anaemia (10 percentage points) after two and one years of 
enrolment, respectively. The study of Barham (2011) is particularly relevant for this 
analysis, as she shows Progresa reduced the rural infant mortality rate in 17 per cent, 
although no effects were found on average neonatal mortality rate.  
 
4.3 Literature Review 
4.3.1 Expected Effects of Health Insurance on Health 
Increased health care utilisation is the main channel through which insurance 
coverage is expected to improve health outcomes. The provision of public health 
insurance is theoretically expected to exert both an income and a price effect (Currie 
and Thomas 1995, Cutler and Zeckhauser 2000). Indeed, the expansion of insurance 
coverage reduces the share of income that is spent when someone gets sick; this is 
the income effect. Insurance coverage also reduces the price of health care services, 
which is expected to increase the demand of health care; this is the price (or 
substitution) effect. The additional use of medical care was traditionally attributed to 
moral hazard, but Nyman (1999; 2001) has argued that this increase may be partly 
due to the fact that insurance provides access to treatments that would be otherwise 
unaffordable; this effect has been called the income transfer effect. In the case of SP 
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this effect could actually be considerable, as it covers some very costly interventions, 
such as child cancer treatment (see Chapter 2).  
Nonetheless, health insurance does not necessarily increase health care 
utilisation. According to Gruber (2003), this depends on whether those previously 
uninsured take up the benefits to which they are entitled; adequate supply of health 
care services (both in terms of quantity and quality) and transportation costs, among 
other factors, may also influence the extent to which health insurance coverage 
increases health care utilisation. There is a large body of evidence, however, that 
indicates that health insurance coverage is generally associated with increases in 
health care utilisation. In particular, the randomised trials on health insurance (the 
RAND experiment, and more recently the Oregon experiment) are key pieces in this 
literature due to the robustness of their design (Brook et al. 1983, Newhouse 1993, 
Finkelstein et al. 2012).  
Increased utilisation of health services, on the other hand, may not translate 
into improved health outcomes (e.g., Lagarde and Palmer 2011, De Allegri et al. 
2012, Dzakpasu et al. 2014), either because the quality and quantity of health care is 
insufficient, or because behavioural and environmental factors are relatively more 
relevant.28 An important branch of the literature on the determinants of health, 
however, has shown that health care can improve at least some conditions (so called 
“health-care-amenable conditions”). In fact, Nolte et al. (2006) have proposed a 
                                                 
28 Gruber (2003) explains that for many economists other behavioural and environmental factors that 
affect the health status of low-income persons are relatively more important than health care. For the 
case of infant mortality, studies that have analysed determinants of child mortality have also 
highlighted the importance of socioeconomic factors that work through an intermediate level of 
environmental and behavioural risk factors that lead to the proximal causes of death. Additional care 
could in some cases be harmful for the patient too when health insurance plans create incentives for 
physicians to increase their income (Cutler and Zeckhauser 2000), but that is not a concern for the 
case of non-contributory health insurance programmes such as the SP. 
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metric to evaluate health systems based on amenable deaths, i.e., deaths that would 
have not occurred if effective health care had been provided. In particular, most 
infant deaths are avoidable in the sense that they can be averted through preventive 
interventions such as measles vaccines and clean deliveries, or through treatment 
interventions such as antibiotics for pneumonia, sepsis or dysentery (Jones et al. 
2003, Bryce et al. 2013).  
Still, the available evidence on the effects of health insurance on health is not 
conclusive. Recent reviews have found that many studies fail to provide robust 
evidence since the correlation between insurance and good health may be driven by 
unobservable factors (selection problem); the studies with more robust designs only 
provide limited evidence (Levy and Meltzer 2008, Giedion and Díaz 2010). The 
RAND experiment in specific found no effects on health status and health habits; 
(Brook et al. 1983, Newhouse 1993). Likewise, the results of a more recent 
randomised trial, the Oregon experiment, found no effects of the expansion of 
Medicaid, a programme that provides public health insurance in the US, on measured 
health outcomes (Baicker et al. 2013). While the analysis after one year of 
implementation indicated that the treatment group had better self-reported health 
than the control group (Finkelstein et al. 2012), the assessment of measured physical 
health outcomes after two years of implementation (high cholesterol levels and 
glycated haemoglobin levels) found no differences between the treatment and control 
group.  
Yet, quasi-experimental studies provide some evidence of positive effects of 
insurance coverage on mortality. For example, Currie and Gruber (1996) found that 
the expansion of Medicaid eligibility during 1984-1992 reduced infant mortality in 
5.1 per cent, while Sommers et al. (2012) found that the expansion of the same 
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programme in three US states in the 2000s led to a 6 per cent decrease in all-cause 
adult mortality. While the different findings of randomised trials and observational 
studies could be related to evident differences in the study design, Sommers et al. 
(2017) argue that other factors such as the definition of the outcome variables as well 
as the timing and sample sizes of the studies could better explain these discrepancies.  
 
4.3.2 Empirical Evidence from Middle-income Countries 
The available evidence on the effect of health insurance and health outcomes in 
middle income countries is scarce and often faces the selection problem mentioned 
before. Dow and Schmeer (2003) is one of the first studies that analysed this issue 
with the expansion of the Costa Rican health insurance during the 1970s as setting. 
Using fixed effects models at the county level, as well as instrumental variables 
estimation, they found that after controlling for maternal, household and community 
characteristics, insurance had no effect on infant and child mortality. A more recent 
study, however, found that the insured have better self-perceived health (Cercone et 
al. 2010). Instead of vital statistics, Cercone et al. (2010) used nationally 
representative surveys but also relied in instrumental variables estimates to try to 
identify the effect of insurance.  
Two studies that analyse the expansion of the subsidised health insurance for 
the poor in Colombia also provide mixed evidence. While Camacho and Conover 
(2013) found that this insurance reduced the incidence of low birth weight in 1.7 to 
3.8 percentage points, Giedion et al. (2010) found no effect on complications after 
delivery and extremely low birthweight. The former used regression discontinuity 
design and administrative records for a single urban municipality, whereas the 
second used the Demographic and Health Surveys and propensity score matching. 
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Importantly, Gruber et al. (2014) examined a supply-side intervention 
implemented in Thailand in 2001, the 30 Baht programme. Instead of increasing 
eligibility, this programme increased the funding available for hospitals to provide 
health care for the poor and reduced the co-payments to 30 Baht. The analysis of 
vital statistics indicated the programme reduced infant mortality in 13 to 30 per cent. 
 Despite the large amount of resources allocated to the Seguro Popular and its 
rapid expansion, relatively few studies have focused on the effects of the programme 
on health outcomes (see a comprehensive review in Bosch et al. (2012) and Knaul et 
al. (2012)). In 2006, just a few years after the creation of the programme, The Lancet 
published a series of six papers about the health system reform in Mexico (Horton 
2006). These papers discussed different aspects of the design and implementation of 
the Seguro Popular, and analysed short-term results (Frenk et al. 2006, González-Pier 
et al. 2006, Lozano et al. 2006, Knaul et al. 2006, Gakidou et al. 2006, and 
Sepúlveda et al. 2006a). In particular, based on the analysis of several data sources 
(e.g. national surveys and administrative records), Gakidou et al. (2006) studied the 
effects of the programme on different dimensions. Among the key findings were that 
the SP coverage was predominantly increasing in poor and marginalised areas; the 
federal expenditure for public health facilities other than those administered by social 
security institutions increased 38 per cent between 2000 and 2005 in real, per capita 
terms; the effective coverage of eleven interventions improved; SP beneficiaries 
were using more inpatient and outpatient services that the uninsured; and 
catastrophic health expenditures for SP affiliates were lower than for the uninsured. 
These analyses, however, were mostly descriptive.  
Six years later, other article published in The Lancet celebrated the fact that 
Mexico had reached universal coverage that year (Knaul et al. 2012). The detailed 
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analysis of the available evidence on the effects of the SP included in this article 
made it clear that some aspects of the programme had been more extensively studied 
such as the labour market effects (e.g., Azuara and Marinescu 2013, Campos and 
Knox 2013, Bosch and Campos 2014), while other remained understudied. For the 
specific case of infant mortality, Knaul et al. (2012) found that it had declined more 
for those without social security, by then mostly covered by the SP, than for those 
with social security (11 per cent vs. 5 per cent), and concluded that “although 
causality cannot be inferred from the available data on mortality and coverage, a 
likely association with the expansion of Seguro Popular merits further research” 
(Knaul et al. 2012 p. 1269). 
 Among the evidence available on the effects of the SP on health outcomes, 
the short-term assessment conducted by King G. et al. (2009) is particularly relevant 
for the characteristics of its design. While affiliation to the programme could not be 
randomised (for ethical reasons but also because affiliation to the SP is voluntary), 
this study used randomised encouragement to enrol to analyse the programme 
effects. In addition to media campaigns in treatment areas, programme offices were 
established to reduce barriers to affiliation, and funding was provided to participant 
states to improve health facilities and provide medications in these areas. The results 
indicated the SP led to a 23 per cent reduction in catastrophic expenditures, but no 
effects on health care utilisation or health outcomes were found. According to the 
authors, the lack of effects on health outcomes may be related to the short duration of 
treatment (only ten months). Victora and Peters (2009) also argue that the 
implementation period could have precluded the identification of such effects, as 
health outcomes normally change more slowly.  
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Similarly, exploiting the phasing-in of the programme across states and 
different cross-sectional surveys, Barros (2008) found evidence of important 
reductions in out-of-pocket health expenditure associated to the SP, but no evidence 
of improvements in health outcomes (incidence of hypertension and self-reported 
health status). Other studies that used the first two waves of the MxFLS and 
propensity score marching to create a comparable control group of uninsured, also 
found that the SP reduced health expenditures (Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la 
Política de Desarrollo Social 2013), but no effects on health outcomes such as 
morbidity, blood pressure, glucose levels and weight measures were observed 
(Parker and Rubalcava 2011). Using the three waves of the MxFLS and propensity 
score matching, however, Teruel et al. (2012) found that the SP improved self-
reported health. Likewise, using the National Health and Nutrition Survey 2005-06 
and a similar design, Bleich et al. (2007) and Sosa-Rubí et al. (2009) found that the 
SP enrolment improved access to treatment and blood/glucose control among 
hypertensive adults in the first case and adults with diabetes in the second case.  
More recently, Pfutze (2015) found that the SP reduced infant mortality by 
nearly 5 out of 1,000 births. Unlike this Chapter, however, Pfutze used data on births 
reported in the micro sample from the 2010 Census. Since this sample only reports 
information on the last live birth per woman, the probability of observing a surviving 
child is higher than the probability of observing a non-surviving child, which bias the 
reconstruction of infant mortality. In fact, while other sources indicate a clear 
downward trend in infant mortality, the rate calculated with this sample exhibits an 
upward trend. The author corrects for this selection problem by using a weighted 
binary model (weighted exogenous sampling maximum likelihood to model the 
probability of death on the first month/year of life), with the weight equal to yearly 
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UNICEF estimates of IMR divided by the rates observed in the sample for each year. 
This adjustment, however, implicitly assumes that the selection problem is the same 
across subpopulation groups, which is not necessarily the case. Moreover, the data 
used here has at least two advantages: vital statistics provide a direct measure of 
infant mortality as well as information for all the municipalities in Mexico.  
 
4.4 Data and Methods 
4.4.1 Data 
Information for this Chapter was obtained from different sources. Since the research 
design is based on the staggered roll out of the SP across municipalities, all the data 
was collected at the municipality level. Please refer to Chapter 3, section 3.1 for a 
detailed description. 
 
4.4.2 Identification Strategy 
The research strategy to estimate the effects of the SP on infant mortality consists of 
comparing those municipalities that were incorporated to the programme at earlier 
stages (treatment group) with those incorporated later on (control group). The main 
assumption of this strategy is that the infant mortality trends in the comparison group 
reflect the trends that would have been observed in the absence of the programme. 
Although this cannot be formally proved, I study below whether pre-programme 
trends in infant mortality were the same across municipalities that started 
implementing the SP at different years. A visual inspection indicated that IMR trends 
between 1992 and 2001 were similar in municipalities that started offering the 
programme in 2002-2005, but presented more evident variations in municipalities 
that introduced the programme at later stages (Figure 4.2); therefore, the latter were 
excluded from the analysis.  
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Figure 4.2. Pre-programme trends in municipality infant mortality rate by initial year of operation 
 
Notes: SP = Seguro Popular. Since less than ten municipalities started offering the programme in 2009-2011, trends are erratic and are therefore excluded. The averages are 
calculated for panel municipalities (n=2,399) and are weighted by municipality population. 
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 Following Barham (2011), pre-programme mortality rates were further 
analysed with the following equation: 
 
𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑚𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜆𝑚 + ∑ 𝜇𝑗𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑗𝑡
2001
𝑗=1992





𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑠𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑚 
  +𝜀𝑚𝑡                    (4.1) 
 
where the left-hand side variable, 𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑚𝑡, is the infant mortality rate in municipality 
m in year t; 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑗 are binary variables for the pre-programme years, 1992-2001, with 
1992 as the reference year; and 𝑠𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖 indicates the start date of the programme 
normalised to 1 in 2002, with 3 as the reference category. The 𝜃’s give the difference 
in mean municipality IMR since 1992 between municipalities that started offering 
the programme in 2004 and municipalities with other SP start dates. Municipality 
fixed effects were also included (𝜆𝑚). The results of these estimates are reported in 
Table 4.2.  
 In general, the estimated 𝜃’s are not significantly different from zero, which 
indicates that the IMR pre-intervention trends for municipalities incorporated to the 
programme between 2002 and 2005 are statistically similar. Only few IMR 
differences that correspond to municipalities with SP start dates equal to 2002 and 
2003 were different from zero but are arguably small in magnitude and similar to 
other nonsignificant differences.29 Therefore, these four groups of municipalities 
                                                 
29 As explained below, a Poisson distribution is a better choice for the functional form of the IMR (see 
section 4.5.2). If equation 4.1 is estimated using Poisson regression instead of OLS, none of the 
estimated θ’s is statistically different from zero. I include the OLS results as they have a more 
intuitive interpretation though. Section 4.6.2 further analyses whether pre-programme trends in infant 
mortality could be a source of bias. 
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were included in the analysis, resulting in a total analytic sample of 28,989 
municipality-year observations.30  
 
Table 4.2. Average difference in infant mortality rates between municipalities 
that started offering the Seguro Popular programme in 2004 and municipalities 
with other start dates, by pre-programme year 
  













1993 -0.176 -0.131 0.206   -0.089 0.167 0.108 
  (.598) (.660) (2.012)   (.462) (.471) (1.328) 
1994 0.191 0.061 0.692   0.412 0.518 0.687 
  (.787) (.805) (2.074)   (.620) (.594) (1.384) 
1995 0.319 -0.270 0.426   0.338 -0.186 0.220 
  (.800) (.741) (2.06)   (.673) (.605) (1.326) 
1996 0.697 0.221 1.097   0.238 0.136 0.478 
  (.971) (.937) (2.076)   (.761) (.718) (1.431) 
1997 0.138 0.142 0.898   -0.290 -0.204 0.019 
  (.871) (.852) (2.038)   (.793) (.721) (1.411) 
1998 1.102 1.198 2.268   0.138 0.384 0.696 
  (.939) (.881) (2.089)   (.764) (.726) (1.447) 
1999 1.402 1.219 1.767   0.501 0.602 0.622 
  (.980) (.840) (2.089)   (.874) (.838) (1.461) 
2000 2.288** 1.872** 2.637   1.042 0.743 1.190 
  (1.059) (.923) (1.977)   (.893) (.794) (1.389) 
2001 2.616** 1.907* 2.652   0.991 0.743 1.018 
  (1.072) (1.037) (2.061)   (.885) (.899) (1.416) 
Notes: Data at the municipality level for the pre-programme period (1992-2001). The IMR and NMR 
are defined as the number of deaths of infants under 12 months and 1 month of age per every 1,000 live 
births, respectively. Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered on municipality; all estimates 
control for municipality fixed effects and are weighted by municipality population to mimic the 
regression analysis. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
Source: Own estimates based on information from vital statistics (INEGI). 
                                                 
30 131 municipalities (i.e. less than 0.5 per cent of the sample) had incomplete information of births 
and/or population size and were excluded from the analyses.  
 71 
4.4.3 Empirical Model 
I used the following differences-in-differences model to estimate the effects of the 
SP on infant mortality: 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑌𝑚𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝜆𝑚 + 𝜇𝑡  +𝛾𝑚𝑡 + 𝛽𝑆𝑃𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑚𝑡                (4.2) 
 
where 𝑌𝑚𝑡 is the infant mortality rate in municipality m in year t, 𝑆𝑃𝑚𝑡 is an indicator 
variable equal to one if municipality m has the SP programme in year t, 𝜆𝑚 are 
municipality fixed effects, 𝜇𝑡 are year effects, 𝛾𝑚𝑡 are municipality-specific linear 
time trends, and 𝜀𝑚𝑡 is a disturbance term. Municipality fixed effects are included to 
control for time-invariant unobserved characteristics of municipalities, while time 
effects are included to control for time trends common to all municipalities. All 
estimates are weighted by municipality population to adjust for the fact that the data 
is not observed at the individual level but is instead aggregated (Davidson and 
MacKinnon 2004); the standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the municipality 
level.  
The log in equation 4.2 comes from the selection of the functional form. 
Since mortality rates are count variables (counts of infant deaths per 1,000 live births 
in this case), I assumed that grouped mortality data follows a Poisson distribution, as 
commonly done in the epidemiological literature (Avendano 2012, Le and Eberly 
2016). The models were thus estimated using Generalised Linear Models (GLM) 
with the log link and the Poisson family in Stata software. This functional form is 
also more suitable to model the typical right-skewed distribution of the IMR, with 
12.9 per cent of the total observations (or 3,736) with zero mortality. The coefficient 




4.5.1 Main Results 
The difference-in-difference results obtained using equation 4.2 are in Table 4.3. The 
first column only includes municipality and year fixed effects, while the second 
column also includes municipality-specific time trends. Although the programme 
effects estimated are similar in both cases, the latter are more robust and are 
therefore preferred.31  
 Column 2 of panel A shows that the coefficient of the SP variable, -0.039, is 
statistically significant (p<0.001), indicating that the SP led to a 3.9 per cent decrease 
in infant deaths per 1,000 live births. The decrease was similar for infants under one 
month (-0.039, p<0.5; column 2 of panel B). With an average IMR of 13.19 between 
2002 and 2011, the expansion period of the SP, the estimated reduction attributed to 
the programme is thus equivalent to 0.5 infant deaths per 1,000 live births (or one 
infant death per 2,000 live births).   
  
                                                 
31 Additionally, municipality-specific time trends are significant in many cases. 
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Table 4.3. Effects of the Seguro Popular programme on infant mortality in Mexico 
 IMR  IMR lagged 
ten years 
 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
Panel A. Infant mortality rate         
     Seguro Popular    -0.037** -0.039*** -0.040*** -0.047*** -0.040*** -0.037***  -0.011 
  (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014)  (0.023) 
Panel B. Neonatal mortality rate         
     Seguro Popular   -0.036* -0.039** -0.040** -0.045** -0.038** -0.038**  -0.016 
  (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018)  (0.027) 
Observations  28,989 28,989 28,679 28,985 28,989 28,989  14,557 
Fixed year effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Fixed municipality effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Municipality time trends  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Municipality characteristics  No No Yes No No No  No 
Adjusted births  No No No Yes No No  No 
Original treatment definition  No No No No Yes No  No 
Stricter treatment definition  No No No No No Yes  No 
Notes: The infant mortality rate (IMR), calculated as infant deaths per 1,000 live births, is the dependent variable. Only 1,456 municipalities that started offering 
the SP in 2002-2005 are included in the analyses. Seguro Popular is a binary variable equal to one if the Seguro Popular programme was operating in the 
corresponding municipality-year. Municipality characteristics include the log of total population, the marginalisation index, and a binary variable that indicates 
whether the PROSPERA programme was operating in each municipality-year observation. The IMR for the estimates in column 4 are calculated using adjusted 
births from CONAPO instead of registered births. All regressions are weighted by municipality population and standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered on 
municipality. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
Source: Own estimates based on information from vital statistics (INEGI), SP administrative records (CNPSS), and Census data (INEGI).
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4.5.2 Robustness Checks  
Different robustness checks were conducted to assess the validity of the main results.  
 
Time-varying observable characteristics 
First, I explicitly consider the trends in some observable municipality characteristics that 
could be associated with the phasing-in of the SP over time, as well as with the outcome. In 
particular, since previous studies found that more populated municipalities implemented the 
programme earlier (Azuara and Marinescu 2013, Bosch and Campos 2014, Pfutze 2015), 
the log of total population was included as a control. The marginalisation index, that 
summarises key determinants of the IMR such as reduced access to piped water and 
drainage (Sartorius and Sartorius 2014), was also used as a control. Finally, since the health 
component of the PROSPERA programme was especially focused on maternal and child 
health, and previous evaluations have found positive impacts on both (Barham 2011, 
Skoufias and McClafferty 2001), a binary variable that indicates whether this conditional 
cash-transfers programme was operating in each municipality-year observation was added 
to the models. The third column of Table 4.3 shows that including these variables does not 
affect the results, as the confidence interval of the estimates is well within the 95 per cent 
confidence interval of the estimated effects without controls.  
 
Placebo test 
The second robustness check further explores whether pre-programme trends of infant 
mortality were related to the SP coverage. Basically, the same specification was estimated 
using 10 lags of the dependent variable as a falsification test (Barham 2011). Since the SP 
implementation across municipalities took place between 2002 and 2011, this number of 
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lags implies using infant mortality rates for the former ten-years period, 1992-2001. 
Column 7 of Table 4.3 shows that the standard errors are considerably larger than the 
coefficients on the treatment variable, indicating the effects are not statistically different 
from zero for both total and neonatal infant mortality (p>0.1; panels A and B, respectively). 
This result confirms that pre-existing trends in infant mortality are not biasing the results.   
 
Underreporting 
As mentioned before, underreporting in vital statistics is a cause of concern in infant 
mortality analyses in general. The municipality fixed effects included in the models control 
for underreporting in Mexican registries, provided this is constant over the period studied. 
The implementation of the SP programme, however, could have affected the reporting of 
deaths and births, which would bias the results. 
 Since 1950 Mexico uses the death certification system recommended by the WHO. 
Initially, informants (e.g. hospitals) captured all the deaths occurred within a month in a 
single report, but from 1987 individual death certificates have been employed. This 
certification system requires a doctor (or an authorised health official) to certify the death, 
which also involves determining the cause. Once the death certificate is issued, it can be 
exchanged in an office of the Civil Registry for the only document legally valid known as 
acta. Therefore, underreporting normally occurs in rural areas where the presence of health 
officials is more limited, and among very poor families who cannot afford calling a private 
doctor to issue a certificate when public personnel is not available (Braine 2006). The 
registration of births follows a similar process, except that until 2008 each state determined 
the type of document required to have an acta issued, i.e. the birth certificate or any other 
such as a birth notice or aviso de nacimiento (Secretaría de Salud 2011). Births 
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underreporting that remains after accounting for extemporaneous registration is, thus, more 
common in rural and more marginalised areas too.  
 Important increases in skilled birth attendance (from 87.6 per cent in 2000 to 93.4 
per cent in 2006 and 94.5 per cent in 2012) and antenatal care (from 72.8 per cent in 2000 
to 81.5 per cent in 2006 and 84.3 per cent in 2012; Gutiérrez et al. 2012), however, suggest 
that the reporting of infant deaths and births may have in any case improved during the 
expansion period of the SP. Some modifications to the administrative process also point in 
the same direction. In particular, since 2008 the birth certificate is mandatory in all the 
country and indispensable to obtain the acta (Secretaría de Salud 2011).  
 If registry improvements reduced overall underreporting of infant mortality rates, 
the effects of the SP would be, if anything, underestimated. But if these improvements were 
particularly focused on births, the observed reductions in infant mortality could be related 
to increases in birth registries. Two tests were conducted to address this issue. First, I used 
an alternative denominator to calculate infant mortality rates, namely adjusted births based 
on pregnancy histories drawn from the National Survey of Demographic Dynamics 
(Encuesta Nacional de la Dinámica Demográfica, ENADID) and Census data (Consejo 
Nacional de Población 2012). Second, I estimated equation 4.2 using the logarithm of 
registered births as the dependent variable instead of infant mortality to analyse whether the 
SP affected birth registries (Gruber et al. 2014). 
Column 4 in Table 4.3 shows that the estimated effect of the SP is similar when 
adjusted births for underreporting are used (β = -0.047; p<0.01), which indicates that the 
results observed before are not likely associated to an increase in registered births 
correlated with the programme. The results obtained using registered births as the 
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dependent variable also support this conclusion, since the coefficient of the SP is small and 
not statistically significant (β = -0.011; p>0.1).  
 
Treatment definition 
The main specification considers that a given municipality started receiving the treatment if 
the yearly number of SP affiliates was greater than ten. To check the validity of this 
assumption, I used instead the original information, i.e., I considered a given municipality 
as treated from the year the records report at least one affiliate to the SP. I also used a 
stricter definition that considers municipalities as treated if the number of affiliates is 
greater than ten in at least two consecutive years. This definition is tested since the number 
of affiliates in some municipalities returns to zero after reaching a value greater than ten for 
a certain year. Columns 5 and 6 of Table 4.3 show that the results remain unaffected when 
these slightly different definitions of the treatment are used.   
 
4.5.3 Heterogeneity of the Results 
In this section I explore whether the effects of the SP varied by municipality size, 
marginalisation and mortality causes. First, the sample was split into two groups according 
to the median levels of total population and population share in localities with less than 
2,500 inhabitants in 2000,32 before the implementation of the SP. Columns 1 to 4 of Table 
                                                 
32 The standard definition of rural area in Mexico is based on the population size at the locality level, namely 
rural areas are localities with less than 2,500 people. Since this analysis is done at the municipality level, 
however, I use the proportion of the population that lives in rural areas within each municipality (i.e. localities 
with less than 2,500 inhabitants) to classify them as rural or urban. If this proportion is above the 2000 sample 
median, 56 per cent, the municipality is classified as rural; if the proportion is equal to or below this 
threshold, the municipality is classified as urban. Similar results are obtained if an arbitrary threshold of 50 
per cent is used, i.e., if municipalities are classified as rural if over half of the population live in rural 
localities.  
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4.4 show that the effect of the SP was basically restricted to more populous (over 15,700 
inhabitants), urban municipalities. For those groups, the estimated effects of the SP were 
similar to the estimated effects for the complete sample (between -0.041 and -0.039 for 
both total and neonatal mortality).  
 The results by marginalisation are in columns 5 and 6 of Table 4.4. The 
municipalities in the two highest marginalisation index quintiles in 2000 were classified as 
high, while those in the three lowest quintiles were classified as low. The effect of the 
Seguro Popular was only statistically significant for municipalities with low pre-
programme levels of marginalisation, and was similar to the estimated effect for the 
complete set of municipalities (-0.041 and -0.043 for TMI and NMR, respectively).  
 In sum, the SP was less successful in small, rural municipalities and those with high 
levels of marginalisation. Since medical supply in these areas has been traditionally behind, 
a possible explanation for this result is that despite aforementioned improvements in birth 
attendance and antenatal care, health services provided in this type of municipalities are 
still inadequate to offer all the interventions covered by the SP, in particular, specialised 
procedures needed to address the causes of death that have become more relevant due to the 
epidemiological transition that is taking place in the country (see Table 4.5 and explanation 
below). In fact, the SP was designed to begin in areas where health facilities were 
appropriately equipped to provide the services included in the programme package (see 
Chapter 2).  
 While supply data cannot be included in the models since this information is only 
available from 2001 and is likely endogenous, it is possible to analyse whether the SP effect 
varies across municipalities with different pre-programme health supply levels. The last 
two columns of Table 4.4 show that the SP effect was significant only for municipalities 
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with high initial levels of medical supply, defined as those with a rate of doctors above the 
pre-programme median.33 This result is consistent with a recent study that found stronger 
effects of the SP on health care access in areas with greater supply of health professionals 
(Bleich et al. 2007), and with a number of studies that provide evidence on the link between 
health-care resources and health outcomes in general (Shi and Starfield 2001, Macinko et 
al. 2003). Grogger et al. (2015) also found that the effect of the SP on catastrophic spending 
was concentrated in urban areas and rural areas with well-staffed facilities, while the effect 
on residents of rural areas with limited infrastructure (either single-nucleus facility or to no 
facility), that account for nearly 40 per cent of the eligible rural households, was null. 
 
  
                                                 
33 The rate is defined as the number of doctors in contact with patients per 1,000 population. Health supply 
data are from the Information Subsystem of Equipment, Human Resources and Infrastructure (SINERHIAS), 
and are publicly available on the Ministry of Health website from 2001 onwards. These data cover the 
facilities run by the central and state governments, which provide health care to Seguro Popular beneficiaries.  
 80 
Table 4.4. Effects of the Seguro Popular by selected municipality characteristics 
  Population 
Rural Urban 
Marginalisation  Health supply 








 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8 
Panel A. Infant mortality rate          
 Seguro Popular -0.006 -0.041*** -0.014 -0.040*** -0.031 -0.041***  -0.024 -0.068** 
  (0.041) (0.015) (0.027) (0.015) (0.029) (0.016)  (0.015) (0.028) 
Panel B. Neonatal mortality rate 
 Seguro Popular 0.025 -0.041** 0.012 -0.038** -0.005 -0.043**  -0.012 -0.084** 
  (0.055) (0.019) (0.033) (0.019) (0.038) (0.020)  (0.020) (0.036) 
          
Observations 14,519 14,470 14,304 14,388 12,345 16,644  14,002 14,047 
Fixed year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Fixed municipality effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Municipality time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Notes: Seguro Popular is a binary variable equal to one if the Seguro Popular programme was operating in the corresponding municipality-year. The median 
population in 2000, before the implementation of the SP, was 15,700. Rural (urban) municipalities are those with a population share in localities with less (equal 
or more) than 2,500 people above 56 per cent, the median in 2000. The high marginalisation group consists of the last two (highest) marginality index quintiles in 
2000. The indicator of health supply is the rate of doctors per 1,000 population; the mean in 2001 was 0.88. All regressions are weighted by municipality 
population and standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered on municipality. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  
Source: Own estimates based on information from vital statistics (INEGI) ), SP administrative records (CNPSS), and Census data (INEGI). 
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 Finally, Table 4.5 presents the SP effects for the main causes of death grouped as 
infectious and non-infectious diseases. Infectious diseases include respiratory and intestinal 
infections, while non-infectious diseases include conditions originating in the perinatal 
period and congenital anomalies.34 Together, these causes of death account for over 80 per 
cent of the total infant deaths. The results indicate that the effect of the SP is statistically 
significant for non-infectious diseases; the average decline associated to the programme is 
4.2 per cent for the NMR (p<0.05). There is also a marginally significant reduction of 5.1 
per cent in the post-neonatal mortality rate related to infectious diseases (p<0.1), defined as 
the number of deaths of children between one month and one year old per 1,000 live births. 
The stronger effect of the programme on non-infectious diseases is reasonable, however, as 
it was designed to address the causes of death that had become more prevalent (Sepúlveda 
et al. 2006a). By the beginning of the 1990s, respiratory and intestinal infections accounted 
for 31 per cent of the total infant deaths, but a decade after the deaths attributed to these 
causes had fallen to 14 per cent (Table 3.1). In contrast, the main non-infectious diseases 
increased from half of the total infant deaths in 1990 to 70 per cent in 2000. Similarly, 
neonatal deaths, mainly attributed to non-infectious diseases, increased from 48 per cent of 
the total deaths of infants under one year in 1990 to 62 per cent in 2000.  
 
  
                                                 
34 Similar results (not shown) are obtained if deaths attributed to nutritional deficiencies are included as non-
infectious diseases.  
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Table 4.5. Effects of the Seguro Popular programme by type of disease 
  Infectious diseases Non-infectious diseases 
Panel A. Infant mortality   
 Seguro Popular  -0.042 -0.038** 
  (0.028) (0.017) 
Panel B. Neonatal mortality   
 Seguro Popular   -0.042** 
   (0.019) 
Panel C. Post-neonatal mortality   
 Seguro Popular  -0.051* -0.022 
  (0.029) (0.032) 
    
Observations 28,989 28,989 
Fixed year effects Yes Yes 
Fixed municipality effects Yes Yes 
Municipality time trends Yes Yes 
Notes: Seguro Popular is a binary variable equal to one if the Seguro Popular programme was operating in the 
corresponding municipality-year. All regressions are weighted by municipality population and standard errors 
(in parenthesis) are clustered on municipality. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
Source: Own estimates based on information from vital statistics (INEGI) and administrative records of the 
SP programme (CNPSS).  
 
4.5.4 Benefit-cost Analysis 
So far, I have shown that the estimated reduction in the IMR associated to the SP is 3.9 per 
cent. To put this number into perspective, I compare in this section the benefits brought by 
the SP programme in terms of infant mortality reductions to the costs of insuring newborns. 





To estimate the programme costs, the annual cost per person was first calculated by adding 
the required federal and state transfers per beneficiary: the cuota social (3.92 per cent the 
minimum wage), the additional federal contribution of 1.5 times de cuota social, and the 
state contribution of 0.5 times de cuota social (column B of Table 4.6). Then, the cost of 
covering the newborns was estimated as the product of the annual cost per person and the 
number of newborns covered by the SP in each year (column D of table 4.6). Since the 
latter is unknown, I assumed that the coverage ratio per municipality also applied to 
newborns, i.e., I estimated the coverage of newborns as the product of the average coverage 
share in each year (between 5 per cent to 45 per cent) and the total number of newborns in 
municipalities covered by the SP (column C of Table 4.6).  
 The total federal and state transfers for newborns in 2004-2011 were equal to 
10,751 million pesos and represent 3.2 per cent of the total federal and state transfers 
reported by the CNPSS. The corresponding share (3.2 per cent) of the annual operation 
costs of the CNPSS was also considered (column E of Table 4.6). Since the formula to 
calculate the transfers per beneficiary was applied until 2004, it was assumed that the total 
cost of covering the newborns in the pilot years of the programme, 2002-2003, was 
equivalent to 3.2 per cent of the total budget allocated to the SP in those years. The total 






















Total cost of 
covering 
newborns  
  A  B C D = B * C E F = D + E 
2002     25,104     62.05 
2003     50,830     34.43 
2004 60.43 2,558.33 121,030 309.63 5.01 314.64 
2005 60.12 2,545.05 248,219 631.73 11.93 643.66 
2006 60.33 2,554.04 334,748 854.96 23.44 878.40 
2007 60.29 2,552.50 461,432 1,177.80 14.40 1,192.20 
2008 59.64 2,525.05 572,932 1,446.68 17.07 1,463.75 
2009 59.02 2,498.79 641,045 1,601.83 12.02 1,613.85 
2010 59.42 2,515.52 870,216 2,189.04 26.08 2,215.12 
2011 59.82 2,532.54 1,002,802 2,539.63 29.85 2,569.49 
Total     4,328,357 10,751.32   10,987.59 
Notes: Between 2004-2009 the required public transfers were calculated per family, thus, the formula to 
calculate the required federal and state transfers per individual beneficiary in force since 2010 was applied to 
the complete study period (column B). To calculate the number of newborns with SP coverage in column C, 
the average share of the population covered by the programme in each year was multiplied by the total 
number of newborns in municipalities covered by the SP. Since the total transfers for newborns in 2004-2011 
(10,751 pesos of 2011) are equivalent to 3.2 per cent of the total federal and state transfers for the same period 
(340,204 million pesos of 2011 according to the CNPSS), the corresponding share of the operation costs of 
the CNPSS for each year is considered in column E. Finally, it was assumed that the total cost of covering 
newborns in the pilot years of the programme, 2002-2003, was equivalent to 3.2 per cent of the total budget 
allocated to the SP in those years. 
Source: Own estimates based on daily minimum wages from the National Minimum Wages Commission 
(Comisión Nacional de los Salarios Mínimos, Conasami), vital statistics from the National Institute of 
Statistics and Geography (INEGI), SP costs from the Comisión Nacional de Protección Social en Salud 
(various years), and SP coverage from administrative records (CNPSS). 
 
Programme benefits  
According to the main specification (column 2 of Table 4.3), the SP programme reduced 
infant mortality in 3.9 per cent. Since the average IMR for 2002-2011 was 13.2, this is 
equivalent to 0.5 infant deaths per 1,000 live births. During the same period, it was 
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estimated that 4.33 million newborns were covered by the SP (column C of Table 4.6), so 
the estimated number of averted deaths is 2,228. To monetarise these health benefits, the 
value of a statistical life (VSL), that indicates the willingness to trade wealth for a small 
reduction in the mortality risk, was used.  
 The estimates of the VSL vary widely depending on the methods used and are 
usually for high-income countries. Therefore, following a common procedure employed in 
the environmental literature (Viscusi and Gayer 2005), I adjusted the VSL estimated for the 
US in a meta-analysis, US2000$5.5 million or US2011$7.2 million (Viscusi and Aldy 
2003), by the income ratio for Mexico and the US, and the income elasticity of the VSL 
(equation 4.3). While the same meta-analysis found income elasticities below 1, Hammitt 
and Robinson (2011) suggest that the income elasticity for developing countries should be 
above 1. To be on the conservative side, I used 1 and 1.5 as income elasticities. The income 
ratio, 0.23, was calculated with the average annual wages for the two countries reported by 
the OECD. The estimated VSL for Mexico was between 0.78 and 1.64 (Table 4.7).  
 
𝑉𝑆𝐿𝑀𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑐𝑜 = 𝑉𝑆𝐿𝑈𝑆 ∗ (𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑀𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑐𝑜 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑈𝑆⁄ )
𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦             (4.3) 
 
Benefit-cost ratio  
The final step was to compare the estimated costs and benefits. The bottom of Table 4.7 
shows that the benefit-cost ratio is between 1.98 and 4.15, i.e., the benefits exceed the costs. 
Put differently, since the estimated VSL for Mexico is higher than the programme costs per 
averted death (US2011$0.39 million; Table 4.7), the benefits more than compensate for the 
programme costs.  
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Table 4.7. Benefit-cost analysis of the Seguro Popular programme 
Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) for Mexico (million 2011 US dollars) 1.64 0.78 
(income elasticity of VSL) (1) (1.5) 
Benefits     
  Average infant mortality rate 2002-2011  13.2   
  Reduction in infant deaths due to the SP  3.9%   
  Reduction in infant deaths per 1,000 live births due to the SP 0.5   
  Estimated live births with SP coverage in 2002-2011 4,328,357   
  Infant deaths averted 2002-2011 2,228   
  Benefits = infant deaths averted * VSL, million 2011 US dollars 3,652 1,745 
Costs     
  Programme costs 2002-2011, 2011 million US dollars 879   
Benefit - cost ratio  4.15 1.98 
Programme costs per averted death, million 2011 US dollars 0.39   
Notes: To calculate the VSL for Mexico, the VSL for the US (Viscusi and Aldy 2003) was adjusted with the 
income ratio for both countries (0.23) and two different income elasticities, 1 and 1.5. The income ratio was 
calculated as the ratio of the average annual wages for 2011 reported by the OECD. 
Source: Own estimates based on vital statistics from the National Institute of Statistics and Geography 
(INEGI) and SP records (CNPSS). 
 
4.6 Discussion 
This chapter exploits the implementation of an ambitious health insurance programme in 
Mexico to analyse the effects of public insurance on infant mortality. The estimates indicate 
that the Seguro Popular led to a 3.9 per cent decrease in infant mortality, equivalent to one 
infant death per 2,000 live births. Since roughly 4.3 million newborns were covered by the 
SP in 2002-2011, this implies that 2.2 thousand deaths were averted. A simple benefit-cost 
analysis also showed that the health benefits of the programme more than compensate for 
its costs. Moreover, the benefits of this analysis are likely underestimated, since other 
benefits such as morbidity reductions are not considered.  
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 So far, only a handful of studies have used randomisation to evaluate health 
insurance and have found no effects on health outcomes (Brook et al. 1983, Newhouse 
1993, Baicker et al. 2013). This is also the case for the study that used randomised 
encouragement to evaluate the effects of the SP after ten months (King G. et al. 2009). 
These studies, however, have focused on measures of adults’ health, and their sample size 
is normally not suited to analyse mortality in general. In contrast, the findings of this 
analysis are comparable to those of observational studies that also concentrate on infants’ 
health, such as those that evaluate Medicaid expansions in the US (Currie and Gruber 1996) 
and those recently estimated for the SP (Pfutze 2014).  
 One of the most relevant findings was that the SP effectively reduced neonatal 
mortality, mostly related to non-infectious diseases. According to the results, the SP led to a 
3.9 per cent decrease in neonatal deaths per 1,000 live births. This indicates that providing 
access to a comprehensive benefit package can be used to address the causes of death that 
are relatively more challenging and more prevalent in advanced stages of the 
epidemiological transition.  
 Unlike previous studies on the effects of the SP on infants’ health (Pfutze 2014), 
this article uses infant mortality and live birth measures from vital statistics that are 
certified by health professionals, providing a more accurate measure. Such registry process 
minimises recall errors and other measurement problems more commonly present in self-
reported and survey data. Underreporting in administrative records is probably the main 
concern when this type of information is employed, but the quality of the Mexican 
registries is ranked as high (Mathers et al. 2005, World Health Organization 2012), and 
some robustness checks conducted indicate this is not likely a source of bias.  
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Health insurance is expected to improve health outcomes through increased access 
to health care. Unfortunately, despite the advantages of infant mortality data from vital 
statistics, they provide limited information on access measures at the municipality level. 
While survey data indicates that the SP increased access to obstetrical services (Sosa-Rubí 
et al. 2009), and timely antenatal care for some population groups (Servan-Mori et al. 
2015), more research into the channels through which public health insurance can affect 
infants’ health is required.  
 The estimated effects of the SP were not homogeneous across population 
subgroups. More populated, urban municipalities and those in the lowest half of the 
marginalisation distribution where the municipalities that registered reductions in infant 
mortality associated to the SP. Since health facilities in this type of municipalities have 
been traditionally better equipped, a possible explanation for this result is that the 
programme had stronger effects where the supply was appropriate to provide all the 
interventions in the benefit package, in particular, more specialised procedures. In fact, the 
effect of the SP was only statistically significant for municipalities with high pre-
programme levels of medical supply, and was twice the size estimated for the complete set 
of municipalities. This certainly rises distributional concerns that are beyond the scope of 
this study but should be addressed in future studies.  
Many countries are currently considering the implementation of programmes to 
reach universal health coverage (Giedion et al. 2013). While it is clear that no single path 
applies to all contexts (World Health Organization 2010), these results are informative in 
evaluating how rapid expansion of insurance coverage worked in a middle-income country 
context. In particular, these findings should be of particular interest for countries in a 






5. Consumption Smoothing and Health Insurance Expansion35 
 
5.1 Introduction 
One of the main objectives of health insurance is to protect households against the financial 
risks of ill health. In the absence of health insurance, households have to resort to informal 
mechanisms such as depleting savings, selling assets, or increasing labour supply to address 
health problems. In some cases, households may employ other mechanisms that have long-
term consequences, such as reducing food consumption or school enrolment. If health 
events affect income earners, the welfare consequences can be even worse as the 
household’s ability to generate income is diminished.  
Evidence on the effects of health shocks on welfare is limited. Using data for 
Indonesia, Gertler and Gruber (2002) showed that households are not able to smooth 
consumption in the absence of health insurance. In particular, they found that reductions in 
the ability to perform daily life activities were associated with a 20 per cent drop in 
consumption. Using other indicators of major illness, such as sizeable drops in the body 
mass index of the household head, Wagstaff (2007) also showed that Vietnamese families 
are vulnerable to idiosyncratic shocks. In contrast, Mohanan (2011) found that households 
who suffered bus accident injuries in India were able to smooth food and housing 
                                                 
35 Most of this chapter is available as a UNU-WIDER Working Paper (Sáenz de Miera-Juárez 2017).  
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consumption, but experienced reductions in educational spending. He also found that the 
main informal insurance mechanism households employed was debt, which led to 
important levels of indebtedness after experiencing the health shock.  
For Latin America, the dearth of studies on the welfare consequences of health 
shocks is even more marked. Baeza and Packard (2006) analyse some related indicators for 
six Latin American countries, such as the percentage of households that fall into poverty 
due to health expenditures. They could not formally examine the impact of health shocks 
on consumption, however, due to the lack of longitudinal data. Chiapa (2008) provides 
some evidence using Mexican data, namely the evaluation survey of the conditional cash 
transfer program PROSPERA (see section 4.2.2 of Chapter 4 for more information about 
this programme). He found that having an ill child reduces the consumption of poor, rural 
households, although that program helps to mitigate this effect.  
On the other hand, most studies on health insurance programs have focused on the 
analysis of welfare gains measured by increased utilisation of health services and health 
improvements. Importantly, there are at least two other ways to measure the benefits of 
insurance. First, following the studies of risk in developing countries, health insurance is 
expected to reduce fluctuations in consumption. Second, even when consumption is not 
sensitive to health shocks, Chetty and Looney (2006) show that health insurance can result 
in important welfare gains if it allows households to substitute costly coping mechanisms. 
Gruber (1997) is one of the few studies providing evidence of the consumption smoothing 
benefit of social insurance in general. He estimated that in the absence of unemployment 
insurance in the United States, consumption of the unemployed would fall by 22 per cent. 
More recently, Bronchetti (2012) reached a similar conclusion.  
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The Mexican case provides an interesting setting to analyse the welfare 
consequences of health shocks and the role of public insurance. As explained in Chapter 2, 
there are two types of public health insurance in Mexico: social security, which is 
compulsory for salaried workers and their families, and the SP, more recently introduced to 
cover those who are excluded from social security. In particular, the staggered expansion of 
health insurance that took place in Mexico through the implementation of the SP, offers a 
unique opportunity to identify the welfare effects that may be brought by reducing the 
health expenditure risk through formal insurance.  
In principle, the SP is expected to provide consumption insurance in the event of 
health shocks, as previous studies have found the programme reduced actual medical care 
expenditures. According to Knaul et al. (2012), catastrophic and impoverishing health 
expenditures (30 per cent of the capacity to pay and expenditures that force households 
below or further below the poverty line, respectively) significantly decreased with the 
implementation of the SP. Between 2000 and 2010, the first fell from 3.1 per cent to 2 per 
cent, while the second fell from 3.3 per cent to 0.8 per cent. The evaluation based on the 
randomised encouragement to enrol in the Seguro Popular also found health expenditures 
were reduced after ten months of implementation of the program (King G. et al. 2009). 
Similarly, an evaluation based on the longitudinal survey employed in this analysis 
(MxFLS) found reductions in health expenditures among beneficiaries of the SP (Consejo 
Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social 2013). The potential of the SP to 
mitigate fluctuations in consumption would be reduced, however, if medical expenses were 
relatively small compared to wage losses. The SP is intended to protect households from 
large medical expenses but not from reduced earning capacity. Social security, on the other 
 92 
hand, provides coverage against both types of risks and can therefore help to elucidate their 
relative burden. 
The objectives of this Chapter are to analyse whether Mexican households are able 
to smooth consumption after severe health shocks and the contribution of formal insurance 
both in the form of social security, and especially the Seguro Popular. The Chapter is 
organised as follows. Section 5.2 briefly describes the theoretical framework employed to 
analyse the protective effect of health insurance on the event of health shocks. Section 5.3 
reviews some key studies on the topic. Section 5.4 describes the data, measures and 
empirical model. Sections 5.5 and 5.6 presents the results and the discussion of the results.  
 
5.2 Theoretical Framework 
Mainstream theoretical frameworks in economics such as the Arrow-Debreu model argue 
that households are able to smooth consumption over states of nature in the presence of 
complete private insurance markets (Arrow and Debreu 1954). This implies that 
households’ consumption growth should be independent of idiosyncratic shocks such as 
health shocks (Cochrane 1991, Townsend 1994). But insurance markets can hardly be 
considered complete in practice, in particular in LMIC; therefore, public insurance is 
essential to maintain households’ welfare (revealed in their consumption choices) in the 
face of negative, unexpected events. To formally see how public health insurance is 
expected to mitigate consumption fluctuations, consider the following framework originally 
developed by Baily (1978) and later expanded by Chetty and Looney (2006).  
 Assume there are two states of nature, good and bad (in this case, one with good 
health and one with bad health); also assume that the utility cost of obtaining consumption 
level c is θb in the bad state and θg in the good state, with θb >θg (i.e. θ is an increasing 
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function of health shocks); finally, assume utility is state independent. If agents have a 





















where γ is the coefficient of risk aversion, and cg and cb represent optimal consumption in 
the good and bad state, respectively. Therefore, consumption changes are decreasing in γ 
and increasing in θb. If private insurance markets were complete, Cb = Cg, i.e. consumption 
would be the same in both states, but if private insurance markets are incomplete as 
expected, θb will be likely high unless public insurance is provided. The expansion of 
public health insurance in Mexico can help distinguish whether the provision of public 
insurance can effectively reduce the cost of smoothing consumption.  
  
5.3 Literature Review 
Cochrane (1991) and Townsend (1994) were two of the first studies that tested the full 
insurance (or full risk sharing) hypothesis. The first used longitudinal data to test whether 
households were fully insured against idiosyncratic income shocks in the United States, 
either by formal institutions or informal mechanisms. He found that full insurance could 
not be rejected for short illness, spells of unemployment following involuntary job loss, 
 94 
loss of work due to strike, and involuntary move. Long illness (more than 100 days of work 
lost) and involuntary job loss, however, were associated with consumption drops between 
11 and 14 per cent for the former, and between 24 and 27 per cent for the latter. The second 
study used a general equilibrium model to test optimal risk sharing in consumption in three 
poor villages in southern India. Unlike Cochrane (1991), Townsend (1994) found that after 
controlling for village consumption, a proxy for village risk level, idiosyncratic income 
shocks such as sickness and unemployment did not affect much household consumptions, 
although landless labourers were less insured compared to land-owners in the villages 
analysed.  
More recently, Gertler and Gruber (2002) analysed the effect of major illness on 
households’ consumption growth in Indonesia. They found that decreases in the ability to 
perform activities of daily living (ADL) reduced non-medical consumption by 8-17 per cent 
—depending on whether the reduction was on intermediate or basic ADL. To explain the 
difference between their findings and those of previous studies that indicated no effects of 
idiosyncratic shocks (e.g. Townsend 1994), they argue that the latter had analysed health 
measures that reflected small changes in health status that were easier to insure. Using other 
indicators of major illness, such as sizeable drops in the body mass index of the household 
head, Wagstaff (2007) also showed that Vietnamese families were vulnerable to income 
shocks.  
The studies mentioned, however, evidence two important gaps. First, they do not 
address the role of informal insurance, i.e., the mechanisms behind consumption shares that 
households manage to insure. According to Chetty and Looney (2006), some households 
may resort to costly mechanisms such as pulling children out of school to smooth 
consumption. One of the few studies that analyses this issue is Mohanan (2011). He shows 
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that Indian households who were able to smooth food and housing consumption after 
suffering bus accident injuries, incurred important levels of indebtedness.  
A second issue normally excluded in the health shocks literature is the role of 
formal insurance mechanisms. In fact, a literature review on the economic impact of health 
shocks in LMIC concludes that very few studies look at the implications of insurance for 
non-medical consumption (Alam and Mahal 2014). Wagstaff (2007) shows health shocks 
importantly increase medical spending, even among insured households, but does not 
further address the specific role of formal insurance in consumption smoothing. An 
exception is Levy (2002) who found that health shocks have no significant effect on 
consumption for both insured and uninsured in the United States, and no different effects 
on income and wealth by insurance status.  
The role of other social insurance programmes in protecting consumption has been 
more extensively analysed. Gruber (1997) was one of the first studies that showed that 
unemployment insurance in the United States effectively prevented consumption drops 
across unemployment spells. Thereafter, other studies have used a similar framework to 
analyse different unemployment insurance programmes (Chetty and Finkelstein 2013). For 
example, Bronchetti (2012) found that the workers’ compensation programme in the United 
States offsets the consumption drop of individuals who experienced unemployment due to 
injuries by 3 to 5 per cent. The analysis of unemployment insurance benefits differs at least 
in two aspects from the analysis of health insurance benefits, however. First, the former 
directly replaces income loses associated to the shock (unemployment spells), and second, 
the variation of this benefit can be normally measured with a cardinal variable. In this 
sense, the analysis of the effect of conditional cash transfer programmes on households’ 
vulnerability to risk is comparable to the analysis of unemployment insurance benefits.  
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5.4 Data and Methods  
5.4.1 Empirical Model 
The model I use to analyse whether Mexican households are able to protect their 
consumption levels against health shocks, and especially examine the role of public 
insurance is the following: 
 
Δ𝑙𝑛 (𝐶𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝜇𝑤𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡 + 𝛿Δℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾Δℎ𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 
   +𝜌𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                      (5.1) 
 
where Δ𝑙𝑛 (𝐶𝑖𝑡) is the change in the logarithm of per capita non-medical consumption of 
household i between t and t-1; 𝛼𝑠 are state fixed effects to control for regional, time-
invariant unobservable characteristics; Δℎ𝑖𝑡 captures health shocks to household i that 
occurred between t and t-1; 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 indicates whether the household has public 
medical insurance (either social security or SP) at time t; and 𝑋 is a set of demographic 
variables at first interview. As I use information from three waves of the MxFLS (see 
details in section 3.2 of Chapter 3), the wavet variable indicates whether the information is 
measured at wave 2 (reference category) or wave 3 to allow for changes over time in the 
outcome.  𝛿 ≠ 0 would provide evidence against the full insurance hypothesis, while 𝛾 
would indicate the protective effect of formal insurance. In particular, δ + γ = 0 would 
indicate that households with public insurance are fully insured against health shock h.  
 The common problem of self-selection into insurance is a potential limitation of 
Equation 5.1, however (Giedion and Díaz 2010; Levy and Meltzer 2008). In particular, 
since social security is attached to formal employment as explained above, unobservable 
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characteristics of social security beneficiaries are not only likely correlated with 
consumption levels, but also with short-term consumption growth. Likewise, households 
that gained public insurance through the SP may have unobservable characteristics that also 
affect consumption choices. Therefore, the following strategy based on the exogenous 
variation provided by the SP expansion is employed to identify the effect of public health 
insurance. First, I restrict the sample to households uninsured at baseline. Since no SP 
beneficiaries are reported at wave 1, this implies excluding social security beneficiaries, 
which results in a more homogeneous subsample. Second, the geographic variation in the 
roll-out of the SP is used as an instrument in a two-stage instrumental variable (IV) model 
(see more about the roll-out of the SP in section 2.2 of Chapter 2 and Figure 3.2 in Chapter 
3). The specific instrumental variable is the yearly share of the population covered by the 
programme per municipality and indicates the SP availability to each household in the 
sample at time t. The idea is that municipality coverage entailed decisions at the state and 
federal level rather than at the household level (Sosa-Rubí et al. 2009). All models are 
estimated using robust standard errors. 
 
5.4.2 Data and Measures 
The data are from the three-wave Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), a nationally 
representative longitudinal survey. Section 3.2 of Chapter 3 provides a description of the 
MxFLS.  
The dependent variable, monthly non-medical consumption, is measured as the sum 
of household expenditures and the value of in-kind payments, gifts, and home-produced 
items. The section of the MxFLS questionnaire on food consumption is the most detailed, 
including 37 items plus a special segment on ten highly consumed products such as corn 
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tortillas and soft drinks. The section on non-food consumption covers clothing, home 
services, and electronic appliances, among other durables and services. Consumption 
figures were adjusted for inflation using the National Consumer Price Index (Índice 
Nacional de Precios al Consumidor, INPC) from the National Institute of Statistics and 
Geography (INEGI) and are reported in Mexican pesos of December 2013 (MX$Dec13). 
The main independent variable is the change in health status, i.e., the health shock 
indicator. Two health shock measures are used. The first is an index that captures physical 
performance. According to previous studies (Gertler and Gruber 2002, Gertler et al. 2009), 
this type of measure is more reliable than subjective measures such as self-reported 
symptoms. Also, this index better captures severe, exogenous health problems that 
households find more difficult to cope with, either using formal or informal mechanisms.  
The MxFLS registers abilities to perform eight activities of daily living (ADL) 
among respondents 50 years and older: (1) carry out a heavy bucket for 20 meters, (2) walk 
five kilometres, (3) bend, sit on your knees or squat, (4) climb up stairs without help, (5) 
dress up without help, (6) stand up from a chair without help, (7) go to the bathroom 
without help, and (8) rise from the floor and get on your feet without help. The last four 
ADL can be further classified as basic ADL. For each ADL, participants can respond 
“easily” (coded as 2), “with difficulty” (coded as 1), or “could not do it” (coded as 0). The 











               (5.2) 
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Therefore, those respondents who cannot perform any ADL have an ADL index 
equal to zero, while those respondents who can easily perform all the ADL have an ADL 
index equal to one. Likewise, increases in the ADL index indicate improvement in physical 
capacity, while declines indicate deterioration.  
The ADL index constructed using the MxFLS has an important limitation, however, 
as the information on ability to perform ADL is only available for respondents 50 years and 
older. Older respondents are more likely to present disabilities and are also more likely to 
have lower contributions to household income (Gertler et al. 2009). I focus, though, on the 
physical performance of household heads, which is likely to have a more evident effect on 
consumption. I also analyse a second health shock measure that can be calculated for all the 
households in the sample. The MxFLS asks all adult household members if they have 
suffered severe accidents, and if so, their age and the date when the accident occurred. With 
this information, I am able to construct a variable that indicates whether household heads or 
any other adult household member had a severe accident between waves.  
Following the description of the Mexican health system in Chapter 2, households 
can be broadly classified according to their insurance status: (1) beneficiaries of social 
security, (2) beneficiaries of SP (once available throughout the country), and (3) uninsured. 
Only a few households reported having private insurance and are excluded from the 
sample.36 In particular, households are defined as publicly insured if at least one member of 
the household reported having either social security (IMSS, ISSSTE, PEMEX/ SEDENA/ 
SEMAR, or a state government insurance) or the SP.  
                                                 
36 Only 73 households reported having private insurance exclusively (either at wave 2 or wave 3), which is 
less than one per cent of the total initial sample. After eliminating records with incomplete information in the 
variables of interest, these household-wave observations also account for less than one per cent of the sample 
(see section 5.4.3). 
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Supplementary data on SP coverage across municipalities comes from 
administrative records (see section 3.1 of Chapter 3); household interview dates and 
municipality of residence reported in the MxFLS were used to link these data. Municipality 
population, used to calculate the ratio of programme beneficiaries to total population, was 
obtained from the INEGI 2000 and 2010 Censuses and the 2005 Conteo (see section 3.1 of 
Chapter 3). Linear interpolation was used to calculate the values for the years for which 
data were not available. Population data for 2011-13 are publicly available on CONAPO’s 
website. 
Household head characteristics measured at first interview as well as changes in 
household composition are included in the models to account for preferences and changes 
in preferences. In particular, age, sex, marital status (whether married or not), participation 
in the labour market (whether employed in the 12 months before the first interview) and 
education (none, primary, secondary, high school, or more) of the household head; and 
changes in the logarithm of household size and in the proportion of members 0-5 years, 6-
12 years, 13-15 years, 16-64 years, and 65 and more are used as controls. Rural/urban area 
of residence (less than 2,500 residents/2,500 residents and more) is included too.  
 
5.4.3 Analytic Samples 
The analytic sample for this study includes households with non-missing information for 
the relevant variables for at least two consecutive waves, whose head at first interview was 
part of the household in subsequent waves. This implies that households whose head 
according to first interview died or moved to another household are excluded from the 
analysis. In total, 12,614 and 4,344 household-wave observations are used to analyse the 
health shock measures described above, namely severe accidents and changes in physical 
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capacity, respectively.37 If these samples are restricted to uninsured households at baseline, 
we end up with 3,338 and 1,168 household-wave observations in each case.38 Households 
uninsured at baseline are residents in 122 to 131 municipalities across 16 states.  
 Table 5.1 presents the characteristics of the households included in the analyses. 
The first and second columns include all publicly insured households (i.e. those with social 
security or SP once it became available) together with those uninsured, while the third and 
fourth columns include only uninsured households in 2002 that gained public insurance 
through the SP in subsequent years. The second and fourth columns focus on households 
whose head is 50 years and older, as these are the only household heads for which the 
ability to perform ADL is measured. Overall, most household heads are married, male, with 
no formal education or primary education only. Although labour-market participation is 
lower among older heads, as expected, over two-thirds of the heads 50 years and more 
worked in the reference period; this share reaches 75 per cent among the subsample of 
uninsured at baseline. Around 55 per cent of the households in the complete sample were 
insured at first interview. The main difference between the households in the complete  
                                                 
37 The initial sample comprises households with consistent (not duplicated) head information: 8,439 
households at wave 1 plus 824 new households at wave 2. The steps followed to obtain the final analytic 
sample were: (1) baseline households with no follow-up at wave 2 (969) and new wave 2 households with no 
follow-up at wave 3 (107) were removed; (2) households whose head had died or moved to another household 
by the time the subsequent wave was collected were excluded (391 baseline households and 146 households 
added at wave 2); (3) 73 households that reported having private insurance exclusively were eliminated (see 
footnote above); and (4) households with incomplete information were excluded (328). This resulted in 
12,614 household-wave observations that correspond to 5,365 households with complete information in all 
waves, 1,139 households with complete information in waves 1 and 2, and 745 households with complete 
information in waves 2 and 3. Since changes in physical capacity are only measured for heads 50 years and 
older, the analytic sample in this case is smaller.  
38 Uninsured households at baseline that gained access to social security are also excluded (n = 950) so we can 
compare households that gained insurance through the SP to those that remained uninsured during the whole 
study period.  
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Table 5.1. Sample characteristics at first interview, means and standard deviations 










heads 50+ years 
Household head characteristics           
  Age 45.969 60.440   47.163 61.421 
    (15.816) (9.837)   (15.948) (10.329) 
  Male 0.802 0.737   0.774 0.729 
    (0.398) (0.440)   (0.418) (0.445) 
  No formal education 0.152 0.287   0.256 0.452 
    (0.359) (0.453)   (0.437) (0.498) 
  Last level of education primary 0.479 0.567   0.547 0.512 
    (0.500) (0.496)   (0.498) (0.500) 
  Last level of education secondary 0.202 0.070   0.134 0.017 
    (0.401) (0.256)   (0.341) (0.128) 
  Last level of education high school or more 0.168 0.076   0.062 0.019 
    (0.374) (0.264)   (0.242) (0.138) 
  Worked in the 12 months before the interview 0.815 0.674   0.824 0.745 
    (0.388) (0.469)   (0.381) (0.436) 
  Married 0.653 0.608   0.617 0.544 
    (0.476) (0.488)   (0.486) (0.498) 
Head’s ADL index   0.842     0.841 
    (0.209)     (0.208) 
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(continues) Table 5.1. Sample characteristics at first interview, means and standard deviations 
Household composition variables            
  Household size 4.239 3.948   4.175 3.508 
    (2.032) (2.326)   (2.201) (2.326) 
  Proportion of members 0-5 years 0.112 0.042   0.116 0.035 
    (0.158) (0.092)   (0.164) (0.089) 
  Proportion of members 6-12 years 0.133 0.072   0.153 0.077 
    (0.173) (0.132)   (0.183) (0.142) 
  Proportion of members 13-15 years 0.057 0.047   0.058 0.047 
    (0.108) (0.101)   (0.111) (0.107) 
  Proportion of members 16-64 years 0.604 0.636   0.552 0.576 
    (0.267) (0.322)   (0.285) (0.354) 
  Proportion of members 65 years or older 0.092 0.201   0.118 0.261 
    (0.235) (0.326)   (0.276) (0.374) 
Household insurance status           
  Has public insurance 0.553 0.582   0 0 
    (0.497) (0.493)       
Per capita monthly non-medical consumption (MX$Dec2013) 2,322.27 2,376.65   1,849.21 2,061.52 
  (6,386.36) (6,841.94)   (5,526.19) (7,375.84) 
Number of observations (households) 7,249 2,725   1,827 719 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parenthesis. ADL = activities of daily living. The ADL index takes values 0 to 1; increases indicate improvements in physical 
capacity. MX$Dec2013 = Mexican pesos of December 2013. 
Source: Own estimates based on the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS). 
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sample and those in the subsamples that exclude social security beneficiaries is that the 
latter are less educated.  
 The average health status of household heads 50 years and over, measured using the 
ADL index (0.84; Table 5.1), is good but declining. Nearly 45 per cent report drops in the 
capacity to perform ADL between waves, whereas only 28 per cent report improvements 
(Table 5.2, panel A). Declines in the capacity to perform basic ADL are also more 
prevalent than improvements (29 per cent vs 17 per cent; Table 5.3). No salient differences 
are observed between insured and uninsured households; in particular, current insurance 
status is not associated with larger declines in health. In fact, decreases in the household 
head’s ADL index are more marked for the uninsured, especially in the subsample of 
uninsured at baseline, i.e. those that remain uninsured during the whole study period  
(-0.076 vs -0.047; Table 5.2).  
 Although the second health shock indicator, severe accidents, is measured among all 
household heads, only nearly 3 per cent experienced a health shock so defined (Table 5.3; 
panel B). Therefore, we also consider accidents among other adult members of the 
household, for which the percentage almost doubles. Unlike changes in physical capacity, 
insured households report more accidents than the uninsured for both the head (3.1 per cent 
vs 2.3 per cent) and other adults (6.1 per cent vs 3.4 per cent; Table 5.2).
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Table 5.2. Average changes in health by current insurance status 
    Complete sample  Uninsured at wave 1 
    Insured Uninsured Total  Insured Uninsured Total 
Panel A. Households with heads 50+ years 
   
 
   
  Change in head’s ADL index −0.049 −0.059 −0.052  −0.047 −0.076 -0.067 
    (0.231) (0.239) (0.233)  (0.245) (0.246) (0.246) 
  Proportion reporting decline in ADL index 0.432 0.451 0.438  0.425 0.469 0.455 
  Proportion reporting increase in ADL index 0.277 0.272 0.275  0.304 0.257 0.271 
  Change in head’s basic ADL index −0.039 −0.051 −0.043  −0.023 −0.063 −0.051 
    (0.224) (0.230) (0.226)  (0.226) (0.235) (0.233) 
  Proportion reporting decline in basic ADL index 0.288 0.309 0.294  0.276 0.341 0.321 
  Proportion reporting increase in basic ADL index 0.171 0.169 0.170  0.214 0.167 0.182 




(continues) Table 5.2. Average changes in health by current insurance status 
Panel B. All households  
   
 
   
  Proportion reporting accident of head 0.031 0.023 0.028  0.036 0.022 0.026 
  Proportion reporting accident of other adults 0.061 0.034 0.053  0.070 0.031 0.043 
  Number of observations (household-wave) 8,553 4,061 12,614  1,003 2,335 3,338 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parenthesis. ADL = activities of daily living. The ADL index takes values 0 to 1; increases indicate improvements in physical 
capacity. Changes in health (measured with changes in the ADL index or accidents) refer to changes occurring between wave 1 and wave 2 or wave 2 and wave 3 
of the MxFLS. 
Source: Own estimates based on the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS).
 107 
5.5 Results  
5.5.1 The Effect of Health Shocks and the Role of Public Insurance 
The results obtained using Equation 5.1 indicate uninsured Mexican households are 
unable to protect their consumption levels from severe health shocks to household heads 
(Table 5.3). Passing from being able to perform all ADL to being able to perform none 
reduces consumption by nearly 20 per cent among uninsured households (δ = 0.193; 
p < 0.10; panel A, first column). If the shock affects male heads, whose contribution to 
household income is likely larger, the negative effect on consumption is over 30 per 
cent. Columns 3 and 4 further restrict the attention to potentially more important income 
earners, namely male working heads and male working heads between 50 and 70 years 
old;39 as expected, the effect of health shocks to these household heads is larger.  
 Public insurance in the form of social security seems to have a protective effect, 
but the SP does not. While the coefficients of the interaction between ADL index 
changes and both types of insurance offset the main effect of the health shock (see the 
tests in the last row of panel A; p > 0.10), the results that involve the SP are not 
statistically significant.  
 Panel B of Table 5.3 shows similar results for basic ADL. A change in the head’s 
ability to perform four basic ADL (from being able to perform all to being able to 
perform none) reduces the consumption of uninsured households by 31 per cent 
(δ =0.312; p < 0.01). Again, the negative effect of the health shock is larger when 
relatively more important income earners are affected (columns 2-4). Beneficiaries of 
social security also seem to be insured against this health shock (see the tests in the last 
                                                 
39 Mexico is the second OECD country with the highest effective retirement age, 70 in average 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2015). 
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row of panel B; p > 0.10). In this case, the effect of the SP is significant for some groups 
of heads.  
 The estimates using the second health shock measure, severe accidents, also 
suggest uninsured households are not able to maintain their consumption levels (second 
column of Table 5.4; δ = 0.152; p < 0.05), although the effect is not statistically 
significant for accidents of the household head. This result, however, is likely related to 
the low prevalence of accidents among household heads; as mentioned above (Table 
5.2), less than 3 per cent experienced accidents. The protective effect of social security is 





Table 5.3. Effect of changes in household head’s ADL index on non-medical 
consumption and the role of public insurance, OLS estimates (heads 50+ years) 





  1 2 3 4 
Panel A. General ADL index    
 Change in head’s ADL index 0.193* 0.313** 0.395** 0.461** 
  (0.111) (0.142) (0.158) (0.185) 
 SP × change in head’s ADL index −0.049 −0.278 −0.263 −0.330 
  (0.182) (0.200) (0.210) (0.241) 
 SS × change in head’s ADL index −0.176 −0.399** −0.429** −0.412* 
  (0.133) (0.165) (0.191) (0.219) 
 Household has SP 0.052 0.020 0.034 0.012 
  (0.049) (0.053) (0.054) (0.059) 
 Household has SS 0.049 0.032 0.035 0.036 
  (0.035) (0.041) (0.042) (0.045) 
 State of residence fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 R2 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.09 
 Observations 4,344 3,171 2,451 2,170 
 Ho: δ + γ1 = 0; p > F 0.321 0.801 0.337 0.392 
 Ho: δ + γ2 = 0; p > F 0.821 0.315 0.752 0.678 
     
Panel B. Basic ADL index     
 Change in head’s basic ADL 
index 
0.312*** 0.400*** 0.459*** 0.526** 
 (0.116) (0.149) (0.171) (0.209) 
 SP × change in head’s basic ADL 
index 
−0.164 −0.465** −0.384 −0.500* 
 (0.205) (0.224) (0.239) (0.278) 
 SS × change in head’s basic ADL 
index 
−0.276** −0.426** −0.411** −0.401* 




(continues) Table 5.3. Effect of changes in household head’s ADL index on non-
medical consumption and the role of public insurance, OLS estimates (heads 50+ 
years) 
 Household has SP 0.045 0.015 0.032 0.011 
  (0.048) (0.053) (0.054) (0.058) 
 Household has SS 0.046 0.034 0.040 0.040 
  (0.034) (0.040) (0.042) (0.045) 
 State of residence fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 R2 0.07 0.08 0.1 0.09 
 Observations 4,344 3,171 2,451 2,170 
 Ho: δ + γ1=0; p > F 0.385 0.7 0.654 0.884 
  Ho: δ + γ2 = 0; p > F 0.625 0.76 0.679 0.314 
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the logarithm of per capita non-medical consumption. The 
controls include characteristics of the household head (age, sex, education, marital status, and working 
status) and household composition variables (changes in household size and the share of members under 5 
years, 6-12, 13-15, 16-64, and 65 and over). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10; 
** p < 0.05; *** p <0.01. ADL = activities of daily living, SP = Seguro Popular, SS = social security. 




Table 5.4. Effect of severe accidents on non-medical consumption and the role of 
public insurance, OLS estimates 
 All heads Other adults 
Accident  0.076 −0.152** 
 (0.086) (0.074) 
SP × accident 0.086 0.054 
 (0.156) (0.102) 
SS × accident −0.121 0.158* 
 (0.104) (0.085) 
Household has SP 0.031 0.037 
 (0.025) (0.025) 
Household has SS 0.054*** 0.045** 
 (0.018) (0.018) 
State fixed effects yes yes 
Controls yes yes 
R2 0.07 0.07 
Observations 12,614 12,614 
   
Ho: δ + γ1 = 0; p > F 0.209 0.163 
Ho: δ + γ2 = 0; p > F 0.446 0.888 
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the logarithm of per capita non-medical consumption. 
Health shocks are measured with a binary variable that indicates whether the household head or any other 
adult in the household had a severe accident between waves. The controls include characteristics of the 
household head (age, sex, education, marital status, and working status) and household composition 
variables (changes in household size and the share of members under 5 years, 6-12, 13-15, 16-64, and 65 
and over). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. SP = Seguro 
Popular, SS = social security. 
Source: Own estimates based on the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS). 
 
5.5.2 A Closer Examination of the Seguro Popular in the Event of Health Shocks 
Instrumental Variables Approach 
The results presented so far indicate that health shocks can have sizeable effects on 
households’ consumption, except for that of social security beneficiaries, who seem to 
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be fully insured against these idiosyncratic shocks. No consistent evidence of a 
protective effect of the SP was observed. These estimates are potentially biased, 
however, as unobservable characteristics of publicly insured households can be 
correlated with consumption choices. Therefore, in this section I focus on the subsample 
of uninsured households at baseline that gained insurance through the SP and use the 
geographical variation in the SP coverage to instrument affiliation.  
 Overall, the results for the subsample also indicate that uninsured households are 
not able to protect their consumption levels from health shocks to the household head 
(Table 5.5). The effect is clearer for shocks to relatively more important income earners 
and for basic ADL (panel B of Table 5.5). Additionally, the magnitude of the main 
effect of changes in the heads’ basic ADL index is similar to the one observed with the 
full sample: passing from being able to perform all basic ADL to being able to perform 
none reduces consumption by 32-52 per cent.  
 In line with the results from the previous section, the interaction of self-reported 
affiliation to the SP with the health shock offsets the main effect of the latter but is not 
statistically significant (columns 1 to 4 of Table 5.5). Columns 5 to 8 of Table 5.5 
present the results using the SP municipality coverage to instrument the programme’s 
affiliation. The last two rows of both panels, A for the general ADL index and B for the 
basic ADL index, indicate that the instrument is valid (p < 0.01) and that self-reported 
affiliation to the programme can be considered exogenous (p > 0.10), so OLS estimates 
are preferred. 
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Table 5.5. Effect of changes in head’s ADL index on non-medical consumption and the role of the SP; OLS and IV estimates  
(heads 50 years and older) 
  Subsample of uninsured at baseline, OLS  Subsample of uninsured at baseline, IV 








  1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8 
Panel A. General ADL index         
 ∆ head’s ADL index 0.129 0.274 0.346* 0.442**  0.165 0.282 0.410** 0.503** 
  (0.133) (0.167) (0.185) (0.209)  (0.147) (0.178) (0.195) (0.210) 
 SP × ∆ head’s index 0.046 −0.229 −0.217 −0.202  −0.058 −0.246 −0.355 −0.331 
  (0.222) (0.253) (0.261) (0.302)  (0.282) (0.308) (0.309) (0.325) 
 Household has SP 0.065 0.021 0.071 0.044  −0.087 −0.009 −0.189 −0.274 
  (0.067) (0.077) (0.080) (0.088)  (0.284) (0.303) (0.331) (0.368) 
 State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 R2 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.10  0.06 0.08 0.09 0.08 
 Observations 1,168 844 722 605  1,167 843 721 604 
 Ho: instrument weak      p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 
 Ho: SP exogenous      p > 0.10 p > 0.10 p > 0.10 p > 0.10 
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(continues) Table 5.5. Effect of changes in head’s ADL index on non-medical consumption and the role of the SP; OLS and IV estimates 
(heads 50 years and older) 
Panel B. Basic ADL index         
 ∆ head’s ADL index 0.231 0.321* 0.439** 0.521**  0.266* 0.332* 0.511** 0.588** 
  (0.145) (0.184) (0.200) (0.245)  (0.156) (0.198) (0.213) (0.248) 
 SP × ∆ head’s index −0.148 −0.418 −0.385 −0.392  −0.233 −0.441 −0.514 −0.479 
  (0.270) (0.314) (0.311) (0.370)  (0.299) (0.342) (0.334) (0.366) 
 Household has SP  0.054 0.014 0.063 0.038  −0.104 −0.029 −0.215 −0.300 
  (0.067) (0.076) (0.080) (0.088)  (0.275) (0.298) (0.327) (0.360) 
 State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 R2 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.10  0.06 0.08 0.09 0.08 
 Observations 1,168 844 722 605  1,167 843 721 604 
 Ho: instrument weak      p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 
 Ho: SP exogenous      p > 0.10 p > 0.10 p > 0.10 p > 0.10 
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the logarithm of per capita non-medical consumption. The controls include characteristics of the household head (age, sex, 
education, marital status, and working status) and household composition variables (changes in household size and the share of members under 5 years, 6-12, 13-15, 16-64, 
and 65 and over). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. ∆ denotes changes, ADL = activities of daily living, SP = Seguro Popular. 
Source: Own estimates based on the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS). 
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 Table 5.6 presents the results for the subsample of uninsured at baseline using 
severe accidents as the health shock measure. Since an even smaller share of the 
household heads in the subsample experienced accidents (2.6 per cent, Table 5.2), only 
accidents to all adults in the household (including heads) and adult members other than 
the head are analysed. The chi-square test in the last row of Table 5.6 indicates that the 
SP self-reported indicator should be considered endogenous and thus the IV estimates 
(columns 3 and 4) are preferred in this case (p < 0.10). In contrast to the results obtained 
for disability shocks, we observe that households that gained access to health insurance 
through the SP can mitigate the adverse effect of severe accidents (γ = 0.398, p < 0.05 in 
column 3; γ = 0.386, p < 0.05 in column 4 of Table 5.6). Uninsured households that 
experienced severe accidents, on the other hand, do suffer consumption drops that range 
between 16 per cent and 27 per cent (δ=-0.271, p < 0.05 in column 3; δ = -0.160, 
p < 0.10 in column 4 of Table 5.6).  
 Taken together, the results of this section suggest that the SP effectively provided 
consumption insurance for unexpected health events such as accidents, but not for those 
that resulted in limited physical functioning.  
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Table 5.6. Effect of severe accidents on non-medical consumption and the role of the 
SP, OLS and IV estimates  
  Subsample of uninsured at baseline 
 OLS  IV 
 Non-head Any adult  Non-head Any adult 
 1 2  3 4 
Severe accident −0.192* −0.076  −0.271** −0.160* 
 (0.107) (0.077)  (0.118) (0.093) 
SP × severe accident 0.163 0.123  0.398** 0.386** 
 (0.142) (0.115)  (0.193) (0.185) 
Household has SP 0.032 0.028  −0.283 −0.315* 
 (0.036) (0.036)  (0.179) (0.189) 
State fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R2 0.07 0.07  0.05 0.05 
Observations 3,338 3,338  3,336 3,336 
Ho: instrument weak    p < 0.01 p < 0.01 
Ho: SP exogenous    p < 0.10 p < 0.10 
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the logarithm of per capita non-medical consumption. Health 
shocks are measured with a binary variable that indicates whether any adult had a severe accident between 
waves. The controls include characteristics of the household head (age, sex, education, marital status, and 
working status) and household composition variables (household size, share of members under 5 years, 6-12, 
13-15, 16-64, and 65 and over). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; 
*** p < 0.01. SP = Seguro Popular. 
Source: Own estimates based on the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS). 
 
PROSPERA Robustness Check 
As previous studies found that the conditional cash transfer programme PROSPERA 
mitigates the effect of health shocks among Mexican households (Chiapa 2008, Skoufias 
2007), the models were recalculated using as an additional control a binary variable that 
indicates whether the households are beneficiaries of that programme. Tables 5.7 and 5.8 
show, however, that the results are virtually unaffected.  
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Table 5.7. Effect of changes in head’s ADL index on non-medical consumption. 
PROSPERA robustness check, OLS estimates  
(heads 50 years and older) 
    Subsample of uninsured at baseline   





  1 2 3 4 
Panel A. General ADL index         
  Change in head’s ADL index 0.135 0.283* 0.356* 0.451** 
    (0.133) (0.168) (0.186) (0.210) 
  SP × change in head’s ADL index 0.026 -0.260 -0.246 -0.228 
    (0.224) (0.257) (0.264) (0.306) 
  Household has SP 0.056 0.007 0.055 0.028 
    (0.069) (0.079) (0.082) (0.091) 
  Household has PROSPERA 0.069 0.082 0.085 0.082 
    (0.081) (0.092) (0.100) (0.109) 
  State of residence fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  R2 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.10 
  Observations 1,168 844 722 605 
  Ho: instrument weak p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 
  Ho: SP exogenous p > 0.10 p > 0.10 p > 0.10 p > 0.10 
Panel B. Basic ADL index         
  Change in head’s basic ADL 
index 
0.235 0.330* 0.448** 0.528** 
  (0.145) (0.185) (0.200) (0.246) 
  SP × change in head’s basic ADL 
index 
-0.170 -0.459 -0.422 -0.426 
  (0.273) (0.320) (0.317) (0.376) 
  Household has SP 0.045 -0.002 0.047 0.022 
    (0.068) (0.078) (0.082) (0.091) 
  Household has PROSPERA 0.072 0.089 0.087 0.081 
    (0.081) (0.093) (0.100) (0.110) 
  State of residence fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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(continues) Table 5.7. Effect of changes in head’s ADL index on non-medical 
consumption. PROSPERA robustness check, OLS estimates 
 Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  R2 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.10 
  Observations 1,168 844 722 605 
  Ho: instrument weak p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 
  Ho: SP exogenous p > 0.10 p > 0.10 p > 0.10 p > 0.10 
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the logarithm of per capita non-medical consumption. See the 
list of controls in the table below. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; 
*** p < 0.01. ADL = activities of daily living, SP = Seguro Popular. 
Source: Own estimates based on the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS). 
 
Table 5.8. Effect of severe accidents on non-medical consumption. PROSPERA  
robustness check, IV estimates 
  Subsample of uninsured at baseline 
  Heads Other adults Any adult 
Accident  0.014 -0.271** -0.164* 
  (0.112) (0.117) (0.094) 
SP × accident 0.350 0.392** 0.384** 
  (0.240) (0.192) (0.184) 
Household has SP -0.308 -0.291 -0.324* 
  (0.189) (0.182) (0.192) 
Household has PROSPERA 0.076* 0.073* 0.076* 
(0.044) (0.043) (0.043) 
State fixed effects yes yes yes 
Controls yes yes yes 
R2 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Observations 3,336 3,336 3,336 
        
Ho: instrument weak p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 
Ho: SP exogenous p < 0.10 p < 0.10 p < 0.10 
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the logarithm of per capita non-medical consumption. Health 
shocks are measured with a binary variable that indicates whether adult household members had a severe 
accident between waves. The controls include characteristics of the household head (age, sex, education, 
marital status, and working status) and household composition variables (household size, share of members 
under 5 years, 6-12, 13-15, 16-64, and 65 and over). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10; 
** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. SP = Seguro Popular. 
Source: Own estimates based on the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS). 
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Exploring Changes in Household’s Labour Supply  
This final subsection of the Results explores whether households use labour supply as a 
copying mechanism in the event of health shocks, and whether this was altered by the 
implementation of the Seguro Popular. On the one hand, households may increase labour 
supply to cover additional health expenditures and income losses associated to health 
shocks, but the opposite could occur if caregivers are needed to assist the member(s) who 
experience health shocks. 
 Equation 5.1 was also used for this analysis, but the change in non-medical 
consumption was replaced by the change in the number of adult household members active 
in the labour market as the dependent variable. Changes in the number of hours worked for 
those active in the labour market before and after the health shock were not analysed 
because the sample size was insufficient. In the case of shocks to the household head, the 
labour supply of the head was excluded.  
 Table 5.9 shows that no evidence of labour supply adjustments to cope with shocks 
was found. Irrespective of insurance status, the coefficients of the health shocks are not 
statistically different from zero in any case (p>0.10). While this is consistent with the 
results of Lindelow and Wagstaff (2005) for China, it is important to consider that the 
outcome variable only reflects aggregate participation in the labour market. Other copying 
mechanisms may also be relatively more important in the event of health shocks. Future 
analyses should explore other informal risk-sharing mechanisms, including the intensive 
margin of labour supply (i.e. number of hours worked).   
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Table 5.9. Effect of health shocks on household’s participation in the labour market and the role of the SP; IV estimates 
 Subsample of uninsured at baseline 































  Any adult 
  1 2 3 4   5 6 7 8   9 
Health shock 0.016 0.071 0.104 0.093   0.083 0.13 0.168 0.137   0.150 
  (0.107) (0.145) (0.167) (0.185)   (0.109) (0.153) (0.176) (0.195)   (0.107) 
SP × health shock 0.001 -0.287 -0.309 -0.153   -0.108 -0.241 -0.232 0.015   0.202 
  (0.281) (0.318) (0.329) (0.351)   (0.276) (0.336) (0.352) (0.338)   (0.207) 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes 
R2 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.05   0.12 0.14 0.12 0.06   0.08 
Observations 1,197 862 734 615   1,197 862 734 615   3,396 
Ho: instrument weak p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01   p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01   p < 0.01 
Ho: Sp exogenous p < 0.10 p < 0.10 p < 0.10 p < 0.10   p < 0.10 p < 0.10 p < 0.10 p < 0.10   p < 0.10 
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the number of adult household members active in the labour market. SP = Seguro Popular; ADL = activities of 
daily living. The ADL index takes values 0 to 1; increases indicate improvements in physical capacity. Health shocks (measured with changes in the ADL index 
or accidents) refer to changes occurring between wave 1 and wave 2 or wave 2 and wave 3 of the MxFLS. The controls include characteristics of the household 
head (age, sex, education, marital status, and working status) and household composition variables (household size, share of members under 5 years, 6-12, 13-15, 
16-64, and 65 and over). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.  
Source: Own estimates based on the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS). 
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5.6 Discussion 
The contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, I provide evidence on the welfare 
consequences of incomplete insurance markets in a middle-income country with a 
fragmented health system; and second, I analyse the protective effect of public health 
insurance. The results indicate that uninsured Mexican families are not able to cope with 
the consequences of health shocks, which is consistent with previous analyses for Indonesia 
(Gertler and Gruber 2002) and Vietnam (Wagstaff 2007). Severe accidents are associated 
with declines in non-medical consumption that range between 16 per cent and 27 per cent. 
Likewise, changes in the health status of household heads, especially those who are 
relatively more important income earners, are associated with declines in non-medical 
consumption that can reach 50 per cent.  
 While the results concerning social security should be interpreted cautiously, it 
seems that this type of public insurance plays an important protective role against both 
types of shocks. Having social security fully offsets the main negative effect of physical 
capacity declines and accidents on non-medical consumption. On the other hand, the 
endogeneity-corrected estimates about the role of the SP differed depending on which 
health shock measure was taken into consideration. For the case of unexpected events such 
as severe accidents, the results indicate that the SP effectively provides consumption 
insurance to beneficiaries, but not so for the case of disability shocks measured by changes 
in the ability to perform ADL. This conclusion is not surprising, though, if we consider that 
income losses associated to disability shocks are likely larger than medical care 
expenditures (Gertler and Gruber 2002). Unlike social security that provides both health 
care at no cost at the point of service and disability pensions, the SP only provides the 
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former. Hence, if disability shocks affect relatively more the income-earning capacity of the 
household, the protective effect of the SP will be limited.  
 One of the limitations of this study is that the role of risk aversion is ignored. 
According to the framework developed by Chetty and Looney (2006), zero or small 
consumption drops could also be observed if agents are very risk averse, i.e. if γ is high (see 
section 5.3). We observed, however, that the health shocks analysed generally resulted in 
consumption drops for those who remained uninsured during the study period. Further 
studies should consider adding indicators of risk aversion to the empirical specifications.  
 The results of this analysis add to the literature that had found reductions in medical 
care expenditures among beneficiaries of the SP (King G. et al. 2009; Knaul et al. 2012). 
Nonetheless, the study on consumption fluctuations provides an alternative measure of the 
welfare gains that can be obtained through the expansion of public insurance and, more 
importantly, highlights the sizeable economic costs that households face in the event of 
major illness when public insurance is not available. In this regard, it seems pertinent to 
consider whether other social security benefits such as disability insurance should be 
extended to non-beneficiaries. Certainly, large welfare gains could be obtained from 
insuring the income loss from severe disabilities. Section 7.3 further discusses the policy 
implications of these results, but more research is required to weight both the potential 











6. Measuring Pure Inequality and Mobility in Health during the 
Mexican Insurance Expansion 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The distribution rather than just overall attainment of health has become an important 
indicator to evaluate a country’s health system performance (World Health Organization 
2000), as well as the success of policy interventions to extend insurance coverage. 
Nonetheless, measuring changes in the distribution of health, and specifically changes in 
inequality and mobility in a population is far from straightforward. A growing number of 
studies have focused on both developing measurement tools and providing evidence for 
specific countries or groups of countries (van Doorslaer and Van Ourti 2011). Most of these 
studies, however, have only addressed health disparities across socioeconomic status, and 
more specifically, income-related inequalities by exploiting the existing covariance 
structure between income and health. While this approach has been helpful in drawing 
attention to dimensions of well-being other than income, it raises some conceptual and 
methodological concerns that we attempt to address in this chapter.  
 Approaches that focus on measuring socio-economic inequalities in health are 
problematic on a number of grounds. First, it may well be argued that all health inequalities 
should be a cause of concern and not only those related to socioeconomic status (Gakidou 
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et al. 2000). Second, the analysis of health-related inequalities often draws on 
unsatisfactory cardinalisation procedures to deal with ordinal variables such as self-
assessed health (SAH). Finally, socio-economic measures do not address the fact that 
income and health might well be codetermined, as evidence suggests. Similarly, with few 
exceptions (Contoyannis et al. 2004), studies that have concentrated on measuring health 
mobility also tend to focus on socio-economic mobility. Alternative distributional measures 
of pure health inequality and mobility are less problematic and more suitable to evaluate the 
potential effect of policy interventions.    
 This Chapter employs a recently developed class of indices suitable for ordinal data 
to analyse the pattern of pure health inequality and mobility between 2002 and 2009 in 
Mexico (Cowell and Flachaire 2016, 2017). The Mexican case provides an interesting 
setting for this study in view of the ambitious health reform that extended coverage to the 
entire population over that period (see details in Chapter 2).  
 Insurance coverage, whether public or private, provides financial security, and 
specifically reduces the risk of unpredictable medical costs that households would 
otherwise absorb. If such costs are too high, individuals go without health care, which can 
have undesirable consequences for their health. Health insurance provides access to 
primary care and preventive services too. In particular, if coverage is provided to the entire 
population (as in the case of the Seguro Popular), it could reduce pre-existing disparities in 
the access to health care inputs, and so reduce pure health inequalities. This would be 
expected to reduce the disparities in health across the population, and more specifically, 
improve the health of those with the poorest health, hence improving pure health mobility. 
 Nonetheless, the production of health depends on a large list of inputs in addition to 
health care access. Moreover, the universalisation of health insurance alone guarantees 
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neither use, nor access to needed health care, especially preventive services. Whether 
increased access takes place, in particular to high value health care that improves health 
status is an empirical question. Overall, the consensus from recent studies drawing on 
insurance expansions in the US is that coverage improves individuals’ perceived health (see 
a summary in Sommers et al. 2017). This is exemplified by the Oregon study, a key and 
paradigmatic randomised expansion of health insurance in the US, that found a 25 per cent 
increase in the likelihood of individuals reporting good or very good health after one year 
(Finkelstein et al. 2012). The evidence on the effects of the Seguro Popular is more limited, 
but Teruel et al. (2012) also found that the programme increased the probability of 
reporting good health by 6 per cent. However, little is known about the effects on the 
distribution of health. Evidence from China, a country that has also undergone important 
reforms to increase insurance coverage among poorer and rural families, suggests that 
health insurance is associated with reductions in health inequalities, but the overall trend 
seems to be largely driven by factors outside the health system (Wang and Yu 2016). In 
fact, health inequalities have increased in China between 1997 and 2009 in both rural and 
urban areas. While no causal interpretation can be given to our results, we expect to provide 
new evidence on the potential association between health insurance expansions and the 
distribution of health.   
 To fully exploit the information on individual changes in health status between 
points in time, we also analyse short-run mobility in health. According to Shorrocks’ 
(1978) seminal paper in the income dynamics literature, the concept of mobility captures 
the extent to which inequality fades over time. Hence, the existence of health mobility 
would suggest that inequality declines could be expected in the long term. Likewise, a 
strong persistence in health would suggest that inequality declines are less likely. Since 
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health is not a continuous measure, we use a recently developed mobility indicator that 
allows dealing with ordinal variables (Cowell and Flachaire 2016). A major contribution of 
this class of indices is that it separates the definition of status (i.e., the position in the 
distribution of health) from the definition of mobility.  
 This Chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 contains a critical guide to the 
relevant literature. Section 6.3 describes the measures, analytic sample, and the methods 
employed to analyse both inequality and mobility in health. Section 6.5 presents the results, 
including some robustness checks. Finally, section 6.6 discusses the results.  
 
6.2 Relevant Literature 
6.2.1 Health Inequalities 
The study of health inequalities has been the focus of numerous studies over the past 
decades. Most analytic tools employed in these studies have been inspired by the income 
inequality literature. But there are salient differences between the nature of income —an 
unbounded, cardinal variable— and health —commonly measured with a categorical 
variable—, for which the real distance between the categories is unknown. In particular, 
concentration indices of health on income (CI) are the most popular tool to measure 
income-related health inequalities (see a survey in Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2000, and 
van Doorslaer and Van Ourti 2011). The World Bank has even published a practical guide 
to facilitate the estimation of CI (O’Donnell et al. 2008). One of the features that makes this 
measure attractive is that it can be decomposed into the contributions of a set of 
characteristics, provided the relevant outcome can be written as a linear function of these 
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characteristics (Wagstaff et al. 2003).40 But as CI should only be used with cardinal 
variables, arbitrary cardinalisation methods have been commonly applied. For example, van 
Doorslaer and Jones (2003) use an ordered probit model to convert SAH categories into a 
continuous index that is then employed to measure inequality. According to Erreygers and 
van Ourti (2010), however, this rescaling procedure does affect the estimates. Indeed, 
Costa-Font and Hernández (2013) show in a meta-regression analysis that most of the 
variation in health inequality estimates comes from differences in the cardinalisation of 
health status.   
  Another aspect that makes the CI approach problematic is that the analysis is based 
on a measure of status that ranks individuals according to socioeconomic status, i.e., 
individual status is given by their position in the income (or consumption) distribution, as 
opposed to a natural health ranking akin to pure health inequalities. The use of CI implies 
that all socioeconomic inequalities are considered illegitimate (unfair and avoidable), and 
so ignores the fact that some income differences across individuals may be a matter of 
choice or may reflect variations in preferences (Fleurbaey and Schokkaert 2011), and that 
income and health may be co-determined. Furthermore, the CI approach neglects other 
aspects of inequalities in health. While health disparities due to demographics such as age 
and sex are normally considered legitimate (hence the demographic standardisation of 
health status is a common practice), the role of other factors as a source of 
(legitimate/illegitimate) inequalities is ignored. Systematic health disparities have been 
found with respect to race, ethnic origin, place of residence, and other characteristics, 
                                                 
40 The literature on social determinants of health is largely based on the analyses of the contribution of 
different socioeconomic and demographic characteristics to health inequalities (Commission on Social 
Determinants of Health 2008).  
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however (e.g. King M. et al. 2009, Cook et al. 2010). Therefore, it has been argued that all 
health inequalities should be a cause of concern and not only those related to 
socioeconomic status (Gakidou et al. 2000). 
 In this study, we use an approach to measure pure health inequalities before and 
after the Mexican health insurance expansion that overcomes the technical and conceptual 
difficulties outlined above. In particular, we estimate a class of indices that do not require 
any cardinalisation and use a similar status concept to those used in poverty and relative 
deprivation analyses (Cowell and Flachaire 2017; see section 6.3.3).  
 While the analysis of income inequalities has evidenced that Mexico is one of the 
most unequal countries (Esquivel 2015), little is known about the distribution of health. A 
few studies that have addressed this issue, have employed the most common CI approach 
and have mainly focused on health care (Urquieta-Salomón and Villarreal 2016, Barraza-
Lloréns et al. 2013). In the case of China, a country that has also recently increased health 
insurance coverage, the study of the distribution of health has received much more attention 
(e.g. Baeten et al. 2013, Tang et al. 2008), but again most analyses have focused on 
income-related health inequalities. The study by Wang and Yu (2016) is an exception that 
finds that health inequality considerably increased between 1997 and 2009 in China. The 
authors argue that this is likely related to factors outside the health system such as 
increasing income inequality and poverty, and environment deterioration. In fact, their 
results suggest that health insurance contributed to the reduction of health inequalities, 
although the overall pattern was in the opposite direction.  
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6.2.2 Health Dynamics 
Health dynamics have been much less studied than health inequalities. Hauck and Rice 
(2004) and Contoyannis et al. (2004) are relatively recent exceptions that rely on 
measurement tools employed in the income dynamics literature. Hauck and Rice (2004) use 
variance components random effects models and linear dynamic regression models to 
analyse mobility in a cardinal indicator of mental health taken from the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS). In the first case, the measure of mobility is obtained from the 
proportion of the total variability in health attributed to the permanent component (i.e., 
unobserved individual heterogeneity); in the second case, the estimated coefficient of the 
lagged health variable indicates the extent of mobility. They find there is much mobility in 
mental health but important variation across socioeconomic groups are observed. In 
particular, the incidence and persistence of mental illness is higher among low income 
individuals. Contoyannis et al. (2004) also use a dynamic regression approach with data 
from the BHPS. Since their health measure is a categorical indicator of SAH, however, 
their specification is non-linear (namely a dynamic panel ordered probit). Unlike Hauck 
and Rice (2004), they provide evidence of substantial health persistence and hence limited 
pure health mobility. Additionally, they show that attrition does not alter their findings. 
 While these studies are important to assess the existence of mobility in health, a 
different approach is needed if the objective is to analyse pure health mobility patterns.41 
Here we use a class of measures to compare mobility during the first half of the Mexican 
                                                 
41 Jones and López Nicolás (2004) developed a mobility measure that can be used to analyse the distribution 
of pure health with a longitudinal perspective. Although their application is to the CI of health on income 
discussed above, measures of total inequality in health, specifically the Gini coefficient of health can be 
estimated and decomposed in a similar way. A major limitation of this method, however, is that it requires a 
cardinal measure of health.  
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health insurance expansion with mobility during the second half of the expansion (see 
section 6.4.2).  
 
6.3 Data and Methods 
6.3.1 Data and Measures 
This chapter uses information from the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), the 
longitudinal survey that is described in section 3.2 of Chapter 3.  
 The health variable employed is the response to the question currently, do you 
consider your health is…?, originally coded as very good (1), good (2), regular (3), bad (4), 
and very bad (5). This information is available for individuals 15 years and older, which 
constitute the basic unit of analysis. To calculate inequality indicators, the variable was 
recoded so that higher values represent better health (i.e., very bad health was recoded as 1, 
bad health was recoded as 2, and so on). 
 SAH information has been widely used in the literature that analyses the 
relationship between health and socioeconomic status (e.g. Adams et al. 2003, Deaton and 
Paxson 1998, Salas 2002), as well as in the studies that focus on the relationship between 
health and lifestyles (e.g. Contoyannis and Jones 2004). While SAH is a simple subjective 
indicator that provides an ordinal ranking of perceived health status, previous studies have 
shown that it is a good predictor of subsequent use of medical care (e.g. van Doorslaer et al. 
2004) and subsequent mortality (e.g. Burström and Fredlund 2001). A number of studies, 
however, have suggested that SAH may be measured with error if different groups of the 
population systematically consider different cut point levels when reporting SAH (Groot 
2000, Sadana et al. 2000, Murray et al. 2001). Using SAH information from the Canadian 
National Population Health Survey Lindeboom and van Doorslaer (2004) found that cut 
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points varied with sex and age, although not with income and education. Our analysis of 
inequalities is therefore conducted for different population groups defined by sex, age, and 
type of residence area.  
 Proxy information of SAH was used if available to increase the sample size (see a 
detailed discussion of the sample size and the effect of non-response in section 6.3.2). Since 
this could be a potential source of bias due to the subjective nature of the variable, section 
6.5.3 discusses the implications. 
 Other variables employed in the analyses include sociodemographic characteristics 
at baseline, namely binary variables to indicate whether the individual was female, lived in 
rural areas, and was active in the labour market in the past 12 months. The region of 
residence, age group (15 to 30 years, 31 to 45 years, and 46 or older), education level as 
defined by the highest level of education completed (none, primary, secondary, high school, 
and university), marital status (cohabitating couple, separated or divorced, single, and 
widowed), and household size are also used.  
 
6.3.2 Sample Description 
Like other longitudinal surveys, the MxFLS suffers from different types of non-response. 
Attrition, a type of non-response specific to longitudinal surveys, occurs when baseline 
participants are not able or willing to participate in subsequent waves of the survey. The 
reasons behind attrition can be death, serious illness, national or international migration, or 
simple refusal (see Uhrig 2008 for a review of the reasons of panel attrition). Item  
non-response, on the other hand, occurs when participants have missing information in 
some parts of the survey. This type of non-response may be caused by unwillingness to 
provide information that is considered sensitive, or simply because the answer is unknown. 
  132 
The survey context is also important to understand item non-response (Frick and Grabka 
2005); the complexity of surveys like the MxFLS may well explain at least part of this 
problem. In either case, if non-response is completely random, the results would be 
unaffected and simple case-wise deletion would be a valid alternative (Rubin 1987). This is 
unlikely, however, and therefore constitutes a potential source of bias that must be 
addressed.  
 To account for multiple events affecting longitudinal samples over time, weighting 
and imputation methods are the most common ways of dealing with attrition and item  
non-response, respectively (Jenkins 2011). While specific weights can be constructed to 
address the research question of interest (e.g. Jenkins 2009, Contoyannis et al. 2004, Jones 
et al. 2006), those normally provided by the survey administrators are often employed. 
These weights are designed to produce estimates that represent the population from which 
the sample was drawn and to adjust for non-response. Imputed data is also frequently 
provided by the survey administrators, especially for variables such as income, with 
relatively high item non-response rates.  
 Both weighting and imputation, however, normally rely on different assumptions 
about non-response patterns that have to be considered. Many studies on income inequality 
and mobility have found that differential attrition does not have a substantial impact on the 
conclusions (see a detailed discussion of this in chapter 3 of Jenkins 2011). Using the 
British Household Panel Survey and the European Community Household Panel to analyse 
socioeconomic determinants of health, Jones et al. (2006) also show that health-related 
attrition has little impact on the results. Frick and Grabka (2005), on the other hand, show 
that using only non-imputed data from the German Socioeconomic Panel Study 
significantly underestimates income mobility. 
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 Overall, the MxFLS has relatively low levels of attrition. In particular, 9.2 per cent 
of the participants 15 years and older at baseline was lost to follow-up at wave 2, while an 
additional 7.3 per cent was lost to follow-up at wave 3 (Table 6.1). General response rates 
of the MxFLS are also good but vary across books. For example, the book that contains 
information about household consumption has a response rate of 95 per cent at baseline, 
while the book on adult cognitive ability has a response rate of 85 per cent. Non-response 
in SAH, however, is relatively high. If no proxy responses are considered, between 17 per 
cent and 22 per cent of the participants have missing SAH information; only after 
considering proxy responses the item non-response decreases to 10 per cent approximately 
(Table 6.1). In contrast, SAH non-response in the British Household Panel Survey is less 
than 1 per cent (Lynn 2006).  
 If we consider both participation in all three waves and complete SAH information 
(including proxy responses), we end up with a balanced sample of 15,088 individuals or 
45,264 wave-individual observations, which constitutes the main analytic sample. The 
weights of the MxFLS provided are used in the main analysis, as these adjust for  
non-response.42 Section 6.5.3, however, explores other specifications to assess the 
robustness of the results, including unweighted estimates, multiple imputation, non-proxy 
information only, and inequality estimates using the unbalanced sample.  
 
  
                                                 
42 The survey materials available at the website of the MxFLS include a document that explains the 
calculation of the weights. In sum, the weights are first calculated at the household level as the inverse of the 
joint probability of selecting this last sampling unit. These weights imply three types of adjustments: 1) to 
account for non-response, 2) for projections to the entire population, and 3) for calibration. Once the 
household weights are adjusted, individual weights for each book (with and without proxy responses) are 
calculated. 
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Table 6.1. MxFLS non-response 
(sample of individuals 15 years and older at baseline) 




Complete SAH information Item non-
response (no proxy) (with proxy) 
1 23,724       19,778 21,610 8.9% 
2 21,550 90.8% 2,174 9.2% 16,936 19,091 11.4% 
3 19,971 84.2% 1,579 7.3% 15,546 17,635 11.7% 
Notes: Only baseline participants considered (individuals added to replenish the sample in the second and 
third waves are excluded from the analyses). 53 observations with no information of age at baseline are also 
excluded.  
Source: Own estimates based on the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS). 
 
 Figure 6.1 shows the distribution of SAH by survey wave. Most of the individuals 
have regular or good health. The share of those reporting very bad and bad health is slightly 
higher in the last wave, but the difference is not clear enough to claim that the distribution 
became worse over the period. Table 6.2 shows the sociodemographic characteristics of the 
sample. About half of these individuals were female, active in the labour market, and lived 
in rural areas at baseline. Their education level was generally low (11 per cent reported no 
formal education and 43 per cent had only completed primary education), and nearly two 
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Figure 6.1. Self-assessed health by survey wave 
 
Notes: Respondents who participated in all three waves and have complete SAH (proxy information 
considered), n=15,088; unweighted percentages.  















Very bad Bad Regular Good Very good
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Table 6.2. Baseline characteristics of the balanced sample  
(unweighted figures) 
    %/mean n 
Age (mean) 37.8 15,088 
  15 to 30 years 39.2% 5,913 
  31 to 45 years 30.5% 4,597 
  46 years or more 30.3% 4,578 
Female 55.0% 8,298 
Marital status     
  Cohabitating couple 63.5% 9,584 
  Divorced or separated 3.9% 588 
  Single 28.1% 4,244 
  Widowed 4.4% 670 
Highest education level completed   
  None 10.9% 1,633 
  Primary 43.0% 6,472 
  Secondary 26.1% 3,924 
  High School 13.1% 1,972 
  University 7.0% 1,048 
Worked in the past 12 months 53.5% 8,078 
Household size (mean) 5.0 15,088 
Rural   47.4% 7,154 
Region     
  South-south east 21.4% 3,228 
  Centre-occident 19.7% 2,965 
  Centre 18.3% 2,758 
  Northeast 19.5% 2,943 
  Northwest 21.2% 3,194 
Notes: The balanced sample include respondents who participated in all three waves and have complete SAH 
(proxy information considered), n=15,088. 
Source: Own estimates based on the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS). 
 
  137 
6.3.3 Measuring Inequality in Health  
To analyse inequality in health status, we employ the Cowell and Flachaire (2017) 
inequality measure specifically developed to deal with ordinal variables such as SAH. Let 
𝑛𝑘 be the number of persons in each SAH category k = 1, 2,…, 5, where 1 is the least 
desired category (very bad health) and 5 is the most desired category (very good health). 




𝑙=1   or  ∑ 𝑛𝑙
𝐾
𝑙=1𝑘(𝑖)                 (6.1) 
 
 Normalising by the size of total population, 𝑛 = ∑ 𝑛𝑘
𝐾
1 , so that individual’s status is 












𝑙=1𝑘(𝑖)                 (6.2) 
  
where 𝑠𝑖 and 𝑠𝑖′ are the downward and upward looking definitions of individual’s status, 
respectively. If there was perfect equality, all the individuals would be in the same category 
and both expressions would be equal to one; this maximum status is the reference point. 
Therefore, inequality measurement amounts to aggregate the information vector with the 
status of all individuals in relation to the equality vector of ones (1,1,…1).  
 Based on a set of elementary axioms, Cowell and Flachaire (2017) show that 










𝑖=1 − 1] , 𝛼 ∈ ℝ, 𝛼 ≠ 0,1               (6.3) 
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where 𝛼 < 1 indicates the sensitivity of the index to different parts of the health 
distribution. In particular, high values of 𝛼 produce indices that are more sensitive to  
high-status inequality, while low and negative values produce indices that are more 
sensitive to low status. Depending on whether we use the definitions of status 𝑠𝑖 or  𝑠𝑖′ (2) 
to calculate 𝐼𝛼(𝑠) (3), we will have an index of ordinal inequality based on a downward or 







𝑖=1                  (6.4) 
 
 As can be seen in equations 6.5 to 6.7 the Cowell and Flachaire class of indices is 
actually similar to the well-known Generalised Entropy class of inequality measures 𝐺𝐸𝛼 
(Cowell 1980, Shorrocks 1980). The second, however, takes the mean 𝜇(𝑠) as the reference 
point, which makes sense only if the measure of status is cardinal. Therefore, when ordinal 
variables such as SAH are employed, a common approach is to use an arbitrary 
cardinalisation to estimate 𝐺𝐸𝛼. We use this approach in section 5.3 to test whether these 

































 𝑛𝑖=1                 (6.7) 
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 Percentile bootstrap with 1,000 replications is used to calculate confidence intervals, 
i.e., we generate 1,000 bootstrap samples by resampling with replacement from the 
observed data, and then we estimate 𝐼𝛼
𝑏 (or 𝐺𝐸𝛼
𝑏), with b =1,…,1000, for each bootstrap 




𝑏 ]                 (6.8) 
 
where 𝑐0.025
𝑏  and 𝑐0.975
𝑏  are the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of the Empirical Distribution 
Function of the bootstrap statistics.  
 All the routines to estimate the Cowell-Flachaire indices were programmed in Stata 
14.2. The routine created by Jenkins to estimate generalised entropy measures was also 
used (Jenkins 2006). 
 
6.3.4 Measuring Mobility in Health 
Transition matrices or contingency tables provide a simple alternative to explore mobility. 
These matrices have been widely used to analyse mobility with categorical data such as 
employment status, educational attainment, or income quintiles (e.g. Ferrie 2005, Corak 
and Piraino 2010). Let S denote the set of all possible health status values, with S =[0,1] 
and subsets S1,…,Sk ⊂ S such that 𝑈𝑘=1
𝐾 𝑆𝑘 = 𝑆. Also, let nkl be the number of individuals in 








                    (6.9) 
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 If nobody remains in the same position (perfect mobility), all the elements in the 
diagonal are equal to zero; if everybody stays in the same position (no mobility), all the 
elements in the diagonal are equal to one.  
 Mobility indices, however, provide a more useful approach that takes advantage of 
all the available information at the individual level. In particular, we use the Cowell and 
Flachaire (2016) mobility index that has at least two important advantages compared to 
other commonly used mobility measures: it is able to capture nonlinear relationships, and it 
separates the definition of individual’s status from the definition of mobility.  
  Let 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑣𝑖 denote the status of individual i at time t0 and time t1, respectively, 
where 𝑢𝑖, 𝑣𝑖 ∈ 𝑆 and S =[0,1], then the profile 𝑧 ≔ {(𝑢𝑖 , 𝑣𝑖)𝑖=1,…,𝑛} contains all the 
information about mobility for the population of n individuals. Based on a set of axioms on 
mobility orderings over all possible pairs z, Cowell and Flachaire (2016) derived the 
following class of mobility measures that are independent of the population size and the 















− 1]𝑛𝑖=1 , 𝛼 ∈ ℝ, 𝛼 ≠ 0,1            (6.10) 
 
where 𝜇𝑢 and 𝜇𝑣 are the means of u ad v, respectively, and 𝛼 is a sensitivity parameter that 
characterises the particular members of the class. Positive values of 𝛼 produce indices that 
are sensitive to downward movements, while negative 𝛼’s produce indices that are sensitive 
to upward movements. The limiting forms for the cases where 𝛼 = 0 and 𝛼 = 1 are, 
respectively: 
 

























⁄ )𝑛𝑖=1                 (6.12) 
 
Since we are employing an ordinal measure of health, proportions are used to define 
status:43 
 





∑ 𝐼(𝑥𝑘𝑗 ≤ 𝑥)
𝑛
𝑗=1  is the empirical distribution function of individual health 
in periods k=1, 2, and I(.) is an indicator function equal to 1 if its argument is true and equal 
to 0 otherwise. Percentile bootstrap with 1,000 replications is also used to calculate 
confidence intervals.  
 
6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Inequality in Health  
Figures 6.2 and 6.3 show the results of the Cowell and Flachaire inequality index 
(equations 6.3 and 6.4), using both the downward and upward looking definitions of status. 
In both cases, the point estimates suggest that health inequality increased between 2002 and 
2009, but this change is only statistically significant when the upward looking definition is 
                                                 
43 In other contexts (e.g. analyses of income mobility), different status concepts may be derived from a given 
data and the class of mobility measures 𝑀𝛼  can be calculated for each status concept. Therefore, equations 3 
to 5 can be actually considered a “superclass” of mobility measures (Cowell and Flachaire 2011). 
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used. If we hold constant the definition of status, the conclusion is the same for different 
values of the sensitivity parameter 𝛼. Therefore, only the adoption of different status 
definitions affects the conclusions.  
  
Figure 6.2. Health inequality during the public insurance expansion in Mexico. 
Downward looking status (balanced sample, weighted estimates) 
 
Notes: Inequality is measured with the Cowell and Flachaire inequality index; the dotted lines represent 95 
per cent confidence intervals estimated using bootstrap with 1,000 replications. The balanced sample includes 
the respondents who participated in all three waves of the MxFLS and have complete SAH information 
(proxy information considered); n=15,088. 
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Figure 6.3. Health inequality during the public insurance expansion in Mexico. 
Upward looking status (balanced sample, weighted estimates) 
 
Notes: Inequality is measured with the Cowell and Flachaire inequality index; the dotted lines represent 95 
per cent confidence intervals estimated using bootstrap with 1,000 replications. The balanced sample includes 
the respondents who participated in all three waves of the MxFLS and have complete SAH information 
(proxy information considered); n=15,088. 
Source: Own estimates based on the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS). 
 
 Table 6.3 further analyses health inequality among population subgroups holding 
the sensitivity parameter at ⍺ = 0. As explained above (section 6.3.1), this is to account for 
the possibility that different groups of the population consider different cut point levels 
when reporting SAH, but also to assess whether inequality patterns vary among these 
population groups. The results obtained are similar to the results for the total population. If 
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across both rural and urban areas, males and females, and cohorts, but increasing if the 
upward looking version is considered. The only group for which the increase is not 
statistically significant even if the upward looking status definition is used is the older 
cohort.  
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Table 6.3. Health inequality during the public insurance expansion in Mexico by baseline characteristics. Balanced sample, 
weighted estimates  
(sensitivity parameter 𝛼 = 0) 
  
Downward looking status   Upward looking status   
2002 2005 2009   2002 2005 2009 n 
Total  0.492 0.503 0.504   0.474 0.497 0.513 15,088 
[0.479, 0.505] [0.490, 0.515] [0.491, 0.516]   [0.461, 0.485] [0.484, 0.508] [0.502, 0.524]   
Area of residence                             
  
Urban 0.485 0.504 0.507   0.471 0.499 0.514 7,934 
[0.469, 0.500] [0.487, 0.519] [0.492, 0.523]   [0.455, 0.486] [0.484, 0.513] [0.501, 0.527]   
Rural  0.497 0.499 0.492   0.473 0.485 0.505 7,154 
[0.481,  0.512] [0.483, 0.514] [0.476, 0.509]   [0.458, 0.487] [0.470, 0.499] [0.491, 0.518]   
Sex                               
  
Male 0.489 0.500 0.510   0.466 0.485 0.511 6,790 
[0.469, 0.506] [0.482, 0.517] [0.490, 0.527]   [0.446, 0.483] [0.467, 0.501] [0.494, 0.527]   
Female 0.490 0.501 0.497   0.477 0.502 0.511 8,298 
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(continues) Table 6.3. Health inequality during the public insurance expansion in Mexico by baseline characteristics. Balanced 
sample, weighted estimates  
(sensitivity parameter 𝛼 = 0) 
Age                             
  
15-30 years 0.452 0.481 0.487   0.439 0.462 0.485 5,913 
  [0.430, 0.470] [0.461, 0.502] [0.467, 0.507]   [0.417, 0.460] [0.442, 0.481] [0.464, 0.503]   
31-45 years 0.474 0.483 0.470   0.465 0.497 0.508 4,597 
  [0.448, 0.496] [0.458, 0.505] [0.442, 0.494]   [0.442, 0.486] [0.474, 0.516] [0.490, 0.527]   
46+ years  0.500 0.491 0.496   0.493 0.496 0.503 4,578 
  [0.475, 0.524] [0.465, 0.514] [0.470, 0.521]   [0.472, 0.512] [0.474, 0.514] [0.482, 0.521]   
Notes: Inequality is measured with the Cowell and Flachaire inequality index; 95 per cent confidence intervals, estimated using bootstrap with 1,000 replications, 
are in brackets. The balanced sample includes the respondents who participated in all three waves of the MxFLS and have complete SAH information (proxy 
information considered). 
Source: Own estimates based on the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS). 
  147 
6.4.2 Mobility in Health  
The results presented so far indicate that the distribution of health remained stable in 
Mexico during the past decade, or probably worsen (became more unequal) according to 
one of the definitions of status employed. Now we exploit individual changes in health 
between points of time to analyse mobility. In particular, we are interested in the extent to 
which health status in the previous period affects the distribution of health in the current 
period.  
 Figure 6.4 shows the distribution of SAH at wave 2 (or 3) by SAH at wave 1 (or 2). 
It seems clear that it is more likely to stay in the same state than to transition to another, 
especially if we look at the extreme categories. Those with very good health at wave 1, for 
example, are more likely to have very good health at wave 2. Similarly, those with very bad 
health at wave 2 are more likely to have very bad health at wave 3. The transition matrices 
in Table 6.4 present an alternative way of analysing this. The rows indicate health in the 
previous period, t-1 (or t-2 in the case of panel C), while the columns indicate health in the 
current period, t. In general, the larger percentages are located in the diagonal or close to 
the diagonal, which is also an indicator of persistence in health. Additionally, we can see 
that the values in the diagonal that correspond to lower categories of health increased, but 
those that correspond to upper categories decreased. This suggests that overall mobility was 
likely stable.  
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Figure 6.4. Self-assessed health at wave t by self-assessed health at wave t-1 
 
Notes: Unweighted percentages using the balanced panel (respondents who participated in all three waves of the MxFLS and have complete SAH information);  
n=15,088. 
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Table 6.4. Transition matrices, self-assessed health in Mexico   
Panel A. Self-assessed health at wave 2 by self-assessed health at wave 1 
    2005 
    Very bad Bad Regular Good Very good n 
2002 
Very bad 0% 29% 50% 19% 2% 58 
Bad 1% 17% 54% 26% 2% 784 
Regular 0% 5% 51% 40% 4% 6,755 
Good 0% 2% 32% 58% 8% 6,887 
Very good 0% 1% 21% 61% 18% 604 
n 32 631 6,210 7,251 964 15,088 
Panel B. Self-assessed health at wave 3 by self-assessed health at wave 2 
    2009 
    Very bad Bad Regular Good Very good n 
2005 
Very bad 6% 25% 56% 13% 0% 32 
Bad 4% 23% 53% 19% 2% 631 
Regular 1% 7% 58% 31% 3% 6,210 
Good 0% 3% 37% 51% 9% 7,251 
Very good 0% 2% 28% 55% 14% 964 
n 104 825 6,896 6,260 1,003 15,088 
Panel C. Self-assessed health at wave 3 by self-assessed health at wave 1 
    2009 
    Very bad Bad Regular Good Very good n 
2002 
Very bad 10% 19% 50% 19% 2% 58 
Bad 3% 23% 55% 18% 2% 784 
Regular 1% 6% 57% 32% 4% 6,755 
Good 0% 3% 36% 52% 9% 6,887 
Very good 1% 1% 24% 54% 19% 604 
n 104 825 6,896 6,260 1,003 15,088 
Notes: Unweighted percentages using the balanced panel (respondents who participated in all three waves of 
the MxFLS and have complete SAH information); n=15,088. 
Source: Own estimates based on the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS). 
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 Figure 6.5 better depicts the behaviour of mobility in health over the period studied. 
While the point estimate of the Cowell-Flachaire mobility index (equations 10 to 12) 
indicates a decrease in mobility, the change is not statistically significant. This result holds 
for different values of the sensitivity parameter 𝛼.   
 
Figure 6.5. Mobility in health during the health insurance expansion in Mexico 
(balanced panel, weighted estimates) 
 
Note: Mobility is measured with the Cowell and Flachaire mobility index; 95 per cent confidence intervals, 
estimated using bootstrap with 1,000 replications, are in brackets. The balanced sample includes the 
respondents who participated in all three waves of the MxFLS and have complete SAH information (proxy 
information considered); n=15,088. 
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6.4.3 Robustness Checks 
This section examines whether some of the assumptions underlying the results in the 
previous section are likely fulfilled. In particular, we have a better look at the potential 
effects of non-response and the choice of the inequality measure.    
 
Reconsidering non-response 
To assess whether attrition may be biasing inequality estimates, we recalculated the Cowell 
and Flachaire index using the unbalanced sample. Table 6.5 shows that these estimates are 
consistent with the main results discussed above.44 In sum, they suggest that health 
inequality increased between 2002 and 2009, although the changes are only statistically 
significant if the upward-looking status concept is adopted. This conclusion holds, 
however, for negative and positive values of the parameter 𝛼. 
                                                 
44 The sample used to estimate the weighted figures for waves 2 and 3 is slightly lower as some individuals 
have no weights assigned in the survey databases. While there is no clear explanation, the consistency of the 
unweighted results using the same sample suggests that the impact of these missing weights is negligible.    
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Table 6.5. Health inequality during the public insurance expansion in Mexico. Unbalanced sample, weighted and unweighted 
estimates 
  ⍺ 2002 2005 2009   2002 2005 2009 
    (n = 21,610) (n = 18,194) (n = 17,572)   (n = 21,610) (n = 19,091) (n = 17,635) 
    weighted results   unweighted results 
Panel A. Downward looking status                     
  -0.5 0.572 0.580 0.574   0.573 0.573 0.582 
  [0.561, 0.582] [0.566, 0.591] [0.561, 0.585]   [0.567, 0.578] [0.566, 0.579] [0.576, 0.588] 
                              
  0 0.506 0.516 0.512   0.510 0.512 0.519 
    [0.496, 0.517] [0.505, 0.526] [0.498, 0.525]   [0.505, 0.514] [0.507, 0.516] [0.513, 0.524] 
                              
  0.5 0.740 0.756 0.756   0.744 0.750 0.762 
    [0.725, 0.756] [0.740, 0.772] [0.733, 0.774]   [0.739, 0.749] [0.745, 0.755] [0.756, 0.767] 
                              
Panel B. Upward looking status                       
  -0.5 0.492 0.505 0.519   0.492 0.494 0.518 
  [0.484, 0.501] [0.497, 0.512] [0.509, 0.529]   [0.488, 0.496] [0.491, 0.498] [0.515, 0.521] 
                              
  0 0.483 0.502 0.514   0.483 0.491 0.514 
    [0.473, 0.493] [0.492, 0.510] [0.503, 0.525]   [0.479, 0.487] [0.487, 0.496] [0.510, 0.518] 
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(continues) Table 6.5. Health inequality during public insurance expansion in Mexico. Unbalanced sample; weighted and 
unweighted estimates 
  0.5 0.729 0.752 0.764   0.730 0.740 0.766 
    [0.713, 0.744] [0.737, 0.768] [0.745, 0.781]   [0.725, 0.735] [0.733, 0.745] [0.760, 0.771] 
Notes: Inequality is measured with the Cowell and Flachaire inequality index; 95 per cent confidence intervals, estimated using bootstrap with 1,000 replications, 
are in brackets. The unbalanced sample includes the respondents who participated in any of the three waves of the MxFLS (except for new entrants at wave 2 and 
3) and have complete SAH information (proxy information considered). 
Source: Own estimates based on the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS). 
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 In addition, we recalculated the Cowell and Flachaire index for the balanced sample 
without weights. While the results are again similar, these estimates provide stronger 
evidence of an increase in health inequality between 2002 and 2009, as this change is not 
only statistically significant for the upward looking definition of status, but also for the 
downward looking definition (Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.7). The unweighted estimates of 
health mobility, on the other hand, confirm that it remained stable over the period studied. 
To facilitate the comparison, the first two columns of Table 6.6 show the weighted 
estimates of mobility that correspond to Figure 6.5 above, while the last two columns show 
the unweighted estimates.  
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Figure 6.6. Health inequality during the public insurance expansion in Mexico. 
Downward looking status (balanced sample, unweighted estimates) 
 
Notes: Inequality is measured with the Cowell and Flachaire inequality index; the dotted lines represent 95 
per cent confidence intervals estimated using bootstrap with 1,000 replications. The balanced sample includes 
the respondents who participated in all three waves of the MxFLS and have complete SAH information 
(proxy information considered); n=15,088. 
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Figure 6.7. Health inequality during the public insurance expansion in Mexico. 
Upward looking status (balanced sample, unweighted estimates) 
 
Notes: Inequality is measured with the Cowell and Flachaire inequality index; the dotted lines represent 95 
per cent confidence intervals estimated using bootstrap with 1000 replications. The balanced sample includes 
the respondents who participated in all 3 waves of the MxFLS and have complete SAH information (proxy 
information considered); n=15,088. 
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Table 6.6. Health mobility during the public insurance expansion in Mexico. Balanced 
sample, weighted and unweighted estimates 
⍺ 2002-2005 2005-2009 2002-2005 2005-2009 
weighted results unweighted results 
-0.5 0.227 0.214 0.236 0.221 
  [0.211, 0.243] [0.198, 0.229] [0.224, 0.247] [0.211, 0.232] 
                  
0 0.164 0.155 0.171 0.162 
  [0.156,  0.172] [0.148, 0.163] [0.166,  0.175] [0.158, 0.167] 
                  
0.5 0.150 0.143 0.155 0.152 
  [0.143, 0.157] [0.138, 0.150] [0.151, 0.159] [0.148, 0.156] 
                
1 0.163 0.160 0.167 0.170 
  [0.156, 0.171] [0.153, 0168] [0.163, 0.172] [0.164, 0.175] 
Notes: Mobility is measured with the Cowell and Flachaire mobility index. 95 per cent confidence intervals 
estimated using bootstrap with 1,000 replications are in brackets. The balanced sample includes the 
respondents who participated in all three waves of the MxFLS and have complete SAH information (proxy 
information considered); n=15,088. 
Source: Own estimates based on the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS). 
 
 As noted before, proxy information of SAH was considered to avoid missing a large 
number of observations due to item non-response. If the individuals with proxy 
information, however, are systematically different from the rest of the sample, the results 
would be biased. The indices were therefore recalculated using only the information 
directly reported by the individuals. Table 6.7 shows that the magnitude of these estimates 
is only slightly lower, but the pattern is the same. If we use the downward looking 
definition of status, no significant change is found between 2002 and 2009, but if we use 
the upward looking definition the increase in health inequality is statistically significant.  
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Table 6.7. Health inequality during the public insurance expansion in Mexico. 
Balanced sample with no proxy SAH information, weighted estimates 
    2002 2005 2009 
Panel A. Downward looking status       
  ⍺=0 0.483 0.499 0.491 
    [0.468, 0.497] [0.485, 0.511] [0.475, 0.505] 
                
Panel B. Upward looking status         
  ⍺=0 0.471 0.500 0.511 
    [0.457, 0.485] [0.488, 0.512] [0.499, 0.522] 
Notes: Inequality is measured with the Cowell and Flachaire inequality index; 95 per cent confidence 
intervals, estimated using bootstrap with 1,000 replications, are in brackets. The balanced sample includes the 
respondents who participated in all three waves of the MxFLS and have complete SAH information (no proxy 
responses are considered for these estimates); n=11,897.  
Source: Own estimates based on the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS). 
  
 Since attrition does not seem to affect the conclusions, we conducted a final test 
focused on item non-response. As mentioned above, imputation methods are widely used to 
deal with this type of non-response.45 Survey administrators of the British Household Panel 
Survey, for example, use hot-deck imputation and predictive mean matching, depending on 
the nature of the variable that is being imputed (Jenkins 2011). But many different 
approaches are available. Here we use multiple imputation to account for uncertainty in the 
imputation strategy (Rubin 1987). In particular, we use multivariate imputation with 
chained equations (MICE) to take advantage of any SAH information available for 
individuals with missing values for some waves. This imputation method basically imputes 
                                                 
45 Imputation methods can also be applied to replace the missing values caused by attrition (see an application 
of imputation methods to deal with attrition in health surveys in Härkänen et al. 2016). As other simpler tests 
described above suggest that the effect of attrition is negligible in this case, however, we only use imputation 
to replace missing values of SAH for those who participated in all the three waves of the MxFLS.   
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multiple variables iteratively through a sequence of univariate imputation models, with 
fully conditional specifications of prediction equations (i.e., all the variables except the one 
being imputed are included in a prediction equation). The model specified for the univariate 
imputation was an ordered logistic regression, with sex, age group, area and region of 
residence, marital status, education, household size, and participation in the labour market 
as independent variables.46  
 The sample for the imputed exercise include all the individuals who participated in 
all three waves of the MxFLS (n = 19,971; see Table 6.1 above); proxy information was 
ignored, i.e., SAH responses provided by proxy informants were also treated as missing 
values. Since we also used percentile bootstrap with 1,000 replications to calculate 
confidence intervals, the number of imputations was set to five to simplify the computation 
procedure.47 This implies that we estimated the inequality index for all five imputed 
datasets generated for each bootstrap sample. The estimated values of the index for each 
bootstrap sample were combined using Rubin’s rule (Rubin 1987), which basically 
amounts to calculating an average. Table 6.8 shows that the results obtained for the 
parameter 𝛼=0 are similar to those presented above. An increase if health inequality 
between 2002 and 2009 is noted, although the increase is statistically significant for both 
the downward and upward looking definition of status.  
  
                                                 
46 Some of the independent variables had incomplete information for 75 individuals of the balanced panel 
(less than 0.5 per cent). These observations were excluded from the analyses. 
47 According to Schafer (1999) there is normally no practical benefit to using more than five imputations. 
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Table 6.8. Health inequality in Mexico. Balanced sample with multiple imputation of 
SAH, unweighted estimates 
    2002 2005 2009 
Panel A. Downward looking status       
  ⍺=0 0.498 0.506 0.512 
    [0.494, 0.504] [0.501, 0.512] [0.506, 0.519] 
                
Panel B. Upward looking status         
  ⍺=0 0.477 0.492 0.515 
    [0.473, 0.481] [0.487, 0.500] [0.510, 0.521] 
Notes: Inequality is measured with the Cowell and Flachaire inequality index; 95 per cent confidence 
intervals, estimated using bootstrap with 1,000 replications, are in brackets. The balanced sample includes the 
respondents who participated in all three waves of the MxFLS; n=19,896. Missing information of SAH was 
imputed.  
Source: Own estimates based on the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS). 
 
Measuring inequality with the Generalised Entropy index 
Although the Generalised Entropy measures (𝐺𝐸𝛼) are suitable for cardinal variables, in 
this section we assess whether the results obtained using this indicator substantially vary 
from the results obtained using the Cowell and Flachaire index. The 𝐺𝐸𝛼 index was 
calculated using equations 6.5 to 6.7 above with the status of individual i, 𝑠𝑖, simply 
indicated by the category number of SAH (1 for very bad SAH, 2 for bad SAH, and so on).  
 Table 6.9 shows that the Generalised Entropy estimates are consistent with those 
obtained using the upward looking definition of status. For 𝛼=-1,0,1, this measure indicates 
that inequality in health increased over the period studied. These results hold for the 
balanced and unbalanced panel, with or without weights, except for some alphas for the 
weighted figures where the change between 2002 and 2009 is not statistically significant.  
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 Costa and Cowell (2016) had previously analysed the correlation between health 
inequality rankings across 70 countries using both the Cowell and Flachaire index (with the 
downward and upward looking definitions of status) and the GE index for different values 
of the sensitivity parameter 𝛼. Their results indicate that both measures resulted in similar 
patterns of inequality across countries only for the extreme case of 𝛼 = 0.99. This analysis, 
however, shows that both indices can give more consistent results for the analyses of 
within-country inequality patterns.  
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Table 6.9. Health inequality in Mexico using the Generalised Entropy Index 
  ⍺ 2002 2005 2009   2002 2005 2009 
    weighted results   unweighted results 
Panel A. Balanced panel                       
  -1 0.024 0.023 0.026   0.024 0.022 0.028 
  [0.022, 0.025] [0.022, 0.025] [0.025, 0.028]   [0.023, 0.025] [0.021, 0.023] [0.027, 0.029] 
                              
  0 0.021 0.021 0.023   0.021 0.020 0.025 
    [0.020, 0.022] [0.020, 0.022] [0.022, 0.024]   [0.020, 0.022] [0.020, 0.021] [0.024, 0.026] 
                              
  1 0.019 0.020 0.022   0.020 0.019 0.023 
    [0.019, 0.020] [0.019, 0.021] [0.021, 0.023]   [0.019, 0.020] [0.019, 0.020] [0.022, 0.024] 
 n 
 
15,088 15,088 15,088   15,088 15,088 15,088 
                              
Panel B. Unbalanced panel                       
  -1 0.025 0.026 0.027   0.025 0.024 0.028 
  [0.024, 0.027] [0.024, 0.028] [0.026, 0.029]   [0.024, 0.026] [0.023, 0.025] [0.027, 0.030] 
                              
  0 0.022 0.023 0.024   0.022 0.022 0.025 
    [0.021, 0.023] [0.022, 0.024] [0.023, 0.025]   [0.022, 0.023] [0.021, 0.022] [0.024, 0.026] 
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(continues) Table 6.9. Health inequality in Mexico using the Generalised Entropy Index 
  1 0.021 0.021 0.022   0.021 0.020 0.023 
    [0.020, 0.021] [0.019, 0.021] [0.022, 0.023]   [0.020, 0.021] [0.020, 0.021] [0.022, 0.023] 
 n 
 
21,610 18,194 17,572   21,610 19,091 17,635 
Notes: 95 per cent confidence intervals, estimated using bootstrap with 1,000 replications, are in brackets. The balanced sample (panel A) includes the 
respondents who participated in all three waves of the MxFLS and have complete SAH information (proxy information considered); the unbalanced sample 
(panel B) includes the respondents who participated in any of the three waves of the MxFLS (except for new entrants at wave 2 and 3) and have complete SAH 
information. 
Source: Own estimates based on the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS).
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6.5 Discussion 
The main objective of this Chapter was to analyse the evolution of health inequalities 
in Mexico over the last decade. Instead of following the common approach that 
focuses on the concentration of health on income, we used a class of measures 
appropriate to deal with categorical indicators of SAH to analyse pure health 
inequalities. The results indicate that the distribution of health worsen in Mexico 
between 2002 and 2009, although the change is only consistent for the upward 
looking definition of status. Together with the lack of mobility in health observed, 
we can conclude that Mexico is becoming more rigid.  
 While short study periods could be expected to provide little opportunity for 
movement in general, Hauck and Rice (2004) actually found evidence of large 
mobility in mental health in the UK over the 1990s decade. In contrast, Contoyannis 
et al. (2004) found strong persistence in self-reported health status in the UK in the 
same period. Our findings are in line with the latter.  
 Teruel et al. (2012) previously analysed the effects of increased coverage 
through the Seguro Popular on perceived health status. They used data from the 
MxFLS and propensity score matching to create a suitable comparison group drawn 
from those still uninsured at the time of collection of the third wave. At baseline, 
those who gained insurance through the SP were more likely to report bad health 
than the comparison group, but the findings suggest that a 6 per cent increase in the 
probability of reporting good health among the former can be attributed to the 
programme. How can we reconcile this result with ours? While the Seguro Popular 
may helped improve SAH among beneficiaries, it seems that other factors shape the 
overall distribution of health.  
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 Unfortunately, available data for Mexico does not allow analysing the extent 
to which different economic, institutional, and environmental factors affect health 
disparities. Evidence for China suggests that income inequality is an important 
determinant of health disparities, as the highest income group has access to high 
quality health care services. In particular, Baeten et al. (2013) argue that the 
contribution of income inequality to health inequality is between 25 per cent and 30 
per cent. Wang and Yu (2016) also show that common indicators of income 
inequality such as the Gini coefficient and the Theil index are positively associated 
with health disparities. Income inequality in Mexico declined over the past decade, 
however (Esquivel 2015, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
2014a). This decline has been attributed to increases in remittances among low 
income households, and reductions in labour income and non-labour income 
(government transfers) inequalities (Esquivel 2015, Esquivel et al. 2010).  
 Costa and Cowell (2016), on the other hand, suggest that institutional 
performance, in particular, better government effectiveness is associated with health 
inequality declines. According to the Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann 
et al. 2010), government effectiveness in Mexico declined from 0.24 in 2002 to 0.17 
in 2009. Other indicators of governance such as regulatory quality, control of 
corruption, and political stability and absence of violence present much larger drops. 
Therefore, these factors could be key to explain the pattern of health disparities in 
Mexico. Additionally, lifestyle and preventive behaviour could also be drivers of 
health inequality patterns. In particular, an obesity epidemic has evolved in Mexico 
over the period of the SP implementation (e.g. Colchero and Sosa-Rubí 2012). 
 In sum, while further analysis on the potential drivers of health inequalities is 
needed, the Mexican experience suggests that insurance coverage can improve health 
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levels but may be not enough to reduce health disparities and promote health 
mobility. 
  







7.1 Summary of the Findings 
The objective of this thesis has been to analyse health, financial and distributional 
aspects of an ambitious health insurance expansion that took place in Mexico during 
the past decade. These aspects are relevant to evaluate health systems in general and 
policy interventions such as the SP in particular (World Health Organization 2000), 
and can encompass lessons for similar proposals elsewhere. More specifically, this 
thesis has focused on three research questions summarised below.  
 First, I analysed whether the SP reduced infant and neonatal mortality. Most 
infant death causes such as pneumonia, measles, HIV/AIDS, and other conditions 
leading to neonatal deaths are preventable through further access to health care, 
which allows the dissemination of essential information and provides early 
identification and treatment of such conditions. Therefore, IMR and NMR are 
important indicators of the effectiveness of health services in the context of an 
insurance expansion. Theoretically, one can expect positive effects of the SP as the 
interventions included in the benefit package address the main causes of morbidity 
and mortality among infants. However, one can also think of factors that could 
reduce the potential effect of the programme such as insufficient quality and/or 
quantity of health care, ex-ante moral hazard that could reduce preventive 
behaviours, or a relatively more important role of behavioural and environmental 
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features. Indeed, conflicting evidence from previous studies that analysed other 
insurance expansions suggest that increased coverage does not necessarily result in 
health improvements. Hence, evidence from the insurance expansion can shed some 
light into the question.  
 More specifically, the findings of Chapter 4 of this thesis indicate that the SP 
led to a 3.9 per cent reduction in both IMR and NMR. Nonetheless, this effect was 
concentrated in urban, more populated, and less marginalised municipalities. As this 
type of municipalities have been traditionally better equipped and were thus better 
prepared to offer all the interventions from the benefit package, a plausible 
explanation is that persistent disparities in health care access might have influenced 
the effects of the programme. Indeed, although the SP encompassed some additional 
investment, it did not make up for the extensive infrastructural shortages across the 
Mexican territory. Hence, the effects of the programme tend to concentrate in areas 
where such infrastructure is in place. These results indicate that insurance expansion 
alone does not suffice to improve health; it needs to be accompanied with basic 
investments and more generally a reduction in barriers to access to health inputs. 
 Second, I analysed whether public health insurance modified the capacity of 
Mexican households to smooth consumption after severe health shocks. That is, I 
attempted to identify the contribution of public health insurance in the form of social 
security and, more recently, the Seguro Popular programme. The evidence on the 
welfare consequences of health shocks for LMIC is scarce. The first studies on the 
question conducted in the 1990s suggested that households were indeed able to 
maintain their consumption levels in the occurrence of unexpected health events, but 
more recent studies found that households could not avert large consumption drops. 
In principle, the implementation of the SP was expected to exert a protective effect 
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on financial wellbeing in the event of health shocks, as previous studies had found 
that the programme reduced medical expenditures. But health shocks may also 
reduce the household’s ability to generate income and the SP does not provide 
coverage for that non-health specific risk. Chapter 5 shows that unexpected health 
events such as accidents and the deterioration in physical capacity are associated 
with large declines in non-medical consumption. Social security seems to provide 
protection against both types of shocks, but the endogeneity-corrected estimates 
indicate that the SP only protects consumption against one specific type of shock: 
accidents. Therefore, income losses associated with disability shocks, for which the 
programme does not offer protection, are likely larger than medical care 
expenditures. Consistent with this finding, we observed that reduced ability to 
perform ADLs among more important income earners lead to larger consumption 
drops. These results are indicative of the limited consumption smoothing effects of 
public health insurance programmes, since alternative risks that remain uninsured 
will likely continue exerting effects on consumption. 
 Finally, given that health insurance expansions can influence access to health 
care, it is important to understand the effects beyond overall health outcomes, and 
more specifically, to focus on the distribution of such outcomes across the 
population. Hence, I analysed whether the patterns of health inequality and mobility 
changed over the period in which the SP coverage was progressively extended. As 
mentioned above, the effect of insurance coverage on health outcomes is debated, but 
the effect on perceived health status is clearer according to recent evidence 
(Finkelstein et al. 2012). In particular, a previous study found that the SP increased 
the probability of reporting good health by 6 per cent (Teruel et al. 2012). Little is 
known about the potential effect on the distribution of health, however. On the other 
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hand, the analysis of health inequality has largely focused on income-related health 
inequalities, which raises some conceptual and methodological concerns. Chapter 6 
addressed these concerns by using two recently developed indices to analyse pure 
health inequality and mobility in Mexico. The results indicate that health inequality 
increased during the past decade, although the change is only statistically significant 
if an upward-looking definition of status is adopted. At the same time, no changes in 
mobility in health were observed. Hence, these results are suggestive of the limited 
effects that health insurance expansions have on reducing health disparities. Indeed, 
health inequality and mobility likely depend on a myriad of factors beyond health 
care such as lifestyle, government effectiveness, and absence of violence, among 
many others. Specifically, Mexico has been subject to an obesity epidemic in the 
period (e.g. Colchero and Sosa-Rubí 2012), which has affected more deprived 
population groups that might have benefited from the SP. Additionally, different 
indicators of governance that could also be key determinants of health disparities 
present important reductions over the period of the SP expansion (Kaufmann et al. 
2010). Consequently, alternative underlying factors might be driving health 
inequality patterns instead. 
 
7.2 Limitations and Further Research 
The results of this thesis are not without important limitations. Below I highlight 
those that I consider more salient and suggest some directions to extend our 
understanding of the effects of the Mexican insurance expansion.  
 The main limitation of the infant mortality analysis is that similar data were 
not available to further explore the specific channels through which the SP 
contributed to the reduction of infant deaths in Mexico. Hospital registries cover a 
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limited number of municipalities, but information on other levels of attention could 
be probably useful if made available. Also, since child health is related to later life 
outcomes (Currie and Cole 1993, Behrman and Rosenzweig 2004), it would be 
interesting to explore the impact of the SP on long-term health. 
 The second analysis showed that the SP seems to be protecting households 
against the risk of catastrophic health expenditures in the event of health shocks. 
However, the results also suggested that the protection provided by the SP is 
incomplete, especially in cases were households’ ability to generate income is 
significantly affected. Future studies should investigate in more detail the 
consequences of different health shocks to shed light on the relative importance of 
the associated risks. Further analysis on the social security component that protects 
against the risk of income losses could also be relevant to inform about the welfare 
gains of such insurance.  
 The third analysis showed that the implementation of the SP was not 
associated with reductions in health inequality, neither with improvements in health 
mobility. This does not imply, however, that the SP had no effect on the distribution 
of health, but rather that factors outside the health system may have played a more 
important role as previous studies suggest (Wang and Yu 2016, Costa and Cowell 
2016). Unfortunately, the longitudinal survey employed in the analysis was not 
suitable to further analyse the contribution of institutional, socioeconomic, and other 
factors to the shape of the health distribution; future studies should certainly move in 
this direction.    
 Finally, while the results of this thesis together with previous findings suggest 
that the SP has improved financial protection and overall levels of health, other 
studies have raised concerns about its effects on the labour market (Knaul et al. 
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2012). Although most studies had found small or not significant effects of the SP on 
formal employment (e.g., Azuara and Marinescu 2013, Campos and Knox 2013), 
Bosch and Campos (2014) more recently showed that between 4 to 5 per cent 
additional formal positions would have been created in the absence of the 
programme. Future studies should therefore evaluate the welfare effects of the 
programme as a whole. 
 
7.3 Policy Implications and Recommendations 
The IMR is an important indicator of social development, as it reflects the 
availability, access, and utilisation of health services. Indeed, one of the eight 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) agreed in 2000 was the reduction of child 
deaths, most of which occur during the first year of life. The Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
adopted in 2015, also include the reduction of preventable deaths of newborns and 
children under five years. During the 1990s, the IMR in Mexico already exhibited a 
downward trend associated to the implementation of highly cost-effective 
interventions for the general population —such as massive vaccination campaigns—, 
and some targeted interventions —such as the health component of the PROSPERA 
programme. It was not clear, however, whether this trend could be sustained without 
further improvements in health access. 
 Between 2000 and 2011, the IMR fell from 15.4 to 12.7 infant deaths per 
1,000 live births. Similarly, the NMR fell from 9.4 to 8.0 neonatal deaths per 1,000 
live births. Chapter 4 indicates that this reduction was at least in part associated to 
the implementation of the SP. As more countries are in the quest for universal 
coverage and interventions to fulfil the infant mortality target of the SDGs are being 
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implemented, the SP experience can be enlightening, in particular for countries in 
similar stages of the epidemiological transition. Nonetheless, the observed 
heterogeneity in the effects deserves special attention. This is not the first analysis 
that suggests that the SP effects have been stronger in areas with better supply of 
health professionals and infrastructure. Bleich et al. (2007) and Grogger et al. (2015) 
also reach a similar conclusion when analysing the effect of the SP on blood control 
and catastrophic spending, respectively. Therefore, the Mexican government should 
focus on the reduction of persistent gaps in health supply across the country and 
between health care providers.  
  While Chapter 5 shows that the SP has protected households against the risk 
of impoverishing medical expenditures, it also shows that unexpected health events 
entail other risks for which only social security beneficiaries are protected. 
Moreover, it shows that an important share of the population was still uninsured at 
the beginning of this decade. This situation reveals a deep problem: marked 
difference in access to social protection persist. At the beginning of the current 
administration, large debates on the reforms that the country required took place. 
One of these debates involved the necessity to reform the system for social 
protection to establish a minimum level of wellbeing for the entire population 
(Chávez et al. 2012). This included guaranteeing a minimum income, health 
insurance, life and disability insurance, and a minimum pension. The convergence of 
all public health care providers was an important component too. The fiscal reform 
that was also envisioned would provide the resources to fulfil that objective. But 
almost six years later only a mild fiscal reform was approved, and the system for 
social protection has been practically unaltered. To overcome institutional 
fragmentation, persistent differences in the quality of services and coverage, 
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duplication of programmes, among other problems, but especially to guarantee 
access to social protection as a civil right independent of work status, the Mexican 
government should focus on this long-postponed reform of the system for social 
protection.    
 Lastly, Chapter 6 shows that overall improvements in health measured as 
individual’s perceived health (or IMR as in Chapter 4) do not necessarily imply 
improvements in the distribution of health. Further studies to understand the causes 
of health disparities are certainly required, but if policy makers are indeed interested 
in the distribution rather than just overall levels of health, a first step is to start 
monitoring health inequality using measures such as those introduced in this thesis. 
While international organisations such as the WHO and the OECD normally include 
Mexico in their endeavour to monitor inequality in health (e.g World Health 
Organization 2000; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
2014b, 2015), there is no clear initiative at the local level. For example, the National 
Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy (Consejo Nacional de 
Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social, CONEVAL) —the institution in 
charge of poverty measurement and other activities oriented towards the achievement 
of social development objectives—, currently estimates some inequality indicators, 
but these only include the Gini coefficient and two inter-decile ratios to measure 
income disparities. Furthermore, there is limited coordination between public health 
and health care system initiatives, which can explain why measures of health equity 
do not show major shifts since the introduction of the SP. 
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Appendix. Mexican municipalities created in 1990-2016 
State Municipality of origin New municipality Date of 
creation 
Aguascalientes Aguascalientes El Llano 01/03/92 
Aguascalientes Aguascalientes San Francisco de los Romo 01/03/92 
Baja California Tijuana Playas de Rosarito 21/07/95 
Baja California Sur Comondú Loreto 20/08/92 
Guerrero Zapotitlán Tablas Acatepec 23/03/93 
México Chalco Valle de Chalco Solidaridad 09/11/94 
México Ixtapaluca 
México La Paz 
México Chicoloapan 
Quintana Roo Cozumel Solidaridad 28/07/93 
San Luis Potosí Tamazunchale Matlapa 02/12/94 
San Luis Potosí Ciudad del Maíz El Naranjo 02/12/94 
Tlaxcala Sanctorum de Lázaro 
Cárdenas 
Benito Juárez 09/10/95 
Tlaxcala Terrenate Emiliano Zapata 27/09/95 
Tlaxcala Terrenate Lázaro Cárdenas 27/09/95 
Tlaxcala Chiautempan La Magdalena Tlaltelulco 18/08/95 
Tlaxcala Tepeyanco 
Tlaxcala Tetlatlauca San Damián Texoloc 27/09/95 
Tlaxcala Chiautempan San Francisco Tetlanohcan 18/08/95 
Tlaxcala Tetaltlahuca San Jerónimo Zacualpan 27/09/95 
Tlaxcala Tzompantepec San José Teacalco 18/08/95 
Tlaxcala Tepeyanco San Juan Huactzinco 11/08/95 
Tlaxcala Zacatelco San Lorenzo Axocomanitla 02/10/95 
Tlaxcala Xaltocan San Lucas Tecopilco 02/10/95 
Tlaxcala Ixtacuixtla de Mariano 
Matamoros 
Santa Ana Nopalucan 02/10/95 
Tlaxcala Nativitas Santa Apolonia Teacalco 09/08/95 
Tlaxcala Zacatelco Santa Catarina Ayometla 15/08/95 
Tlaxcala Acuamanala de Miguel 
Hidalgo 
Santa Cruz Quilehtla 11/08/95 
Tlaxcala Tepeyanco Santa Isable Xiloxoxtla 15/08/95 
Campeche Champotón Calakmul 31/12/96 
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Campeche Hopelchen 
Campeche Carmen Candelaria 19/06/98 
Campeche Champotón 
Campeche Escárcega 
Chiapas Chenalho Aldama 16/07/99 
Chiapas Ocosingo Benemérito de las Américas 16/07/99 
Chiapas Las Margaritas Maravilla Tenejapa 16/07/99 
Chiapas Ocosingo Marques de Comillas 16/07/99 
Chiapas Ángel Albino Corzo Montecristo de Guerrero 16/07/99 
Chiapas Simojovel San Andrés Duraznal 16/07/99 
Chiapas Larrainzar Santiago del Pinar 16/07/99 
Sonora Etchojoa Benito Juárez 26/12/96 
Sonora Guaymas San Ignacio Río Muerto 26/12/96 
Veracruz Cosamaloapan de Carpio Carlos A. Carrillo 30/11/96 
Veracruz Chacaltianguis 
Veracruz Mecayapan Tatahuicapan de Juárez 20/03/97 
Veracruz Soteapan 
Veracruz Minatitlán Uxpanapa 30/01/97, 
17/05/97 Veracruz Jesús Carranza 
Veracruz Hidalgotitlán 
Veracruz Las Choapas 
Zacatecas Guadalupe Trancoso 17/11/99 
Guerrero Cuajinicuilapa Marquelia 11/12/01 
Guerrero Azoyú 
México San Felipe del Progreso San José del Rincón 01/01/02 
México Tejupilco Luvianos 01/01/02 
Guerrero Atlixtac José Joaquín de Herrera 10/12/02 
Guerrero Chilapa de Álvarez 
Guerrero Metlatónoc Cochoapa el Grande 10/12/02 
Guerrero Tlacoachistlahuaca 
México Jaltenco Tonanitla 03/12/03 
Veracruz Playa Vicente Santiago Sochiapan 29/12/03 
Veracruz Tecolutla San Rafael 29/12/03 
Veracruz Martínez de la Torre 
Zacatecas Benito Juárez Santa María de la Paz 17/11/04 
Zacatecas Juchipila 
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Guerrero Marquelia Juchitán 07/06/05 
Guerrero Cuajinicuilapa 
Guerrero Azoyú 
Guerrero Malinaltepec Iliatenco 25/11/05 
Guerrero San Luis Acatlán 
Jalisco Arandas San Ignacio Cerro Gordo 31/07/06 
Quintana Roo Solidaridad Tulum 10/05/08 
Quintana Roo Othón P. Blanco Bacalar 17/02/11 
Note: The new municipalities that were segregated from more than one municipality are in italics. 
Source: Information publicly available on the website of the National Institute of Statistics and 
Geography (INEGI). 
